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ABSTRACT: ESSAYS ON COMPETITION IN E-MARKETS 
Electronic markets (e-markets) are an increasingly important platform for retail 
commerce. Costs of obtaining and processing information shape competition in 
markets. Lower buyer search costs reduce sellers’ market power, but 
information asymmetries may offset this. This dissertation discusses the impacts 
of information costs on competition in retail e-markets.  
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the economics of e-commerce. Chapter 2 is 
an empirical inquiry into competition in the online music market. Chapter 3 
models the impact of lower buyer search costs on a market for a homogeneous 
good. Chapter 4 is an empirical study of how a seller’s reputation influences 
pricing in retail e-commerce. Chapter 5 presents a model of competition for the 
comparison shopping services environment. 
 
ABSTRAKTI: ESSEITÄ KILPAILUSTA E-MARKKINOILLA 
Elektroniset markkinat (e-markkinat) ovat kasvavassa määrin tärkeä alusta 
kaupankäynnille. Tiedon hankkimisen ja käsittelyn kustannukset muokkaavat 
kilpailua e-markkinoilla. Alhaiset etsintäkustannukset vähentävät myyjän 
markkinavoimaa, mutta epäsymmetrinen informaatio voi kumota tämän. Tässä 
väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan informaationkustannusten vaikutusta kilpailuun e-
markkinoilla. 
Ensimmäinen kappale on johdatus e-kaupankäynnin taloustieteeseen. 
Toinen kappale on empiirinen tutkielma kilpailusta internetin 
musiikkimarkkinalla. Kolmannessa kappaleessa mallinnetaan alentuneiden 
ostajan etsintäkustannusten vaikutusta homogeenisen hyödykkeen markkinaan. 
Neljännessä kappaleessa tutkitaan myyjän maineen ja hinnoittelun välistä 
yhteyttä e-markkinoilla. Viidennessä kappaleessa esitellään kilpailumalli 
hintavertailusivustoille. 
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1 Introduction to Economics 
of e-Commerce 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Electronic business (e-business) utilizes information and 
communication technologies to lower information costs in business 
activities. Firms seek to minimize coordination costs which motivates 
them to take advantage of electronic commerce (e-commerce) and 
electronic markets (e-markets) (Wigand 1995). E-commerce is exchange 
of goods or services through an electronic channel such as the Internet or 
the electronic data interchange (EDI). In pure e-commerce, every stage of 
a commercial transaction is conducted in the electronic channel. This 
means that the exchanged goods or services are intangible digital 
products. Usually the delivery of goods or services takes place in a 
physical channel because most goods or services are tangible. E-
commerce can take place in electronic hierarchies within a firm or an 
industry or electronic markets that connect multiple buyers and sellers.  
Any form of economic exchange depends on communication. There 
must be a way to communicate information about demand and supply 
between the parties interested in exchange of goods and services. As the 
use of information is costly, the communication technology influences 
the exchange process through information costs, such as the cost of 
obtaining information. This has implications on competition and market 
structures of e-markets as well. 
The determinants of market structure are market concentration, 
product differentiation, conditions of entry and exit and information 
(Jacobson and O’Callaghan-Andréosso 1996). In the models of 
competition that assume symmetric information, rational buyers and 
homogeneous goods, the equilibrium obtains at a single price. This price 
varies between the competitive price and the monopoly price depending 
on whether market structure is characterized by perfect competition, 
oligopoly or monopoly. When these assumptions are relaxed by allowing 
heterogeneity, the single price equilibrium may disappear. This occurs, 
 
for example, when information is costly to obtain (Stigler 1961), or when 
information is asymmetrically distributed between market incumbents 
(Akerlof 1970). As heterogeneity is often a step towards realism, price 
dispersion is a common observation in conventional markets.  
The efficiency of information processing is at the core of e-business. 
For this reason, many scholars have expected that the introduction of e-
business impacts conventional markets as well as emerging e-markets. 
With lower information costs, e-markets may become a preferred venue 
of exchange for many goods (Malone et al. 1987). Furthermore, e-markets 
are characterized by low barriers of entry which attracts more suppliers 
to adopt e-commerce (Strader and Shaw 1997). These factors alone 
suggest that competition in e-markets could be fierce, unless sellers are 
able to employ differentiation strategies to insulate themselves from 
competition. However, empirical researchers have discovered that 
competition may not be as intense in e-markets as the theory suggests, 
because price dispersion is present in the market environments where 
search costs are zero1. 
E-commerce is being conducted in business-to-business (B2B), 
business-to-consumer (B2C), consumer-to-business (C2B) and consumer-
to-consumer (C2C) e-markets 2 . In the studies presented in this 
dissertation, the attention focuses on retail electronic commerce (e-
commerce) that takes place in B2C markets. Retail e-commerce is 
becoming an increasingly important source of growth in retail sales. The 
share of e-commerce out of all retail sales is still fairly low. For example, 
the US Census Bureau (2009) estimates that retail e-commerce accounted 
for 3.2% of all retail sales in 2007. Since 2002, the average annual growth 
rate of retail e-commerce, approximately 23% a year, has surpassed 
growth rate of conventional retail at 5% a year3. As an innovation, e-
commerce is one of the major technological breakthroughs in the history 
of retailing alongside shopping cart and barcode scanner (Grewal et al. 
2004). This is hardly surprising because retailing, which requires the 
management of flows of information and goods between locations, has 
always benefited from major innovations in transportation and 
information technology (Dinlersoz and Hernández-Murillo 2004). 
                                                     
1 See Pan et al. (2004) for a review of empirical results. 
2 Perhaps C2B markets are not as common as the other three markets, but they do exist especially in 
the markets for second-hand consumer durables. 
3See US Census Bureau (2009).  
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The objective of this dissertation is to study the factors that influence 
competition in e-markets. More specifically, the impact of information 
costs of the online business environment on competition is explored in 
the following chapters. The approach is both theoretical and empirical 
using statistical and econometrical methods as well as concepts of the 
microeconomic theory.  
The outline of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1 discusses the 
economics of e-commerce. The special emphasis is laid on the influence 
of lower information costs on e-commerce transactions. This section 
reviews also the literature of electronic markets research. The research 
articles presented in Chapters 2 to 5 are the main contribution of this 
dissertation.  
Chapter 2 is an empirical inquiry into competition in the online 
music market. The results suggest that while online retail markets are not 
as competitive as expected, price matching takes place. Chapter 3 
presents a theoretical search model for the emergence of price dispersion. 
A partial equilibrium model shows that price dispersion may increase 
when search costs diminish disparately among the consumer population. 
Chapter 4 is an empirical study on returns on a seller’s reputation in 
online retail markets. The evidence shows that there are no universal 
returns on reputation. However, specific seller groups may benefit from 
their reputations. Chapter 5 proposes a model of competition for online 
comparison shopping markets where an online feedback mechanism 
provides sellers’ reputations to Bayesian buyers. The model suggests that 
reputations determine seller prices, and the seller with a better 
reputation earns higher profit. The empirical evidence provides some 
proof for the proposition of the model. 
 
 
1.2 ECONOMICS OF E-COMMERCE 
 
1.2.1 Rise of e-Business 
Despite the terms e-commerce and e-business are widely used, there 
are no universally accepted definitions for them. A narrow definition for 
e-commerce could be a commercial transaction in which a part of the 
information exchange concerning the transaction is relayed through an 
electronic channel such as an information network. A broad definition 
comprises all buying and selling, customer service, collaboration 
between business partners as well as interorganizational and 
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intraorganizational information exchange through electronic networks 
(Piris et al. 2004). Perhaps a better term for the latter definition would be 
e-business, which results from electronization of all wealth generating 
economic activities (Vasarheleyi and Greenstein 2003).   
An electronic market emerges when a market transaction is 
conducted through an electronic medium. E-markets are, therefore, 
exchanges that facilitate e-commerce. A minimum requirement for an e-
market is that some part of the transaction process is conducted through 
an electronic channel. In this case, the earliest e-market transactions were 
made in the 1800s when the telegraph was used to place buy or sell 
orders for various goods. At the other extreme, a pure e-market is a 
market where every stage of the market transaction process is conducted 
through an electronic channel. A modern day example of this (at the time 
of writing) is the i-Tunes store where buyers can purchase music in 
digital format and pay for it with a credit card.  Most e-markets fall in 
between the two extremes. Usually search and negotiation processes take 
place on the Internet while distribution relies on the physical channel. E-
commerce can be further categorized into the user-driven “first 
generation” and the automated “second generation” e-commerce 
(Vulkan 2003). In the first generation, the consumer uses the Internet to 
purchase products. In the second generation, the consumer delegates her 
online transactions to a software agent that represents the consumer in 
online markets.  
Electronization of business activities has been a gradual process with 
great advances occurring during the past two decades. Inarguably, the 
introduction of the electric telegraph jump-started this process already in 
the 19th century because much of the electric telegraph traffic was 
business-related (Bernstein 2004). However, the birth of modern e-
business required two key inventions; the personal computer (PC), 
which conquered homes and offices in the 1980s, and the Internet-
technologies, which brought in an open network for computers in the 
1990s 4 . As a result, what was initially electronic B2B information 
exchange spawned electronic markets for B2B, B2C, C2B and C2C 
commerce.    
Chu et al. (2006) identify four stages of electronization in “modern 
times”. “The pre-web era” was characterized by closed 
                                                     
4 These would not have been possible without Intel’s microprocessor (1971) and DARPA’s 
ARPANET (1969) not to mention numerous other inventions preceding and following them. 
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interorganizational information systems. The introduction of EDI 
provided a standard network environment for corporate information 
systems, but it was a closed system that was costly to run (Kenney and 
Curry 2000). At this stage, an interorganizational information system was 
a substantial investment which could create significant switching costs to 
its participants (Bakos and Treachy 1986).  
“The reactive web” phase began in the early 1990s when the open 
access Internet technologies such as the World Wide Web (WWW), the 
Universal Resource Locator (URL) and the web browser were introduced. 
Consequently, the standardized web access became available which 
enabled e-commerce for firms of all sizes (Vulkan 2003). At this stage, 
web sites became information resources and web portals provided access 
points to the Internet.  
Innovations such as cookies and cryptography ushered in “The 
interactive web” era. As a result, personalized web pages, two-way 
negotiations and secure transactions became possible. At the same time, 
the exponential growth of web traffic generated potential for retail e-
commerce. Finally, in “the integrative web era”, e-business became 
pervasive encompassing not only online trading but also the supply 
chain management. As a recent development, e-business is becoming 
ubiquitous because wireless networks, mobile phones and PDAs provide 
an access to information networks almost everywhere.  
 
1.2.2 Costs of an e-Commerce Transaction 
To gain insight on how e-business influences the market 
environment, it is useful to inspect the impact of the online environment 
on economic costs of a market transaction. In this section, we deconstruct 
an e-commerce transaction and study how e-commerce changes costs of 
transaction. 
There are two types of economic costs. First, production costs are 
direct expenses that the firm accrues when transforming inputs into 
outputs. The choice of production technology affects production costs. 
Second, transaction costs, apart from transportation costs which originate 
from physical movement between locations, are indirect by nature. 
Transaction costs arise from the exchange process. Coase’s (1938) theory 
of the firm suggests that they determine the institutional form of 
production. Markets are preferred when transaction costs are low, 
whereas the firm internalizes production when the cost of using the 
markets in production exceeds its benefits. Hence, transaction costs 
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define the boundaries of the firm. Also, high production costs favor 
production within the firm, whereas low production costs lead to a 
market-based solution (Malone et al. 1987). In e-commerce, consumers’ 
willingness to use e-markets depends on transaction costs which arise 
from uncertainty over the reliability of the e-commerce environment and 
its incumbents (Teo & Yu 2005).  
Transaction costs are essentially information costs. According to 
Williamson (1973), they are caused mainly by opportunism and bounded 
rationality. As Akerlof’s (1970) famous lemons example suggests, 
asymmetric information between the agents that engage in an exchange 
of goods makes opportunistic behavior possible5. Opportunism, in turn, 
creates motivation costs. These emerge in agent-principal situations 
where the principal’s objective is to align the agent’s interest with her 
interest. Thus, adverse selection and moral hazard result from 
opportunism.  
Bounded rationality spawns coordination costs. Coordination costs 
refer to the costs involved in information processing (Malone et al. 1987). 
These can be divided further into the costs arising from obtaining 
information (Stigler 1961), the costs arising from coordinating inputs in a 
production process (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), and the costs arising 
from measurement (Barzel 1982).  
Exchange of goods involves a set of procedures that the agent 
undertakes during a market transaction 6 . A market transaction in e-
commerce can be decomposed into four distinct stages which are search, 
negotiation, delivery and consumption. This decomposition is presented 
in Figure 1. The agent incurs several transaction costs during each stage 
of the process. 
 
 
Figure 1. E-Commerce Transaction Process 
 
 
                                                     
5 There is asymmetric information between agents when one agent is better informed than another. 
6 See Office of Technology Assessment (1994). 
SEARCH NEGOTIATION DELIVERY CONSUMPTION 
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1.2.3 Search  
At the first stage, the agent searches for an exchange partner whose 
attributes best match her preferences. Search costs dominate this stage. 
The theory of costly search was developed to explain price dispersion 
(Stigler 1961) and unemployment (McCall 1970). Search costs originate 
from locating potential trading partners and comparing their attributes, 
such as the price and quantity they are willing to supply the good. The 
agent may also resort to screening between the potential trading partners 
to avoid frauds. 
Perhaps the most profound impact of the Internet on business 
processes has been felt at the search stage. Global reach of the Internet 
and powerful search engines have brought a cornucopia of information 
available for disposal. Buyers benefit from lower information acquisition 
costs. They enable them to consider more alternatives and the quality of 
those alternatives as well as decrease the cost of selection process 
(Malone et al. 1987). Since physical movement between locations is not 
required on the Internet, search costs are dramatically lower in e-markets.  
There are several examples of how the Internet technologies reduce 
the cost of search. Search engines find information about products and 
sellers. Price comparison shopping websites (shopbots) provide a list of 
prices from various sellers for the desired product (Smith 2002; Garfinkel 
et al. 2008). Electronic marketplaces, portals and shopbots gather 
together sellers of goods and services. Quality considerations may be 
improved by electronic communities that provide important information 
about sellers and products (Kannan et al. 2000). Some marketplaces 
distribute information about products’ price histories. Moreover, 
independent rating services and reputation systems provide information 
about sellers’ past behavior (Resnick et al. 2000)7.  
While low search costs increase price transparency which is 
detrimental to sellers, they may benefit from them as well. First, sellers 
are able to communicate price information to buyers at lower costs. 
Second, consumer profiling and website customization enable to tailor 
the seller’s website’s content, such as product offerings, to match the 
targeted consumer’s preferences (Garfinkel et al. 2008). Third, reduced 
search costs enable better matching of buyers and sellers and considering 
                                                     
7 Reputation systems, in which buyers rate their experience with the seller after a transaction, have 
become commonplace in price comparison services, e-commerce marketplaces and online auctions. 
See, for example, shopping.yahoo.com, Amazon.com marketplace or eBay’s auctions. 
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more alternatives, which increases the efficiency of market transactions 
(Bakos 2001).  
On the other hand, an increase in the number of websites as well as a 
greater number of competing sellers in the market may lead to 
information overload (Grover et al. 2006). Hence, search costs may 
actually increase when the buyer filters relevant information. With many 
options available, a branded seller may be preferred, because a brand 
lowers search costs concerning the seller’s characteristics (Ba et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, Bakos (2001) suggests that if sellers control price search 
mechanisms, they should favor product information over price 
information to decrease the buyer’s price elasticity. Search obfuscation 
may even be a strategy that some sellers use to lower the buyer’s ability 
to discover price information (Baylis and Perloff 2002; Ellison and Ellison 
2004).  
 
1.2.4 Negotiation  
At the second stage, the agents negotiate over the terms of the 
exchange. This creates agency costs. Negotiating a delivery contract 
involves hazards arising from asymmetric information and opportunistic 
behavior. Therefore, motivation costs arise from specifying the contracts 
that alleviate the detrimental effects of asymmetric information. The 
processes that take place at this stage are bargaining, payment and 
verifying identities.  
Most B2C e-commerce transactions are traditional; a seller posts a 
price and a buyer either accepts or declines the offer. Negotiation costs 
are low, but verifying the seller’s credibility increases transaction costs. 
As with search costs, branding may lower negotiation costs as well 
(Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001). As an alternative to traditional retailing, 
online auctions have gained popularity especially among small 
enterprises. However, in standard and reverse auctions, the bidding 
process is time-consuming, and the outcome of an auction is uncertain. 
Thus, auctions may display significant transaction costs. A study by 
Hann and Terwiesch (2003) at a reverse auction website indicates that 
buyers are heterogeneous in their frictional costs, and these costs account 
for approximately 3% of the threshold price.   
While benefits from e-business were more tangible to buyers at the 
search stage, benefits from the negotiation stage tend to favor sellers. E-
commerce passes on most of the costs of the purchasing process to 
consumers. For instance, e-commerce requires very little staff for 
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customer service, and the consumer selects payment and delivery 
methods that are processed electronically (Borenstein and Saloner 2001). 
These lead to substantial cost savings compared to conventional retailing. 
Moreover, database-driven e-business infrastructure provides more 
options for pricing. As the buyer leaves behind information about herself 
every time she visits or purchases products at the seller’s website, this 
information can be utilized to learn the buyer’s preferences (Bakos 2001). 
For example, price discrimination based on consumer profiles is feasible 
(Acquisti and Varian 2005).  
The cost of price changes (menu costs) is lower, which enables rapid 
responses to changes in demand and experimentation with prices to 
learn price elasticities (Baye et al. 2007). This improves the seller’s 
bargaining position because the buyer’s market knowledge becomes 
obsolete at higher rate than in conventional markets (Biswas 2004). While 
pricing is potentially more flexible in e-markets, non-price competition 
may uphold rigidity in prices (Kauffman and Lee 2009). Akimoto and 
Takeda (2009) find that online sellers change prices more in the early 
stages of the product life-cycle, which suggests that new products garner 
more attention among consumers. Initially, this mandates an active 
pricing strategy, whereas the costs of price changes outweigh the benefits 
in the latter stages of the product life-cycle.     
A popular strategy that sellers use when trying to increase their sales 
at the negotiation stage is bundling. A product bundle is offered at a 
discounted price, and usually a buyer saves in shipping costs as the unit 
cost of shipping is lower for the bundle. Bundling may also deter entry 
by rivals, lower the bundler’s barrier of entry to a new market, and 
provide competitive advantage in pricing (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 2000). 
Furthermore, bundling expands markets, if adding new products to a 
bundle induces more buyers to consume the product bundle. 
Information goods are suitable for bundling because their marginal cost 
of production is close to zero. 
There are also product differentiation strategies available. 
Customization attempts to modify the product to match an individual 
buyer’s preferences (Dewan et al. 2003). Add-ons, such as a shipping 
upgrade or an extended warranty, increases the value of a transaction to 
the seller, and could lower the buyer’s price sensitivity (Ellison and 
Fisher Ellison 2005). Versioning, in which product attributes are varied 
between different versions of the product, is a method to price-
discriminate between buyers. This has been a common practice in 
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industries as diverse as the fast food to software. While versioning 
increases the seller’s profit, it also increases welfare because the buyers 
with low willingness to pay are also being served (Shapiro and Varian 
1999). 
 
1.2.5 Delivery 
At the third stage, the actual exchange of goods takes place in 
accordance to the negotiated contract. Costs arise from direct and 
indirect expenses of transportation. Processes that take place at this stage 
are organizing, coordinating and monitoring the logistics of 
transportation. Establishing the delivery involves coordination costs, 
such as the time and place of the delivery, as well as the direct 
production costs of the actual shipping process. 
E-commerce has changed the responsibilities of the delivery process. 
In conventional retailing, the consumer organizes the shipping from the 
retailer to the consumer, whereas in e-commerce it is often outsourced to 
a third party that provides logistical services. As a result, consumers 
learn the direct pecuniary cost of delivery, when they make a purchase 
online. According to Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001), consumers 
particularly dislike pecuniary transportation costs. Consequently, 
Harrington and Leahey (2007) show that firms internalize transportation 
costs into the product price and provide “free” shipping in equilibrium.  
Since most e-commerce transactions involve exchange of physical 
goods, the separation of purchase and delivery lacks the instant 
gratification available from purchases in conventional retail outlets. This 
adds to the consumer’s indirect costs of a transaction. However, this does 
not appear to be a significant cost, because catalog shopping has been a 
successful business model for decades. A significant logistical 
improvement in e-business has been the ability to track shipments in real 
time. Information links between suppliers and retailers give an 
opportunity to adjust production and inventory levels to match the 
fluctuations in the end-consumer demand. As a consequence, consumers 
can be informed about the inventory and shipment status of their 
purchases. However, the most revolutionizing change has been digital 
distribution. Goods or services that can be digitized can be delivered 
more efficiently through the information network. For this reason, the 
markets for financial instruments, travel, news, music and videos exist 
increasingly only on the Internet. 
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1.2.6 Consumption  
At the final stage, the buyer consumes the purchased good. Possible 
breaches of the negotiated contract become visible in consumption. Thus, 
the transaction process may conclude here, or the buyer returns to the 
second stage. Costs involved at this stage are the costs of measurement. 
All physical goods are subject to scrutiny whether or not they correspond 
to the description of the item on the seller’s website. In case the item is 
defected, new transaction costs emerge from the shipping of the good, 
the verification of defects, the postponement of consumption, repairing, 
restocking and possible litigation.  
While consumption is the least affected by e-business, some changes 
are visible though. The ability to access information goods in real-time is 
increasingly important in value creation (Borenstein and Saloner 2001). 
For example, traditional newspapers cannot compete with their online 
counterparts in the speed they publish news. In addition, the public good 
dimension of information goods may affect consumption habits. For 
instance, sharing material through peer-to-peer (P2P) networks is 
popular despite the fact that the shared content may be copyrighted and 
illegal to redistribute. On the other hand, the impact of shared 
information goods on the seller’s welfare is ambiguous, because the 
seller’s profit may increase or decrease depending on how well sharing 
aggregates demand (Bakos et al. 1999). 
    
1.2.7 Cost of Information in e-Commerce 
Electronic markets differ from conventional markets in information 
costs. Traditionally, there has been an inverse relationship between the 
cost and availability of information to market incumbents. The 
bandwidth of an information channel has determined the reach of a 
message as well as the richness of its information content. The more 
informative the message, or the wider the audience, the more costly the 
delivery is. Evans & Wurster (1997) argue that the Internet breaks down 
this tradeoff between cost and reach. They claim that the low cost of 
bandwidth and the hyperarchical structure of the Internet increase 
connectivity and richness of messages without inflating the associated 
costs. For instance, advertising by mail or broadcast television is far-
reaching but expensive, whereas an e-mail advertisement reaches 
potentially millions of customers with almost zero costs. In addition, an 
e-mailed message can be customized with respect to its information 
content to fit the preferences of the targeted recipient which is often 
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infeasible in the conventional media. However, these properties have 
lead to explosive growth of e-mail advertisements which diminishes 
their impact as most of them are deemed “junk-mail”.   
Much of the discussion about the impact of the Internet on markets 
has revolved around search costs. These costs arise from locating and 
processing information on prices and product offerings as well as the 
characteristics of trading partners (Stigler 1961; Williamson 1973). For 
example, buyers incur costs from transportation, communication and the 
time spent on search process, while sellers expend resources on market 
research, advertising and other sales promotions (Bakos, 2001). To 
further illustrate this, we can define the total (expected) cost of a market 
transaction k for a buyer as 
 
        (1) cpk +=
 
where p is the price and c is the search cost. This is essentially the 
buyer’s reservation price. It has been argued that reduced search costs in 
e-markets lead to a lower k as c decreases. For example, physical 
constraints for conducting search vanish on the Internet, and Internet 
technologies, such as shopbots, increase the efficiency of the search 
procedure (Kephart and Greenwald 2002). As a result, lower search cost 
may depress prices by lowering buyers’ reservation prices. On the other 
hand, shopbots increase price transparency which may increase prices 
because sellers resort to trigger strategies in tacit price collusion (Vulkan 
2003). In addition, sellers may attempt to obfuscate search that makes 
price information less transparent (Ellison and Ellison 2004).  
The value of information is intrinsically tied to search costs because 
search process is essentially an optimal choice problem. In economics, 
the value of information is defined as the incremental increase in utility 
that results from better information in an optimal choice problem (Varian 
1999). To illustrate this, consider a consumer choice problem where the 
consumer’s indirect utility v(p) depends on the price p that she pays for 
some good. The consumer knows that two firms sell the good, but the 
price of the good varies.  Let  and  Then the 
consumer is willing to pay up to c to be revealed which firm sells at the 
lowest price, because 
][ , UL ppp ∈ ).()( UL pvpv >
 
 .        (2) )()( UL pvcpv ≥−
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If c is interpreted as search cost, it corresponds to the value of 
information because cpvpv UL ≥− )()( 8 . This result implies that 
declining search costs lead to depreciation of the value of information in 
e-markets. This could result from positive externalities of increased 
search activity which depresses prices universally (Baye et al. 2001). Thus, 
other buyers’ search efforts ensure competitive pricing in the market and 
remove the need to pay incremental costs to get informed. But if there is 
no value in information, a buyer has no incentive to conduct costly 
search. In consequence, the seller’s optimal response is to charge the 
monopoly price because buyers do not search for lower prices (Diamond 
1971)9. This means that price dispersion is prerequisite for any search 
activity (Biswas 2004). Also, the value of a good influences the intensity 
of search because the expected monetary gain from search is increasing 
in value (Nelson 1970). Thus, higher search effort is worthwhile with 
more valuable items, whereas the cost of search may exceed the 
monetary benefit when items are less valuable.  
From the firm’s standpoint, the value of information is tied to its 
profit margin. As long as a fraction of buyers faces positive search costs 
and information has value, firms can price above marginal cost and 
capture surplus from the imperfectly informed consumers. The models 
of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Varian (1980) illustrate this. Therefore, it 
is in the interest of firms to retain the value of information. Baye and 
Morgan (2001) show that a monopolistic “information gatekeeper” 
controls the information flows in the market by setting its fees in a way 
that the value of information does not vanish10. The gatekeeper achieves 
this result by setting its fees high enough to discourage full participation 
by all sellers to the gatekeeper’s market of information. As a consequence, 
the provision of comparison shopping engines as a public good could be 
socially beneficial (Latcovich and Smith, 2001).  
An incentive for firms to use an information gatekeeper is that it 
provides a low cost access to vast markets. Ellison and Ellison (2004) note 
that large e-retailers face high fixed costs from advertising, management 
and website development, whereas small e-retailers are more efficient in 
                                                     
8 Baye et al. (2004) define the value of information (VI) as the difference between the minimum price 
and the expected price of n-1 higher prices: VI=E[p]-pmin. 
9 This outcome, known as the Diamond Paradox, posed a theoretical problem for which numerous 
solutions have been provided. More of these on p. 25. 
10 Some examples of information gatekeepers include e-marketplaces, comparison shopping websites 
and trade publications. 
  21 
 
this respect. For this reason, popular information gatekeepers may 
provide a cost-efficient alternative to e-retailing, as sellers need neither 
advertising nor website development because these can be outsourced to 
the gatekeeper. For example, the storefront package offered by 
Pricegrabber achieves these goals 11 . Moreover, gatekeepers’ may 
obfuscate search because they derive income from the participating 
sellers (Smith 2002). For instance, search results may be ranked in such 
order that the gatekeeper’s preferred sellers are shown on the top of the 
list. 
Although price information is easily accessible on the Internet, 
uncertainty over quality remains problematic. Some product classes are 
inherently more suitable for e-commerce. Information technology 
expands the markets of products for which product descriptions can be 
distributed at lower costs (Malone et al. 1987).  Generally, the uncertainty 
about the quality of commodities and other standardized products and 
branded goods is not as great as the uncertainty about experience goods, 
services, and goods that involve high financial risks (Grewal et al. 2004). 
For instance, it is easier to judge the quality of a CD or a bolt than a 
diamond or an Internet security software package beforehand. As a 
result, branding, which reduces buyers information costs in assessing 
quality, is more important in e-markets where buyers face lower 
switching costs to competitors than in conventional markets (Erdem and 
Swait 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2001; Ba et al. 2007). 
The issues of trust and reputation can lead to problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard in e-markets. Therefore, sellers may engage 
in reputation building, because a good reputation can be seen as 
insurance against opportunistic behavior (Standifird 2001). The cost of 
adverse selection is that sellers receive lower prices for their goods, or 
even unraveling of markets in extreme cases (Akerlof 1970). As the full 
price of a product is a combination of a purchase price, search costs and 
costs of a disappointing purchase, a good reputation can mitigate the 
costs of a disappointing purchase (Kim and Xu 2007). Thus, a reputable 
seller could enjoy a price premium over its less trustworthy rivals (Klein 
and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983). In addition, a reputation can raise 
barriers to entry in an e-market (Melnik and Alm 2002). Indeed, a study 
of eBay auctions by Lin et al. (2006) suggests that the sellers with high 
                                                     
11 See http://www.pricegrabber.com/info_memtermsofuse.php.  
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reputation scores grow at higher rate than the sellers with lower 
reputation scores. 
Virtual environment and declining information costs place pressure 
on a firm’s market power, because its profit margin depends on its 
efficiency and market conditions. The choice of production technology 
such as production facilities, logistics and inter-organizational relations 
determine the firm’s minimum efficient scale. The market conditions, on 
the other hand, are mostly determined exogenously. Entry and exit by 
rivals, technological progress and changes in consumer tastes are the 
factors that a competitive firm has to take into account in its own 
decisions without having much leverage on the decisions that other 
market incumbents make. 
To some extent, the market power depends on how easy it is to 
disseminate product information over the electronic channel. This is 
attributed to lower online search costs which enable the buyer to locate 
the seller with the lowest price. However, not all information can be 
delivered in the electronic channel. As suggested by Nelson (1970), the 
true (posterior) value of many products can be ascertained only by 
experiencing the good which is often impossible in the online 
environment. For this reason, the goods that require physical contact – 
experiencing the good – are problematic to sellers. Due to the distinct 
temporal and spatial separation of purchase, delivery and consumption, 
this problem may encompass also products that are not experience goods 
offline. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001) propose that most physical 
products sold online become experience goods, because buyers face 
uncertainty about the service quality that a seller provides.  
De Figueiredo (2000) divides products into four categories based on 
their product characteristics and ability to disseminate product 
information over the Internet. These are presented in Table 1. First, 
commodities are standardized products, for which product 
differentiation is difficult. For example, a steel nail with given 
measurements cannot differ significantly between different producers. 
As a result, it is easy to communicate product information over the 
Internet. This provides little market power to the seller because other 
sellers can sell similar products and buyers face little search costs in 
making comparisons between the competing products and sellers.  
Second, quasi-commodities are differentiated products from each 
other, but the individual sales articles do not differ across sellers. For 
example, movie DVDs fall into this category. In e-commerce, quasi-
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commodities share the qualities of ordinary commodities, and the 
markets for them are likely to be highly competitive12. The third product 
type is experience goods. These are typically quasi-commodities with 
strong brand recognition among customers. The key distinction to 
regular quasi-commodities is that consumers have to be able to verify 
their quality or characteristics before purchase. For example, cosmetic 
products are experience goods. Experiencing these goods may not be 
easy on the Internet, but once consumers learn the product characteristics, 
they become regular quasi-commodities. As a result, the market power in 
this product category is fleeting at best.  
 
Table 1. Properties of Different Product Types in e-Commerce. 
Product Type Properties Communicability Pricing Power 
Commodity Standardized, 
undifferentiated 
Easy Little 
Quasi-Commodity Differentiated, 
homogenic 
Easy Little 
Experience Good Differentiated, 
branded 
Hard Some 
Experience Goods of 
Heterogeneous Quality
Unique, asymmetric 
information about the 
quality favors sellers 
Hard Substantial 
  
The fourth product type is experience goods of heterogeneous 
quality. As the name suggests, product characteristics and quality can 
vary between the same products. Products from fresh fruit to used cars 
and art fit into this category. Asymmetric information is an obvious 
problem in the markets for these goods. Consequently, sellers can have 
significant monopoly power because objects in this category can be 
unique. As information about quality is not easy to convey over the 
Internet channel, a market for experience goods with heterogeneous 
quality could easily unravel due to asymmetric information. Perhaps 
surprisingly, one of the most successful business models in online 
markets has been C2C commerce of used consumer durables as the 
success of online auctions, most notably eBay, clearly displays 13 . 
                                                     
12 Han (2005) finds that brand-loyal consumers search more price information in e-markets than in 
conventional markets. 
13 eBay’s market share is 90% of the online auction market (Liang et al. 2009). eBay’s revenue (net 
income) increased from $224.7 (10.8) million in 1999 to $8541.3 (1779.5) million in 2008 (Source: 
Morningstar).    
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Borenstein and Saloner (2001) attribute this success to the efficiency of 
matching buyers and sellers on the Internet.  
 
1.3 ELECTRONIC MARKETS 
 
1.3.1 Electronic Marketplaces, Disintermediation and Reintermediation 
E-commerce transactions are executed in electronic markets or in 
direct negotiations between the trading parties. We will concentrate only 
to e-markets. Electronic marketplaces are important implementations of 
e-markets, because marketplaces have historically been the institutions 
that allow buyers and sellers to meet and trade. The purpose of an e-
marketplace is to provide a common interface for e-commerce in virtual 
environment to multiple parties who are interested in exchange of goods 
and services (Grieger 2003).  
The introduction of personal computers in the 1980s spawned brave 
visions of the coming age of e-markets in B2B commerce. Malone et al. 
(1987) presented the Electronic Markets Hypothesis (EMH) which has its 
roots in Coase’s theory of the firm. The visible tendency at the time was 
that e-commerce would drive inter-firm exchanges because computers 
and databases lower coordination costs. According to EMH, the logical 
conclusion of this process is that the hierarchical relationships between a 
firm and its suppliers are replaced by market transactions. As a result, 
the firm has access to more suppliers which leads to more intense 
competition among suppliers. Vulkan (2003) argues that markets may be 
preferred in the long-run if agents can freely choose the exchange 
platform. This is especially true in B2C markets where asset specifity is 
likely to play a minor role in selecting the supplier14. A buyer is better off 
the more sellers there are in a B2C e-market, because competition 
between sellers lowers prices. 
In B2B markets, however, asset specifity has implications on the 
preferred exchange type. For this reason, if the number of suppliers 
remains low, a market solution may be viable. On the contrary, an 
increase in the number of suppliers may raise the costs of locating the 
right supplier to a level where hierarchies become preferred over 
markets again (Daniel and Klimis 1999). Glassberg & Merhout (2003) 
argue that continuous switching of exchange partners may lead to 
increasing monitoring costs. Participation to an electronic marketplace 
                                                     
14 Asset specifity refers to the degree of hold-up in a buyer-seller situation. 
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can also create substantial switching costs and demand investments in 
technology and processes that the use of exchange requires. For these 
reasons, hierarchical inter-firm relationships may remain a viable 
alternative to electronic marketplaces in B2B markets. 
Bakos (1991a) lays out five strategic benefits from an e-marketplace. 
First, it reduces information costs of market incumbents. This applies to 
conventional marketplaces as well. Commerce has agglomerated to 
marketplaces where trading partners are easy to find throughout history 
(Ellison and Ellison 2005). Second, e-marketplaces tend to display 
positive network externalities as defined in Katz and Shapiro (1985). 
Thus, increasing the number of participants leads to increasing economic 
surplus available through trading. Third, switching costs may become 
significant. These stem from significant technological investments, 
awareness building among consumers or the opportunity cost of staying 
out from the marketplace (Grewal et al. 2004; Latcovich & Howard, 2001; 
Filson, 2004). Fourth, the operator of the electronic marketplace has 
significant economies of scale and scope. Due to scale, the operator faces 
low marginal costs from the inclusion of more participants. At the same 
time, promotional activities and additional services, which increase the 
value of the marketplace to its participants, offer economies of scope. 
Finally, potential participants face uncertainty over the benefits of joining 
the marketplace. This is directly related to positive network externalities 
as the economic benefits depend on the number of participants. Hence, 
the first-mover advantage may prove important because early adopters 
of electronic marketplaces may possess such gravity that competing 
marketplaces cannot develop the size that induces market incumbents to 
join. In addition to these benefits, Bakos (1997) argues that e-
marketplaces may improve the quality of information by separating costs 
involved in a transaction including transportation costs and financing 
terms.   
Initially, many observers expected that e-commerce leads to 
disintermediation of the industrial value chain (see e.g. Gellman 1996; 
Strader and Shaw 1997). Since a direct connection between consumers 
and producers can be formed in e-markets, this would eliminate the 
middleman in the process. For example, music can be sold directly from 
artists to consumers without a record company in the middle of the value 
chain. Markets for information goods, such as broadcast television, news, 
music, travel services and financial instruments, are prone to 
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disintermediation because digital information can be distributed directly 
from the producer to the end-user (Bakos 2001).  
 
Although disintermediation may reshape market structures in some 
industries, the use of Internet for e-commerce has lead to 
reintermediation of the value chain. According to Garven (2002), low 
transaction costs have created business opportunities to introduce new 
value-added services. Examples of reintermediation are numerous. At 
the basic level, infrastructure providers, such as the Internet service 
providers and application service providers, are required to run the basic 
infrastructure of an e-market. Search engines are being used to locate 
trading partners. Moreover, security and privacy of e-commerce 
transactions has created business opportunities for providers of e-
payment and network security providers. In addition, transportation of 
physical goods has increased demand for courier services. Bakos (2001) 
notices that there is also free-riding on existing intermediaries, as buyers 
can examine goods in conventional stores and buy them on the Internet. 
 
1.3.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of e-Business 
The power of e-business lies in a potent mix of data-processing 
power of computers and information transmission capabilities of 
computer networks. Each computer is capable of processing and 
analyzing digital information faster than the human brain can. Linking 
computers together with networking technology sets up an information 
network, in which a computer is a node in the network. As a result, 
digital information can be transmitted almost instantly between the 
nodes which can independently receive, send and process digital 
information.  
Two major implications emerge from this. First, data can be 
processed anywhere and anytime in the network regardless of the 
geographical location of a node. Second, transaction costs from data 
processing and transmission are negligible because computers perform 
redundant tasks almost indefinitely thus eliminating the costs arising 
from human labor and errors. For example, Cisco estimated that a 
quarter of its traditional B2B orders were erroneously filled, but a switch 
to e-commerce reduced the error rate to 2% leading to substantial cost 
savings (Wyckoff and Colecchia 1999). Moreover, as information is the 
glue that binds together the industrial value chain, improvements in the 
inter-organizational and intra-organizational information exchange 
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increase efficiency (Porter 1985). Malone et al. (1987) argue that 
networked computer systems can handle and communicate more 
complex information than traditional communication methods which 
expands the role of markets in production. 
Two main types of e-commerce are business-to-consumer e-
commerce and business-to-business e-commerce. In B2C e-commerce, 
firms sell their products to consumers through an electronic medium 
such as the Internet or wireless networks. In B2B e-commerce, firms sell 
and purchase products from each other through a closed internal 
network, a closed external network or an open network such as the 
Internet. A third type of e-commerce is consumer-to-consumer e-
commerce. This consists of e-commerce transactions in online auctions 
and electronic bulletin boards. The fourth type is consumer-to-business 
e-commerce where consumers sell their products to firms. 
Naturally, differences between B2C and B2B e-commerce exist. In 
B2B markets, buyers may have substantial bargaining power because 
purchasing is done by well-informed professionals, which reduces 
asymmetric information, and the firm size matters in negotiations 
(Vasarheleyi and Greenstein 2003)15. In contrast, buyers take prices as 
given, and information asymmetry between the buyer and the seller is 
more prevalent in B2C markets. Despite these differences, very often 
these markets are intertwined. Burt and Sparks (2003) warn that it may 
be disadvantageous to consider the different types of e-commerce 
distinctly separate, because changes in B2B relationships impact also 
end-consumers.  
Several factors contribute to the growth of Internet retailing. 
According to Grewal et al. (2004), these are product category, access to 
information, the novelty of the sales channel, accessibility and 
convenience. All these are tied to the ability to process and distribute 
information. The products for which product information is easy to 
convey on the Internet are more suitable for e-commerce. Also, it is 
relatively costless to provide abundant pre-sale and post-sale 
information to customers. Moreover, search engines provide an easy 
access to price and product information and information about sellers 
from external sources. Obviously, consumers with high opportunity cost 
                                                     
15 This may also be the case with C2B e-commerce where the buyer (the firm) usually has better 
knowledge about supply and demand than individual consumers. 
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for time may choose e-commerce to avoid time-consuming trips to 
traditional retail outlets (Ellison and Ellison 2004).  
New shopping formats such as online auctions, access to global 
markets and around the clock service may also draw buyers to online 
markets. In addition, digitalization of information products such as 
music and digital distribution has created new markets for these 
products. In some retail segments, e-commerce is a consequence of 
evolution towards a low inventory business model where the retailer acts 
as an downstream intermediary between the upstream supplier and the 
final demand (Bakos 1991b). An industry-wide implication is that e-
commerce diminishes the need for vertical integration between upstream 
and downstream firms (Malone et al. 1989). 
The key difference between the traditional brick-and-mortar (BnM) 
retail format and e-retailing is that the latter does not require prominent 
location and retail space to attract consumers. For this reason, retail space 
costs less in e-retailing (Strader and Shaw 1997). The online storefront is 
a website on the Internet where the interaction between the seller and its 
customers take place. However, an e-retailer needs conveniently located 
warehouses, because its business model relies on efficient supply chain 
management. Thus, e-retailers can hold lower inventory levels than 
conventional retailers who must maintain adequate inventories to meet 
in-store demand (Kenney and Curry 2000). Moreover, e-retailing requires 
less in-store personnel because orders are shipped from warehouses. 
This lowers e-retailers labor costs. 
Since the online store provides infinite shelf space to display 
available products, the variety of product offerings in online stores are 
vastly larger than in conventional retail outlets (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). 
Estimates by Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) suggest that the increased variety 
of product offering improves consumer welfare significantly. However, 
running a high-end e-commerce website requires technical expertise 
which could offset some of the cost savings from the reduced need for 
labor (Wang 2006). Due to the inherent properties of information goods – 
that is zero marginal cost of reproduction and the low cost of digital 
distribution over the network - e-commerce is superior to conventional 
retailing because all costs accruing from inventories, production and 
distribution are lower than in conventional markets (Strader and Shaw 
1997). Especially for information goods, e-commerce as a business model 
will likely prevail as the dominant retail format.  
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1.3.3 Value Drivers in e-Commerce 
Understanding the fundamentals of e-business gives strategic 
options that may provide competitive advantage in competition in e-
markets. According to Lumpkin et al. (2002), the strategies available are 
overall cost leadership, differentiation or focusing in a niche market. 
With the overall cost leadership strategy, the firm’s goal is to be the 
lowest price seller. A cost leader targets the price sensitive consumers 
who exploit low search costs in e-markets. The differentiation strategy 
aims to use assets such as the seller’s brand or reputation, or 
competencies such as superior service quality, to extract a price premium 
over the cost leader for the goods and services the seller provides. This 
strategy exploits heterogeneous consumer preferences over service 
quality and asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. Finally, 
the niche strategy is based on the wide reach of e-markets. Due to the 
lack of geographical constraints on the Internet, it is possible to achieve 
the minimum efficient scale and serve a global market for the selected 
niche products. As the barriers of entry are low in e-commerce, the niche 
strategy may have to be augmented with the cost leadership or 
differentiation strategy to maintain the competitive advantage.     
Amit and Zott (2001) argue that the drivers of value creation, and 
therefore the competitive advantage, rely on efficiency, complementaries, 
lock-in and novelty. Furthermore, these four value drivers are 
intertwined because they can strengthen each other. Efficiency results 
from reductions in transaction costs and asymmetric information. A 
state-of-the-art e-commerce operation requires considerable investments 
in technology and on-going services which are a natural source of 
economies of scale (Borenstein and Saloner 2001). Moreover, positive 
network externalities and economies of scale may be available through 
cheap interconnectivity of e-markets. For example, the prospect of 
receiving more bidders for a product or more items for which to bid 
increases the value of eBay to its users. Also, network effects and 
economies of scale may be connected because large marketplaces reduce 
information costs and offer a wider product variety (Ellison and Fisher 
Ellison 2005). For instance, eBay has become the dominant online auction 
because it connects (and has a reputation of connecting) buyers and 
sellers of all possible artifacts worldwide.  
Providing complementaries means bundling goods or services 
which are produced by the firm or its strategic partner(s) to increase the 
value of a transaction to consumers. Lock-in attempts to raise consumers 
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switching costs. Unlike in physical markets, where geography creates 
switching costs, the cost of physical movement is zero in e-markets. 
Therefore, personalization and customization technologies, service, 
branding and virtual community building may be effective methods to 
differentiate a firm from its competitors and create switching costs. 
Novelty has potential to be an effective value driver. If the firm is the 
first to introduce a compelling e-business solution, the first-mover 
advantage may prove decisive, but its value should not be overestimated 
(Liang et al. 2009). Nikolaeva (2005) shows that the first-mover 
advantage does not exist in online retail markets in terms of measured 
web traffic. A concrete example of the elusive nature of the first-mover 
advantage is the success of Google. There were many popular search 
engines, such as AltaVista, in the online search market before Google, 
but Google became the market leader by providing better search results 
in less than two years after its incorporation (Cusumano 2005).  
Another source of the competitive advantage in e-business is 
economies of scope. Economies of scope occur when a firm realizes cost-
savings from by-products that arise from its production process (Panzar 
and Willig 1981). For example, Amazon.com started as a book retailer, 
but soon added more product categories, such as CDs, DVDs and digital 
downloads, to its product offerings. Moreover, as the physical shelf-
space does not limit the number of products available, e-retailers may 
offer wider selections than conventional retailers, which may be a 
considerable competitive advantage. For example, Amazon.com hosts a 
catalogue of over two million books, and 40% of its sales is derived from 
less popular books (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). In addition, these titles are 
being sold at higher prices than regular titles. Brynjolfsson et al. (2007) 
consider the possibility that demand may shift to “the long tail” in e-
markets, because experienced online buyers tend to search and buy less 
popular titles which form the long tail. Perhaps this increasing demand 
for niche products has prompted e-retailers, such as Amazon.com and 
Play.com, to set up marketplaces on their own websites for affiliate 
sellers that cater for the demand for used and deleted products. 
While the advantages of e-commerce in retailing could be concrete, 
the traditional brick-and-mortar business model is vigorously alive. 
Obviously, many goods and services are not very suitable for e-
commerce. For example, the experience goods that require a closer 
inspection of the good before purchase, or the goods that are intended 
for instant consumption are more difficult, if not impossible, to sell 
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online. Keen et al. (2004) show that the majority of consumers favor the 
conventional retail format over e-commerce16. Moreover, the traditional 
retail format, in which consumers search, collect, pay and transport the 
goods they wish to consume, is cheaper to the retailer than the logistics 
of e-commerce (Ellison and Ellison 2004). Thus, the entire logistic chain 
from the retailer to the end-user would have to be reorganized. Forman 
et al. (2009) suggests that the disutility from online purchasing may be 
substantial. They show that the location of a conventional retail outlet 
also determines how much consumers purchase online. The closer to the 
consumer a retail outlet is located, the less is purchased online. This 
implies that consumers derive significant disutility from online 
transaction costs and the lack of instant gratification from consumption.  
In B2C commerce, consumers’ preferences over the retail format are 
decisive, because retailers rarely possess enough market power to force 
consumers to participate in a single market. For this reason the buyer’s 
cost may dictate which retail format prevails. Strader and Shaw (1997) 
compare “relevant buyer costs” between conventional markets and e-
markets. They argue that the product price, search costs and sales taxes 
are higher in conventional markets, whereas risk costs, distribution costs 
and market costs are higher in e-markets. This merits some discussion on 
the current relevance of these costs in both market types.  
Since e-business has improved the supply-chain management, the 
price differential between the market types should narrow. Also, many 
conventional stores provide product and price information on the 
Internet which has reduced search costs in traditional markets. As e-
commerce is subject to local sales taxes, differential tax rates between 
locations favor e-commerce. Risk costs are higher in e-markets, but their 
relevance has diminished because of improvements in network security 
and feedback mechanisms on the Internet. Strader and Shaw assume that 
the use of conventional markets is costless, whereas consumers are 
subject to costs in accessing e-markets. As the cost of the Internet access 
and bandwidth has decreased, market costs have become lower for e-
commerce. Moreover, due to transportation costs and the opportunity 
cost for time, the use of conventional markets is not costless. As a result, 
these offset some of the higher distribution costs associated with e-
commerce. 
                                                     
16 Of course, this result could change if e-commerce gains popularity as an alternative shopping 
format. 
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A notable development in e-commerce has been the blending of 
sales channels. Usually this has resulted from “brick-and-mortar” (BnM) 
retailers adopting an online sales channel and becoming “click-and-
mortar” (CnM) retailers. Borenstein and Saloner (2001) argue that this 
development will ultimately determine the structure of e-markets. 
Indeed, established conventional retailers have many advantages in 
competition in e-markets. First, they have established brands that 
increase consumer trust in the more uncertain online environment (Burt 
and Sparks 2003). Second, they have relationships to suppliers in place, 
which could lower their coordination costs (Malone et al. 1987). Third, 
some retailers possess substantial market power which can be leveraged 
to online markets. Fourth, their supply chain can be modified to support 
the online channel as e-commerce requires warehouses, logistics and 
possibly pick-up points for consumers in retail outlets (Burt and Sparks 
2003). Fifth, conventional retailers have accumulated knowledge about 
consumers by experience, which may prove useful in predicting online 
customer behavior. Bernstein et al. (2006) show that all traditional 
retailers adopt the CnM strategy as the game-theoretic equilibrium 
outcome if they face competition from BnM retailers. Wang (2006) 
suggests that the implosion of the dot-com bubble in 2000 resulted from 
the shift of BnM firms to the BnC business model which squeezed the 
weakest pure-play online retailers out of the market 17 . Interestingly, 
some pure-play online sellers may also adopt CnM strategy. For example, 
Verkkokauppa.com, a Finnish computer and consumer electronics 
retailer, transformed from a pure-play online seller into a BnC firm by 
setting up traditional retail outlets in select locations.   
 
 
1.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
1.4.1 Online Retail Markets 
Electronic markets produce a wealth of information as a side 
product of everyday business procedures. Empirical research has been a 
great beneficiary of this, because it is fairly easy to compile information 
on the Internet. Researchers have been especially interested in price 
levels, price dispersion and the determinants of pricing on the Internet. 
Next, a brief review to this literature is presented.     
                                                     
17 This is supported by Baye and Morgan (2003) who identify an increasing trend in market 
concentration until 2002, after which the trend reverses. 
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The impact of e-markets on price levels has been a subject of 
numerous studies. When retail e-commerce was at its infancy, Bailey 
(1998) reported that prices for books were higher online than offline. Lee 
(1998) reported a similar finding in auction markets for used cars. 
However, subsequent research has found that prices are lower online in 
many product categories, such as books and cars among others 
(Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Morton et al. 2001; Lee et al. 2003; 
Ancarani and Shankar 2004)18 . As buyers become more aware of the 
existence (and reliability) of online markets, competitive pressures lower 
prices also offline, because the goods offered are substitutes to each other 
in both market types (Borenstein and Saloner 2001). For example, Brown 
and Goolsbee (2002) show that the use of comparison websites lowered 
prices for life insurance policies in the 1990s. Moreover, Gan et al. (2007) 
find no statistical difference in price levels for groceries between BnC 
retailers and pure-play e-retailers.  
The existence of price dispersion in competitive markets has been a 
puzzle to economist for a long time19. Product differentiation explains 
much of the observed price dispersion, but the law of one price for a 
homogenous good in a competitive market is fundamental in economics. 
However, this result lies on the assumption that information is perfect 
and complete. In addition, the standard competitive model assumes that 
both sellers and buyers are homogenous. Obviously, these assumptions 
are realistic only for simplified models. 
Numerous models that produce price dispersion as an equilibrium 
outcome have been proposed20. Location advantages and transportation 
costs could explain differential pricing for a homogenous product (Tirole 
2003). Since Stigler (1961), theoretical models have attributed price 
dispersion also to search costs. As consumers incur positive search costs 
for obtaining additional price quotes, firms respond to this by posting 
prices that are above the competitive price. Costly sequential search (e.g. 
Rothschild 1974) and fixed sample-size search (Burdett and Judd 1983) 
produce equilibrium price dispersion. On the other hand, price 
dispersion has also been attributed to consumer heterogeneity. In 
information clearinghouse models, such as Salop & Stiglitz (1977) and 
                                                     
18 However, Ancarani and Shankar (2004) notice that offline prices are lower when posted prices of 
online retailers include shipping costs. 
19 The measures of price dispersion include the coefficient of variation, price gap, range and variance 
(standard deviation). 
20 For a good review of different search models, see Baye et. al (2006). 
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Varian (1980), some buyers that have an access to complete price 
information through an information clearinghouse (e.g. a newspaper) 
purchase at the lowest price, while those who do not buy at random. In 
Reinganum (1979), price dispersion is due to heterogeneity in firms’ 
production costs. Carlson & McAfee (1983) present a hybrid model, in 
which price dispersion results from the heterogeneity in buyer’ search 
costs and seller’s production costs.  
The emergence of e-markets on the Internet revived the interest on 
the drivers of price dispersion. Price dispersion emerges when there is no 
full information in the market, and either sellers or buyers or both are 
heterogeneous (Lach 2002). Search costs are lower on the Internet as 
search process involves no physical movement. As a result, the location 
advantages which are based on geography diminish. There are, however, 
reasons to assume that they do not disappear altogether. First, 
transportation costs in physical goods still depend on the distance that 
separates the buyer and the seller and for this reason, Hotelling’s (1929) 
differentiation by location does not vanish altogether. This does not 
affect digital information goods for which the cost of distribution is 
uniform regardless of the whereabouts of buyer. Second, the seller’s 
strategic actions where the seller selects how much to spend on 
advertising and customer service could explain price dispersion (Ba et al. 
2007). For example, Ennew et al. (2005) show that the number of links 
from other websites is an important driver of web traffic into the seller’s 
website. Third, there are restraints on the trade of information goods that 
forbid sales from one region to another. Examples of these include the 
region codes in DVDs and the regional restrictions on sales of 
audiovisual content in the i-Tunes webstore. Finally, governments 
impose taxes and duties which are based on the geographical location of 
the seller. 
The information clearinghouse models have become popular 
because of the shopbot technology21. Shopbots are software agents that 
give instantly a listing of prices for a desired item. Should their use 
become widespread, this could mark a dramatic shift in bargaining 
power from sellers to buyers. In contrast to conventional markets, where 
acquiring information through a newspaper is often costly to the buyer, 
the use of a shopbot is effectively costless. Given that shopbots provide 
                                                     
21 Popular shopbots 
include www.pricegrabber.com, www.bizrate.com, www.shopper.com, www.dealtime.com 
and www.mysimon.com.  
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an easy solution to the buyer’s search problem, one might expect that the 
amount of consumer search decreases with them. This could lead to the 
Diamond Paradox. However, Baye & Morgan (2001) show that a profit-
maximizing shopbot keeps service charges low enough to induce all 
buyers to subscribe the service, whereas the user fees for sellers are high 
enough to discourage universal participation. As a consequence, price 
dispersion exists, and buyers benefit from acquiring information.  
While shopbots improve the consumer’s ability to undertake price 
search, it is more difficult for them to communicate information about 
product and seller characteristics (Smith 2002). Zhang & Bing (2007) 
discover that consumers search more information about sellers when 
they engage in a shopbot search. They argue that consumers find a 
tradeoff between price and other observed seller characteristics such as 
shipping services, brand, reputation and product availability (see also 
Pan et al. (2002)). This finding implies that although a shopbot reveals 
the lowest price in the market, informational asymmetries between the 
buyer and the seller influence purchase decisions. Thus, the seller’s 
characteristics could also explain the persistence of price dispersion. For 
this reason, many shopbot services have reputation systems that collect 
and distribute information about sellers’ past behavior for the buyer’s 
benefit (Resnick et al. 2000).  
 The empirical evidence of online price dispersion is abundant22. The 
price data for various homogenous products in Bailey (1998) (books), 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) (books and CDs), Clay et al. (2001), 
Morton et al. (2001) and Tang & Xing (2001) (books, CDs, consumer 
electronics, laptop computers, PDAs and computer software)) Leiter and 
Warin (2007) (computers, electronics, video games, movies, software, 
books, office, photography and health products) indicate substantial 
price dispersion on the Internet. The result does not change with 
differentiated products (online travel agents) in Clemons et al. (2002). On 
the other hand, Chiou and Pate (2008) find that price dispersion of 
auctioned gift cards for retail stores display very low price dispersion 
from 4% to 8 %. Their results also provide proof for the theory of buyer 
heterogeneity as the driver of price dispersion because the gift cards for 
discount retailers display less price dispersion than general retailers. The 
evidence provided by Baylis and Perloff (2002) and Nelson et al. (2007) 
reveals that the cheapest sellers tend to stay inexpensive relative to other 
                                                     
22 See Pan et al. (2004) for a good review of the early literature of online price dispersion. 
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sellers over time 23 . Moreover, Baylis and Perloff discover that they 
provide better service than expensive sellers. Again, this points to buyer 
heterogeneity as the explanation for price dispersion (see Smith 2001), 
because one would expect that the sellers that charge high prices and 
provide inferior service would be driven out of the market. Thus, 
equilibrium price dispersion might result from matching price-quality 
pairs as suggested by Bakos et al. (2005).  
Price dispersion could also be a temporal phenomenon which 
disappears as markets mature. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) find that the 
introduction of e-commerce initially increased but later decreased price 
dispersion in the life insurance market. A study of consumer electronics 
markets by Akimoto and Takeda (2009) suggests that price dispersion 
increases in the early stages of the product cycle and decrease in the 
latter stages.  
Along with buyer heterogeneity, empirical evidence points to the 
amount of search as a potential explanation for price dispersion. 
According to Borenstein and Saloner (2001), “nonpecuniary aspects of 
the purchase experience”, such as trust issues and the after sales service, 
may create website stickiness. Johnson et al. (2004) note that consumers 
on average search only 1.1 websites for CDs and 1.8 websites for travel. 
In a controlled experiment, Han (2005) reports that a quarter of buyers 
do not search for lower prices and nearly a half of consumers limit their 
search to 2 websites. As a related matter, seller branding and loyalty 
dampen the overall level of search. Han’s findings also imply that a 
significant portion of online buyers either do not know or use shopbots 
in their price search. Moreover, the results reported by Monga and Saini 
(2009) indicate that a reduction in pecuniary search costs induces more 
search activity than a reduction in search costs measured by time. Since 
buyers may perceive lower search costs as time-saving, this could 
explain the observed low search activity.  
Another explanation could be that while shopbot buyers are more 
price sensitive than regular consumers (Ellison and Ellison 2004), the 
relative abundance of less price sensitive buyers may allow for pricing 
above the competitive level. It is also plausible that concerns over service 
quality and product attributes override low prices in a shopbot market 
(Smith 2002). Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) provide evidence that even 
                                                     
23 Curiously, Lach (2002) finds that offline sellers switch positions within the price distribution. So, 
price dispersion persists, but seller ranks do not. 
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price sensitive buyers strongly favor branded retailers. This is supported 
by Johnson et al. (2004) who find that 70 % of CD and book shoppers and 
42% of travel shoppers were loyal customers to a particular website. In 
addition, individual consumers search fewer alternatives when they 
became more experienced with e-commerce.  
Ancarani and Shankar (2004) argue that seller characteristics 
determine price dispersion. That is, traditional, multi-channel and 
Internet retailers, charge different prices for the same goods. For such a 
differentiation to be a successful strategy, buyers must place some value 
on the services these seller types provide. As e-markets mature, 
differential pricing across seller types may not be possible. For example, 
Gan et al. (2007) find that price levels between pure-play Internet and 
multi-channel retailers do not differ in the Singaporean online groceries 
market. Pan et al. (2002) use hedonic regression to measure the impact of 
a seller’s service quality on prices of various goods. In general, shopping 
convenience, reliability and shipping and handling are positively related 
to prices, whereas the amount of offered product information has a 
negative impact on prices. They conclude that sellers are not always able 
to charge higher prices by offering quality service. However, they raise 
the possibility that online trust or branding could explain price 
premiums in e-commerce. Other explanations could be multi-product 
competition, bundling and add-ons (Ellison and Fisher Ellison 2005). 
There is no clear evidence of how competitive online markets are. 
Baye and Morgan (2003) show that market concentration on the Internet 
is decreasing. Also their ongoing monitoring of competitiveness of online 
markets provides further support to this24. Smith (2001) suggests that 
consumer search is limited to few well-known sellers. As a result, these 
sellers might be able to collude to maintain profitability. This is 
supported by Ennew et al. (2005), who notice that the distribution of web 
traffic is highly concentrated in online markets. Thus, if a volume of web 
site traffic is an indicator of sales, online markets are oligopolistic.  
 
1.4.2 Online Auctions 
The immense popularity of online auctions opened up an important 
avenue for empirical e-commerce research. The strength of online 
auction data is that it shows actual transactions that have been concluded. 
This is an improvement to publicly available retail data which does not 
                                                     
24 See http://nash-equilibrium.com.   
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give any indication whether transactions take place and, if they do, at 
which prices. The weakness of auction data is that auctioned goods are 
often of heterogeneous quality which may explain differential pricing 
(Lee 1998). On the other hand, online auctions use reputation systems 
which allow controlling for seller heterogeneity when studying the 
impact of asymmetric information on online commerce25. 
Empirical research on online auctions has been interested in 
determining the influence of a seller’s reputation on the outcome of an 
auction. The theories presented by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro 
(1983) suggest that a seller may incur losses by investing in reputation 
initially to earn profits through a price premium later. The findings in 
this literature can be summarized as “not all reputations are created 
equal”. Positive returns on a sellers reputation is a widely recognized 
result (Standifird 2001; Melnik and Alm 2002; Ba and Pavlou 2002; 
Dewan and Hsu 2004; Cabral and Hortaçsu 2006; Lucking-Reiley et al. 
2006; Zhang 2006). Nonlinear returns on reputation are reported by 
Livingston (2005) and Sun and Hsu (2007). The latter argues that buyers 
place more emphasis on a seller’s reputation when bid values are high.  
Since buyers can also be sellers in online auctions, Zhang (2006) 
finds that a reputation as a buyer does not matter as a seller, but only a 
reputation as a seller influences outcomes. In addition, a negative 
reputation has a greater impact than a positive reputation (Standifird 
2001; Ba and Pavlou 2002; Houser and Wooders 2006; Lucking-Reiley et 
al. 2006; Zhang 2006).  
Attempts to control for quality uncertainty in auctions have 
produced muted results of a seller’s ability to earn a price premium on 
reputation. In general, product homogeneity lowers a seller’s ability to 
earn price premiums on his reputation (McDonald and Slawson 2002; 
Houser and Wooders 2006; Pate 2006; Sun 2008). However, Resnick et al. 
(2006) devise an experiment in which an established seller of vintage 
postcards, who has a strong reputation in eBay, sets up new seller 
identities and sells vintage postcards under the established identity and 
the new identities. They find that the established seller commands a 
substantial price premium over new sellers.  
 
 
 
                                                     
25 See Dellarocas (2003) for a summary of this literature.  
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1.5 SUMMARY OF ARTICLES 
 
1.5.1 Overview  
This dissertation consists of four articles which have been prepared 
between 2004 and 2009. The objective of these studies is to increase 
understanding of which factors influence competition in e-markets. The 
approach is both theoretical and empirical using statistical and 
econometrical methods as well as concepts of the microeconomic theory. 
A special emphasis is placed on the impact of information costs in the 
online business environment.  
Chapter 2 is an empirical inquiry into competition in the online 
music market. By utilizing non-parametric statistical methods, price 
levels and price dispersion in the market are being examined. The results 
indicate that the online music market is characterized by imperfect 
competition which is manifested by price dispersion and unequal price 
levels. Chapter 3 presents a theoretical model of search which explains 
the observed price dispersion in e-markets. It shows that heterogeneous 
search costs of buyers could be a reason for price dispersion in e-markets.  
Chapter 4 is an empirical study of the impact of reputation on the 
seller’s pricing in retail e-markets for homogeneous consumer goods. As 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers remains problematic 
in e-markets, the research shows that a good reputation may enable price 
premiums in retail e-markets. Finally, Chapter 5 introduces a model of 
price competition in e-marketplaces where Bayesian buyers use a 
reputation system to estimate the seller’s reputation. This paper includes 
also an empirical section that tests the model on data from retail e-
markets for homogeneous consumer goods. The model suggests that 
sellers adjust their prices according to their reputation scores provided 
by the reputation system. In consequence, the seller with a better 
reputation score extracts surplus from cautious buyers, whereas more 
trusting buyers patronize the seller with a lower reputation score. The 
empirical section discloses evidence for the model.      
The contributions of this research to the extant literature stem from 
applied empiricism. This dissertation shows that despite lower search 
costs, the prevalent price dispersion indicates that online markets are not 
extremely competitive. The evidence also reveals that one should not 
overestimate the importance of seller brands in e-markets. One should be 
careful when interpreting price dispersion, because the theory presented 
in this dissertation points to the possibility that asymmetrically lowered 
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search costs may increase price dispersion. Thus, price dispersion cannot 
be interpreted as the lack of competition automatically.  
The importance of a corporate reputation in competition has not 
been widely studied in the context of retail e-commerce. This dissertation 
provides a comprehensive empirical inquiry into the influence of a 
seller’s reputation in online comparison shopping markets. From the 
theoretical aspect, price premiums should accompany good reputations. 
This study reveals that better seller reputations do not provide a clear 
competitive advantage in comparison shopping markets. However, a 
good reputation combined with a seller brand provides pricing power to 
a firm. In addition, small enterprises may signal their trustworthiness to 
consumers by staying in the market for a long time and realize returns on 
reputation. 
 
1.5.2 Competition in e-Markets: Price Levels and Price Dispersion in 
the Online Music Market 
The aim of this article is to study how characteristics specific to the 
online business environment impact competition in e-markets. Since 
search costs are low online, buyers are able to obtain and compare price 
quotes from numerous sellers regardless of their physical location. This 
reduces the seller’s pricing power. On the other hand, asymmetric 
information between buyers and sellers and benefits from the online 
retail space may provide competitive advantage for sellers. The previous 
research has established that seller branding (Brynjolffson and Smith 
2001; Clay et al. 2002) and a channel strategy (Tang and Xing 2001) 
influences pricing in e-markets. This paper explores competition in e-
markets by comparing price levels and price dispersion in the online 
music market. In addition to branding and a channel strategy, this paper 
addresses also the impacts of geographical location and economies of 
scope on price levels. Furthermore, price competition is being studied by 
examining price dispersion and price matching between sellers.  
The data consists of prices of CDs from pure-play Internet and 
hybrid firms in North America and Europe. The online music market 
should be very competitive because CDs are commoditized goods (de 
Figueiredo 2000). The data was obtained weekly from Evenbetter.com 
between July 2000 and December 2000. Sellers are divided in groups 
according to their geographical location, brand valuation and the variety 
of product offerings. Representative items were selected from the 
popular music category because the supply of popular music is larger 
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than marginal music, such as classical music. In consequence, 
competition among the sellers of popular music is more active 26 . To 
capture the online sales element, 20 representative titles were selected 
from the official US sales chart Billboard Hot 200 and Billboard’s Top 
Internet Sales Chart. 
We analyze the data with non-parametric statistical methods. We 
find that pure and total price levels are lower in North America than in 
Europe. Also pure and total price levels are higher among the sellers of a 
wide product offering than among the sellers of a simple product 
offering. However, brands do not seem to enable a price premium. We 
suggest few explanations for the results. First, the North-American music 
market may be more competitive than the European market at the time 
the study was made. Second, a CD is relatively low-cost merchandise. 
This may explain the missing brand premium, because consumers place 
a lower value on warranties and return policies than in purchases of 
more costly goods such as electronics. Third, consumers may pool orders 
across product categories into a single shipment to save in delivery costs. 
This may explain why the sellers of wide product offerings have a price 
premium over the sellers with simple product offerings.  
By using various measures, we find that price dispersion exists in 
the market. Prices are more dispersed among fringe sellers than branded 
sellers. We find also that nearly a half of sellers set prices above the 
market average, and fringe sellers set higher prices than branded sellers. 
A closer inspection reveals that branded sellers act as dominant firms in, 
and fringe sellers match their prices with them. 
The results indicate that the market is characterized by practices of 
imperfect competition: collusion, oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition. Our tests show that geographical location matters in e-
markets, and a variety of product offerings may provide price premiums. 
The North American music market has a group of firms or a single 
dominant firm, with whom most sellers are willing to match their prices. 
We also suggest that fringe sellers act as competitive monopolists. 
However, pure-play branded sellers are locked in oligopoly or they 
collude in pricing, whereas the existence of a physical retail channel 
influences pricing strategies of hybrid sellers. Therefore, the on-line 
                                                     
26 This assumption is supported by Tang & Xing (2001) who find that price competition is more 
active among popular titles than random titles in the market for DVDs. 
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music market proves that expectations of free competition in on-line 
markets are not fulfilled. 
 
1.5.3 Lower Search Costs and Variance of Price Distribution 
The empirical research has shown that e-markets display persistent 
price dispersion, which implies that markets may not be as efficient as 
expected27. The objective of this paper is to provide an explanation for 
the observed price dispersion in electronic markets. This article develops 
theoretical tools to understand competition in e-markets.  
Electronic business processes lower various information costs, such 
as search costs (Malone et al. 1987). In this respect, electronic markets 
should be more competitive than conventional markets because buyers 
can always locate the seller that sets the lowest price for a desired good. 
In consequence, e-markets were expected to gravitate towards marginal 
cost pricing which would eliminate price dispersion. The economic 
theory attributes search costs as the cause for price dispersion (Stigler 
1961). Search costs are much lower in e-markets than in conventional 
markets.  
In this paper, we present a model of price dispersion which is based 
on Carlson and McAfee (1983). In the model, heterogeneous buyers face 
non-negative search costs in the known price distribution, while the 
distribution of search costs is known to sellers. Under certain conditions 
variance of price distribution may increase even though search costs 
decrease. This occurs when a reduction in search costs affects buyers 
disparately. In addition, a partial equilibrium analysis shows that a 
market could display more extreme prices when search costs decreases 
which increases the variance of price dispersion. 
 
1.5.4 Returns on Reputation in Retail e-Commerce 
Asymmetric information that arises from the buyer’s inability to 
observe the quality of merchandise or the identity of a seller in an e-
commerce transaction may influence competition in e-markets. 
Consequently, a seller’s reputation may prove important in e-commerce 
(Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). Game theorists have recognized that 
firms resort to building reputations in attempts to fend off entrants 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1982). The industrial organization literature 
suggests that firms invest in reputation to earn price premiums (Klein 
                                                     
27 See Pan et al. (2004) for a review. 
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and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983). Data from online auctions shows that 
sellers are able to earn returns on their reputations (Sun 2008). However, 
there is very little empirical research about the influence of a seller’s 
reputation in retail e-markets. Hence, the objective of this paper is to fill 
the gap in the extant literature.  
In this study, we analyze sellers of homogeneous consumer products 
that were listed in Pricegrabber in May 2008 to determine whether sellers 
earn returns on their reputation. The product categories include 
appliances, auto parts, children’s products, cameras, computers, 
electronics, furniture, health and beauty products, indoor living products, 
musical instruments, outdoor living products, software, sporting goods, 
toys, TVs and video games. The data set that is used in this study was 
collected by using a computer program designed for the purpose. The 
data set contains information about sellers’ prices, reputation scores, 
which are measured by a rating score and a ratings history and market 
characteristics.  
To capture additional characteristics of sellers, we distinguish to 
separate seller types which can be controlled in the analysis. First, 
Pricegrabber itself provides a self-selection mechanism for sellers who 
have to register with Pricegrabber as storefronts or merchants. The 
participation fees are set in such a manner that the sellers that do not 
expect a high sales volume (small firms) choose the storefront package, 
whereas the sellers that expect to generate a high volume of sales benefit 
from the merchant package. Furthermore, we use the annual list of The 
Internet Retailer Magazine to separate the largest e-commerce vendors 
measured by sales from the rest of the seller population. 
We devise a hierarchical regression model, and use OLS and 
quantile regression to estimate the influence of reputation variables and 
market characteristics on sellers’ prices. To facilitate a direct 
comparability between markets for different products, which show a 
wide variation in their values, standardized variables are used in the 
regression analysis.  
Contrary to online auctions, the results indicate that in general, 
sellers do not earn returns on reputation in retail e-commerce. However, 
the evidence suggests that very large sellers may profit from their 
reputations in competition. In addition, small firms may see benefits if 
they stay in the market for a long period of time. Moreover, we discover 
that while an increase in the number of sellers lowers prices overall, the 
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control groups are not affected by this, but an increase in the number of 
small sellers lowers prices universally.  
 
1.5.5 Competition in Online Comparison Shopping Services 
Comparison shopping services (shopbots) are e-marketplaces where 
buyer search costs concerning price information vanish. However, 
buyers face uncertainty about a seller’s quality. The goal of this paper is 
to present a simple model of competition in an e-market environment 
where information asymmetries exist but price information is freely 
available. The implied results of the model are tested with data from 
Pricegrabber. This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical 
literature of electronic markets research.  
While comparison shopping services lower search costs, asymmetric 
information threatens functioning of e-markets. Comparison shopping 
services are online marketplaces that lower buyer search costs 
significantly by gathering numerous sellers in one place and providing 
easy price search for buyers. Very often, comparison shopping services 
include a reputation system that collects and distributes information 
about the past performance of a seller to buyers (Resnick and Zeckhauser 
2000). As a result, sellers for homogeneous goods are differentiated by 
their reputations which are provided by the reputation system. The 
model shows an explanation for the emergence of price dispersion in an 
environment where search costs do not exist, and buyers and sellers both 
maximize their profit. 
In the model, two profit-maximizing sellers sell a homogeneous 
good to Bayesian, risk-neutral buyers in an online comparison shopping 
service. A buyer uses a reputation system to update her beliefs about 
sellers. Buyers purchase from the seller that maximizes the buyer’s 
expected utility from the purchase. We find that the seller’s profit 
depends on the distribution of buyer beliefs. A degenerate distribution of 
beliefs implies either Bertrand competition or a monopolistic market. A 
non-degenerate distribution implies that both sellers can be profitable 
provided that their reputations differ from each other. The seller with a 
higher reputation score reaps higher profits. If sellers are similar in every 
respect, the Bertrand equilibrium obtains.  
The theoretical propositions are being tested with data from 
Pricegrabber. We estimate a regression model using OLS and quantile 
regression. Two seller types, Top500-sellers (large e-commerce vendors) 
and storefronts (small enterprises) are controlled with dummy variables. 
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While we find no support for overall price premiums originating from 
reputation, the evidence indicates that higher reputation scores may 
support price premiums especially for the controlled seller groups. 
Furthermore, quantile regression estimates suggest that there are returns 
on reputation when the sold goods are more valuable. This implies that 
buyers may consider a seller’s reputation as insurance against fraudulent 
behavior.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents an empirical study of competition in the online music market. 
Data consists of price information about CDs from pure-play Internet and hybrid 
firms in North America and Europe. By comparing price levels and price dispersion, 
we assess the influence of geographical location, branding and a variety of product 
offerings on prices. The results indicate that geographical location and a variety of 
product offerings can create price premiums, but branding does not allow a price 
premium. Price dispersion exists in the market, and prices are more dispersed among 
fringe sellers than branded sellers. The market is characterized by a group of firms or 
a dominant firm with whom most sellers match their prices. While fringe sellers act as 
competitive monopolists, pure-play branded sellers are locked in oligopoly or they 
collude in pricing. Moreover, the existence of a physical retail channel influences 
pricing strategies employed by hybrid sellers. The results imply that competition is 
imperfect in the online music market.  Therefore, the online music market proves that 
expectations of free competition in online markets are not fulfilled. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The technology boom of the late 1990s gave birth to retail electronic commerce (e-
commerce). As the number of Internet users grew at rapid rate, a wide array of firms 
that existed only on the Internet, dubbed as dotcoms, targeted online business-to-
consumer (B2C) markets. As a consequence of increased entry, competition in 
electronic markets (e-markets) intensified. Moreover, online business environment is 
prone to make e-markets more competitive than conventional markets (Malone et al. 
1987). According to Mahajan et al. (2002), two principles of consumer behavior are 
important in retail e-commerce. First, buyers seek the lowest price and second, buyers 
want efficient transactions. Therefore, retail e-markets may be very competitive. 
 
In retail markets, the key difference between the conventional and online business 
environment is the costs associated with information. First, obtaining information in 
physical markets is costly due to transportation costs and human labor costs (Stigler 
1961). Second, the cost of making price changes (e.g. price tags) manually creates 
substantial menu costs (Mankiw 1985). Third, buyers observe the entire commercial 
transaction which reduces asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller 
(Akerlof 1970). Fourth, bounded rationality, which arises from the limited capability 
of the human brain to process information, may cause costly errors in conventional 
markets (Williamson 1973).  
 
The physical retail space creates other differences. First, even with perfect 
information, transportation costs provide some market power to sellers because 
switching sellers is costly to buyers (Hotelling 1929). Second, locality of transactions 
reduces asymmetric information between buyers and sellers because buyers are able 
to inspect the merchandise before purchase and identify the seller (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002). Third, the limited shelf space constraints the number of available 
products. Fourth, a retailer requires sales personnel for tasks such as restocking 
shelves and customer service.  
 
As a result, transportation costs together with search costs provide some market power 
to sellers. Furthermore, if asymmetric information leads to buyers requiring a risk 
premium, it is likely to be lower in physical retailing. Fixed costs of physical retail 
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 space create also a barrier to entry. However, due to menu costs and the limited shelf 
space, a conventional retailer is less capable to respond rapidly to changes in demand. 
Information costs are radically different in e-markets. Retail e-commerce takes place 
on the Internet which is a network of computers, each equipped with processing 
power. The structural form of the Internet is a hyperarchy which is derived from the 
hyperlinks that enable the movement between websites in the World Wide Web 
(WWW). As a result, distances between the nodes on the Internet are equal regardless 
of their geographical locations. Since bandwidth and processing power grow in a 
rapid rate, more and richer information can be processed and distributed at lower costs 
than it is possible in the physical environment.28        
 
Online business environment has powerful consequences on competition in e-markets. 
First, the value of a location diminishes because a hyperarchy does not require 
physical movement between locations. Second, the computers connected to the 
Internet can automatically search and process information retrieved from other parts 
of the network at low cost. In consequence, search costs diminish, and buyers can find 
information about the sellers in a market and the prices they are charging. Hence, 
selling products with commodity-like characteristic may not be profitable, because 
product information about them is easy to communicate over the Internet (de 
Figueiredo 2000). According to a study by Shankar et al. (1999) consumers are more 
inclined to search lower prices in online markets than conventional markets. The 
economic theory states that a seller’s supernormal profit depends on the asymmetry of 
information on market conditions (Bakos 1991a). Information is symmetric and 
complete in perfect competition and monopoly (Salop and Stiglitz 1977). The market 
structures of imperfect competition (excluding monopoly), which are oligopoly and 
monopolistic competition, are to some degree creations of asymmetric information. 
With lower information costs, e-markets should gravitate towards perfect competition. 
However, monopolies or imperfect competition might emerge under certain 
conditions. For example, a market may be characterized by a dominant firm which 
acts as a price leader to small firms that form the competitive fringe (Stigler 1947; 
Bain 1960; Rotemberg and Saloner 1990)29.  
                                                     
28 See Evans and Wurster (1997) for discussion on consequences of the topology of the Internet. 
29 A firm that operates in the fringe (a fringe seller) is a firm which can only meet a fraction of the market demand 
due to capacity constraints (Bain 1960). 
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 Harnessing the power of computers and networks is the source of a competitive 
advantage in online markets. Low cost information processing capabilities enable a 
dramatic decrease in menu costs (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). A firm can apply 
computers in rapid responses to changes in demand or competitors’ pricing decisions. 
However, Tang and Xing (2001) note that frequent rapid reactions may not be 
lucrative because they increase a possibility of a typing error. Consequently, a firm 
can incur large expenses in errors of a digit or a decimal point. 
 
The e-commerce business model relies on warehouses and efficient supply chain 
management. Since the online storefront is a website on the Internet, an e-retailer 
requires less sales personnel for customer service because computers process online 
orders that are fulfilled from warehouses. In addition, the online storefront removes 
constraints on the shelf space because every sales article exists in the retailer’s 
database. For example, online bookstores carry a selection that is over twenty times 
larger than their offline competitors (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). Thus, there may be 
substantial economies of scope available in e-commerce (Curry and Kenney 2001). 
Moreover, networking can be used to minimize inventories and enable modern 
production methods such as just-in-time production and mass-customization. 
Optimally, a retailer becomes an intermediary facilitating a trade between a 
manufacturer and a consumer (Bakos 1991b). The economy-wide introduction of e-
markets could increase overall market efficiency and create new lucrative markets for 
intermediation (Bakos 1997).  
 
While information costs are generally lower in e-markets, a significant delay between 
purchase and consumption may be detrimental for e-commerce vendors. First, buyers 
cannot identify sellers, so their willingness to pay for the good may be lower than in 
conventional markets (Ba and Pavlou 2002). Second, buyers may fear that sensitive 
information, such as the credit card details, are not secure in a transaction (Resnick et 
al. 2000). Brands alleviate these concerns, if they convey a credible signal about a 
seller’s quality (Erdem and Swait 1998). For this reason, sellers with established 
online or offline brands may have a competitive advantage over less known rivals 
(Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001).   
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 Since online markets provide a market environment that differs from conventional 
markets, price levels and price dispersion have been under the loop. Due to lower 
search costs, price levels online were expected to be lower than in conventional 
markets (Bakos 1991a). Lower search costs could also lead to lower price dispersion 
because excess profits are competed away and the marginal cost pricing prevails.  
 
The initial results from price levels were baffling because prices online were found to 
be higher. Lee (1998) compared prices of used cars between a Japanese electronic 
auction system (AUCNET) and conventional auctions in 1986-1995. The results 
indicated that despite lower search costs, the prices in AUCNET were significantly 
higher than in conventional marketplaces. Lee attributed the result to the quality of the 
cars sold in AUCNET. In addition, as the price of a good is determined in an auction, 
the market power of sellers reflected by high reservation prices and the externality 
originating from large number of bidders could explain the result. The obvious 
problem with used cars is product heterogeneity, but Bailey (1998) reported a similar 
result in markets for new books, which are homogeneous across sellers. He suggested 
that the novelty of e-markets as an explanation. In the subsequent research, however, 
lower prices online is an established result. The prices for books and CDs (Lee et al. 
2003), books and CDs (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Ancarani and Shankar 2002), 
DVDs (Tang and Xing 2001; Xing and Tang 2004), and cars (Morton et al. 2001) 
online are lower than offline. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) find that lower search costs 
online have also lowered prices offline in life insurance industry.  
   
The opinion on the observed price dispersion is less unanimous. Price dispersion has 
been observed to be higher online than offline (Bailey 1998; Pan et al. 2001), or lower 
online than offline (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Brown and Goolsbee 2000; Tang 
and Xing 2001; Lee et al. 2003). Ancarani and Shankar (2002) note that a measure of 
price dispersion may be important. Using standard deviation, prices are more 
dispersed offline, but when the price range is applied online prices are more dispersed. 
In addition, Clay et al. (2001) suggest that there is a positive link between product 
popularity and price dispersion. They find that the most advertised books exhibit 
higher price dispersion than other book types.  
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 Seller characteristics could be an explanation for price dispersion. According to Pan et 
al. (2002), a seller’s brand and online trust may be more important determinants of 
price dispersion than the quality of service. Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) find that 
branded retailers are able to set price premiums over their unbranded rivals in the 
online book market. Smith (2001) and Clay et al. (2002) suggest that dominant, 
branded firms in the book retail industry match prices, whereas small competitors 
with less-known brands undercut them with prices. The existence of a physical retail 
chain could also impact prices. Tang and Xing (2001) discover that multi-channel 
(hybrid) retailers have higher price levels than their pure-play online counterparts. 
Ancarani and Shankar (2002) find that shipping charges together with a seller’s type 
influence price levels. With list prices, pure-play online sellers set lower prices than 
multi-channel (hybrid) or traditional retailers. With shipping charges, hybrids set the 
highest prices followed by pure-play and traditional retailers.  
 
In conclusion, factors determining competition in e-markets may prove more complex 
than initially assumed. E-markets provide substantial rewards for those retailers who 
take advantage of the special characteristics of the online business environment.  On 
the other hand, a failure to understand these will have an adverse effect on a seller’s 
profitability.  
 
The goal of this paper is to analyze competition in e-markets with statistical methods. 
We study price levels and price dispersion in the online music market. For this 
purpose, a data set of CD prices was collected on the Internet between July 2000 and 
December 2000. We intend to answer the following research questions on the basis of 
data. Does branding enable a price premium? Does international competition exist on 
the Internet? What effects a variety of product offerings has on competition? Which 
market structures are suitable to describe competition on the Internet?  
 
The paper proceeds in a following order: the methodology and the data will be 
described in the second section. After this, various statistical tests on the data are 
carried out in the third and fourth section30. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
                                                     
30 Mathematical descriptions of the statistical tests employed in this study can be found in Appendix 2. 
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 2. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
 
Commercialization of the Internet began in the mid-1990s as real world business 
models were transferred to online environment. Products of the music industry were 
among the first to be sold on the Internet. The pioneer of online record stores was 
CDNow, which started operating in 1994. It was the market leader until Amazon.com 
branched out to sell music in 199831. Subsequently, numerous retailers have entered 
the market. For this reason, the online music market is an excellent subject to study 
competition in e-markets.  
 
The data consists of price information about compact discs (CDs), which are ideal 
products to research competitive pricing because they are quasi-commodities (de 
Figueiredo 2000). Every CD-title is clearly differentiated from each other but retailers 
cannot further differentiate them. Since contents of a CD (digitized music) can be 
easily distributed over the Internet, the consumer is often able to sample a product 
before she decides to purchase it. Moreover, a CD’s size and weight makes it a 
relatively low cost item to ship. As a result, online sellers can compete with offline 
sellers because buyers are able to experience the good online before the purchase. 
 
The data was gathered by using Evenbetter.com which is a popular shopbot 32 . 
Evenbetter.com specializes in comparing prices in three product categories: books, 
movies and music. The advantage arising from the use of a shopbot is the possibility 
to observe all visible costs associated with the electronic B2C commerce. These 
include a retail price, taxes and duties levied on a product and delivery costs. In 
contrast, invisible costs that a buyer incurs, such as search costs, remain hidden33. 
Due to consumer heterogeneity, these costs are highly individual by their 
characteristics (Stigler 1961). Should they be measured and included, the analysis 
would become very different. Hence, price information is used in two ways. First, a 
“pure price” is a price that does not include any extra costs such as taxes or delivery 
                                                     
31 In 2002, Bertelsmann AG, which owns CDNow, handed over most of the operations of CDNow to its rival 
Amazon.com (International Herald Tribune Online 2002).  
32 Shopbots are price comparison services that allow buyers to obtain a list of prices for specific products. In 2000, 
Bertelsmann AG, the owner of evenbetter.com, sold her to a rival comparison shopping service DealTime 
(internetnews.com 2000). 
33 For example, these could include opportunity costs for time and costs from a computer and an access to the 
Internet.  
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 fees. It reveals the seller’s mark-up in pricing with respect to other sellers. Second, a 
“total price” is a price that includes all visible costs the customer incurs. These 
include a retail price, cost of shipping, and taxes levied by the government.      
                                                     
 
Representative items were selected from the popular music category. The assumption 
behind this is that the supply of popular music is larger than more marginal music 
such as classical music. In consequence, competition among the sellers of popular 
music is more active. Tang and Xing (2001) provide empirical support for this 
assumption. They found that competition on price is more active with more popular 
titles than random titles in the market for DVDs. To capture the online sales element, 
20 representative titles were selected from the official US sales chart Billboard Hot 
200 and Billboard’s Top Internet Sales Chart. Each item was noted on both charts at 
the time the observations started. The retailers included in the study were pure-play 
online sellers and hybrid sellers that were listed by evenbetter.com34. By this method, 
8064 price quotes from the titles were observed from a sample of 32 online retailers35. 
These were made once a week during a period of 26 weeks from the beginning of July 
2000 until the end of December 2000.  
 
In order to discover elements that influence price competition in e-markets, sellers 
were aggregated into groups according to their characteristics to find a general price 
level of a group36. The most fundamental characteristic was geography. Since the 
Internet is expected to broaden markets beyond national boundaries and create a 
global electronic market place, we test international price competition by comparing 
geographical groups. Sellers were located in the USA, Canada, the UK and Germany. 
The first two countries form the single NAFTA-market and the latter two belong to 
the common EU-market. Subscripts for the geographical groups are “NA” denoting 
North American firms and “EU” denoting European firms.  
 
Since the North American firms are more numerous, they are further divided in 
groups with respect to branding and product variation to verify their impacts on 
34 A pure-play online seller is a retailer, which operates only on the Internet. A hybrid seller is a retailer, which has a 
physical store chain in the conventional market and an online business outlet on the Internet. 
35 All price quotes were obtained in the US dollars (USD). The shopbot automatically converted price quotes in other 
currencies to the USD with a current exchange rate.  
36 The table showing these characteristics can be found in Appendix 1. 
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 competition in the market. A brand is considered a strategic tool, which can be used to 
increase sales and set a price premium. Tuominen (1995) describes brand equity as a 
combination of a name, customer loyalty, perceived quality, mental associations and 
possible other value factors. In essence, branding lowers a buyer’s information costs 
in ascertaining a product’s or a seller’s quality. Since it is difficult to imitate, copy, or 
resell a brand, it can provide a permanent competitive advantage. As implemented in 
Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000), we consider the firms attracting most web traffic as 
measured by web21.com more visible37. Since attracting web traffic requires efforts 
similar to branding, these are assumed to have a high brand valuation among buyers38. 
Due to the short history of B2C markets on the Internet, the online firms have not had 
time to build trust between them and consumers (Kotha and Rindova 1999). In 
addition to this, the exchange of confidential information, such as a credit card 
number, between a buyer and a seller accentuates the importance of branding in e-
commerce. Branding was also considered to be higher among hybrid sellers than other 
sellers (Smith et al. 1999). Hybrid sellers can leverage trust earned in conventional 
markets to online markets. A subscript “B” denotes branded sellers. Fringe sellers are 
considered to be those retailers that do not meet either of these criteria. A subscript 
“F” denotes fringe sellers.  
 
Diversity of a product offering can be a way to utilize the economics of scale and 
scope in e-commerce. An online storefront is a source of the economies of scope 
because the seller’s web site has no physical limitations (Curry and Kenney 2001). As 
a result, a retailer does not incur significant costs in adding more items in its catalogue 
(Bakos 2001). This also reduces the risk arising from changes in demand, as the seller 
is less dependent on the demand for single product category. In addition to this, 
electronic processing of orders leads to minimal inventories and increased efficiency. 
According to Bakos (1991b), “endless shelf space” creates significant economies of 
scale. Buyers can usually save in delivery costs by purchasing several goods from the 
same seller or pooling several orders into one. This could be an important factor in 
competition because Smith and Brynjolffson (2001) suggest that consumers are more 
sensitive to changes in delivery costs than changes in a list price of an item. The 
                                                     
37 Web21.com tracks web traffic using the hits on a web site as a measure of the site’s popularity. 
38 As a proxy for popularity, branded sellers accounted for over 90 % of all the links leading to the North American 
sellers’ web sites that were included in the study.  
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 division concerning product offerings is made depending on how close substitutes the 
products the firm sells are. The retailers selling music, movies and books are 
considered to have a simple product offering39. A subscript “S” denotes this group in 
the tables and an abbreviation “SPO-sellers” in the text. In contrast, the retailers 
selling products from different categories (e.g. music and electronics) are considered 
to have a wide product offering. This group is denoted by a subscript “W” in the 
tables and an abbreviation “WPO-sellers” in the text.  
 
A major limitation of the data set, which will have an effect in results, is that it does 
not reveal the market share of an individual firm. List prices are ex-ante prices, so 
they do not reveal at which prices actual transactions occur. For this reason, it is not 
possible to give a certain view over competitive dynamics on the Internet. With this 
limitation in mind, we will run statistical tests on the data in the next section. 
 
3. PRICE LEVELS 
 
In this section, we will analyze general pure and total price levels in the online music 
market. For this reason, retailers are aggregated into groups that represent a seller 
type. Comparisons are made between the groups of North American and European 
sellers, branded and fringe sellers, and SPO- and WPO-sellers. Since most firms offer 
multiple delivery options that vary in duration and cost, the one with the lowest price 
was selected to represent the total price.  
 
The first statistical test implemented on the data is the Jarque-Bera test for 
normality40. The purpose of this test is to find whether the distribution underlying the 
data is normal. “JB” denotes the Jarque-Bera test statistic in the tables. The critical 
value of a χ2-distribution with two degrees of freedom and a 5% probability of error is 
used to determine normality. The test hypothesis is that the distributions are normal. 
We test the distributions measured with pure and total price levels. The results from 
Jarque-Bera tests can be found in Table A1 in Appendix 1. The results indicate that 
the observations are not normally distributed. Removing an outlier observation from 
                                                     
39 CDs, DVDs and books are considered to be relatively close substitutes because they are based on information, used 
mostly for entertainment, and within the same pricing range. 
40 The calculations involved in determining the Jarque-Bera test statistic can be found in Appendix 2. 
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 the group of branded sellers makes the distribution normal but this does not change 
the general conclusion of non-normality41.  
 
Since the Jarque-Bera test leads to a rejection of the normality hypothesis in every 
potential comparison pair, we use a non-parametric test to discover statistically 
significant differences in price levels. The test carried out on the data is Mann-
Whitney’s U-test, which is a non-parametric alternative to the parametric t-test42. In 
the tables, “U” denotes a calculated test statistic, “Md” denotes median values, and 
“p” denotes a probability for acceptance of the test hypothesis. Critical p-values 
below 0.05 reject the test hypothesis. Subscripts “pure” and “total” refer to a price 
type that is used in the test hypothesis. 
 
The first test is conducted between branded and fringe sellers. The U-test determines, 
whether a statistically significant difference in median price levels exists. The test 
hypothesis is that median price levels between the groups are equal. The results from 
tests with pure and total price levels are presented in Table 1. The p-value suggests 
that the test hypothesis of equal median pure price levels should be accepted. 
Removing the outlier does not change this result. The test is then carried out by 
comparing total median price levels. These are also equal with a high probability. As 
before, the result holds when the outlier is removed. In conclusion, we accept the test 
hypothesis of equal price levels. The results indicate that branded sellers, in general, 
do not have an advantage in pricing over fringe sellers, and branding does not enable 
a price premium. 
 
The impact of the Internet on international competition is analyzed by comparing 
price levels between the North American and European retailers. The results from the 
Mann-Whitney U-test with pure and total price levels are shown in Table 2. We reject 
the test hypothesis of equal pure price levels. The median price level in Europe is 
considerably higher than in North America. This result is strengthened by the fact that 
                                                     
41 An “outlier” is a statistical term for an anomalous observation, which is located far from the rest of the data. 
Among branded sellers, BMG USA can be treated as such. Its price level was considerably lower than the price levels 
of other sellers in the group. In addition to this, BMG USA produces music and sells only its own titles. 
42 The calculations involved in determining the Mann-Whitney test statistic can be found in Appendix 2 and the 
numbers of observations in Table A1 in Appendix 1. 
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 current exchange rates at the time were favorable for European sellers43. The result 
obtained earlier holds also with total price levels, as we reject the test hypothesis with 
a very high probability. It seems that especially in global markets, extra costs arising 
from taxes, duties and delivery expenses have a great impact on total prices. This 
sample suggests that expectations of fiercer price competition on the Internet are not 
fulfilled. The pure price levels alone show that there is a great divide between the 
trading blocks. In addition to this, the mandatory extra costs increase the difference 
even wider. 
 
Table 1. The U-test: branded and fringe sellers. 
 
Hypothesis MdB MdF U p Conclusion 
Brandedpure = Fringepure 13.65 14.01 -1.83 0.067 accepted 
Branded*pure = Fringepure 13.72 14.01 -1.23 0.219 accepted 
Brandedtotal = Fringetotal 17.54 17.50 -0.55 0.582 accepted 
Branded*total = Fringetotal 17.48 17.50 -0.58 0.562 accepted 
  
Branded* calculated by excluding BMG USA. 
 
Table 2. The U-test: European and North American sellers. 
 
Hypothesis MdEU MdNA U p Conclusion 
EUpure = NAFTApure 18.15 13.88 -2.43 0.015 rejected 
EUtotal = NAFTAtotal 26.87 17.54 -3.07 0.002 rejected 
  
The online trading system creates significant economies of scale and scope. A seller 
can capitalize these by diversifying its product offering at low costs. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that a seller of a wide product offering can use this to set price 
premiums on items. Anecdotal evidence on a viability of this strategy exists. The 
largest online retailer in the world, Amazon.com, started with selling books online, 
but it has gradually expanded its product offering and become linked to its suppliers. 
As a result, Amazon.com has become an online market place for a wide variety of 
products and services.  
 
The hypothesis presented above is tested by dividing North American sellers in two 
categories according to the variety of their product offering. The test hypothesis is that 
                                                     
43 During the observation period, the average exchange rates were 0.88903 USD/EUR and 1.46419 USD/GBP, whereas 
during three following years these were 0.990174 USD/EUR and 1.52711 USD/GBP. 
68 
 
 pure price levels are equal. The results from the U-test are presented in Table 3. The 
test hypothesis can be rejected with high confidence. The result indicates that WPO-
sellers are able to set a price premium over SPO-sellers. After this, the same test is 
carried out by examining total price levels. The results from the U-test are shown in 
Table 3. According to the test, we reject the hypothesis of equal price levels. As all 
the visible costs are included, the price levels between the groups differ significantly. 
An explanation for this could be that consumers are likely to save in delivery costs by 
pooling order. As a result, WPO-sellers have a higher mark-up per item, which leads 
to larger profits. To compete with them, SPO-sellers have to accept a lower mark-up.  
 
Table 3. The U-test: SPO-sellers and WPO-sellers. 
 
Hypothesis MdSPO MdWPO U p Conclusion 
SPOpure = WPOpure 13.88 13.85 -3.25 0.001 rejected 
SPOtotal = WPOtotal 17.36 17.86 -3.07 0.002 rejected 
  
 
Dividing sellers in groups and comparing their price levels indicated that the price 
levels are not equal in every aspect. By employing statistical methods, we have seen 
that they are equal only between branded and fringe retailers. This would imply that 
an investment in branding does not necessarily lead to a higher profit margin. The 
outcome is contradictory to the results achieved by Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001). 
They analyzed consumer behavior at the shopbots by using a data set, which was 
gathered from book sales by Evenbetter.com-shopbot. The data consisted of prices, a 
number of searches per title and cookies, which revealed a buyer’s location and her 
choice over sellers44. As a result, the study showed that branded sellers could set an 
average price premium of 1.13 USD per item. Consequently, they found out that 
consumer loyalty to the seller enables an average price premium of 2.49 USD per item 
over an unknown seller.  
 
The explanation for these seemingly contradictory results could lie in the differences 
of the data sets and methodology. CDs and books, nevertheless, share the 
characteristics of a quasi-homogenous product based on information. Therefore, the 
missing price premium could result from several factors present in the online music 
                                                     
44 A cookie is a text file, which a web server can store on a user’s hard drive. The web site can store and retrieve 
information on the user’s computer by using cookies. 
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 market as opposed to most other online markets. First, a CD is a product with a 
relatively low price unlike products such as electronic appliances. As a consequence, 
consumers place lower valuations on warranties, return policies or a seller’s 
reputation, which are typically characteristics attached to a brand (Tuominen 1995). 
Second, competition in this particular market could be more intense. Third, the buyer 
population has a higher propensity to search the lowest price than in other online 
markets. Bae (2003) suggests that a lower than expected market price results from 
varying demands among buyers. Some consumers abstain from searching the lowest 
price because search costs exceed their individual consumer surplus. A decrease in the 
market price increases the overall number of buyers in the market. For this reason, 
sellers in the market collusively set prices below the equilibrium, which benefits 
buyers and sellers alike. 
 
The comparison between North American and European sellers shows that geography 
still matters on the Internet. Price levels in Europe were considerably higher with and 
without all visible extra costs. There are two plausible explanations for this. First, it 
could be that North American retailers, in general, are more cost efficient than their 
European rivals. As a consequence, they are able to supply items at lower prices than 
European retailers. Second, it is likely that competition in the North American market 
is more intense than in Europe, which in turn leads to the lower prices. The fact that 
there are more incumbent firms in the North American market than in the European 
market supports this argument.  
 
In the third test, sellers were divided in groups according to variety of product 
offerings. The results indicate that the retailers with a wide product offering are able 
to set a price premium over the retailers who offer less product variety. With both 
pure and total price levels, WPO-sellers have a higher median price level than SPO-
sellers. We can draw two conclusions from this. First, utilizing the economies of 
scope enables a price premium because a wide product variety is a way to use 
efficiently the advantages offered by the online trading system. Second, consumers 
could select a WPO-seller in order to save in delivery costs by pooling orders across 
product categories. These two factors are a likely explanation for the observed price 
premium in this category.  
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 4. PRICE DISPERSION 
 
The existence of price dispersion indicates that one or more conditions of competitive 
markets are not met. It can be a consequence from various reasons. Stigler (1961) 
accounts price dispersion for “ignorance in the market”, which is a result of 
asymmetrical information, product heterogeneity and search costs. Basically, there are 
two kinds of price dispersion. Spatial price dispersion is a range of prices charged in 
different locations. Temporal price dispersion is a range of prices charged in a time 
interval.  
 
There are several theoretical models that illustrate the emergence of price dispersion. 
Salop and Stiglitz (1977) present a model of spatial price dispersion. In this model, 
price dispersion is a result from entry costs or heterogeneous search costs among the 
buyer population. Informed buyers select the lowest price in the market, whereas 
uninformed buyers shop at random. Sellers are monopolistically competitive and set 
their prices accordingly. There are two prices in the equilibrium: a price of perfect 
competition for informed buyers and a price which is above a monopoly price for 
uninformed buyers. Varian (1980) presents a model of temporal price dispersion with 
similar assumptions regarding buyers, sellers and market conditions. As in Salop & 
Stiglitz, two prices prevail in the equilibrium.  
 
Considering the assumptions behind these models, price dispersion should not exist in 
online markets. There are two major reasons for this. First, buyers face low search 
costs on the Internet. The search process can be automatized and no spatial movement 
is required. For instance, the buyers using a shopbot become fully informed with 
negligible search costs on the price level of a market. Second, entry costs incurred by 
buyers are low. Thanks to the Internet, the technology needed for online transactions 
is essentially identical across buyers. In reality, however, price dispersion exists in e-
markets and it can even be higher than in conventional markets45.  
 
There are several explanations for the emergence of price dispersion in electronic 
markets. According to Smith et al. (1999), there are six major factors involved. First, 
                                                     
45 See, for example, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000). 
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 product heterogeneity through differentiation is an obvious reason for a range of 
prices. Second, individually distributed opportunity costs for time may lead to the 
existence of price dispersion. It is also likely that customer awareness in online 
markets, “the neural estate”, could create price premiums. Large investments in 
marketing and highly visible locations at popular web sites support this view. 
Branding could be another cause because it is a way to signal trust to consumers. 
Switching costs can be also utilized to lock a customer in a service and consequently 
raise the price. Finally, price discrimination creates price dispersion. This can take 
place as in conventional markets. For instance, discounts are offered to selected 
customers. Another way is to exploit the benefits of online trading systems, and use 
the information on customers in dynamic pricing purposes.  
 
Smith (2001) presents a model of price dispersion for e-markets. He suggests that 
buyers in e-markets incur different search costs in respect to their mental awareness of 
sellers. He divides buyers in three categories. Dominant aware buyers can search 
without costs for prices among dominant sellers, but finding additional sellers creates 
search costs. Fringe aware buyers have no search costs among the dominant sellers 
and one fringe seller, but additional searches are costly. Buyers in the third category 
use a shopbot and face no search costs in the market. As a result, dominant sellers 
collude by setting prices low enough to discourage consumers from searching lower 
prices. The more numerous fringe sellers, however, randomize their prices in an 
equilibrium, in which the prices are constrained by the decisions of dominant sellers. 
 
The data in this study consists of quasi-homogenous products. This eliminates product 
differentiation as a device of price discrimination. As a result, the information 
affecting the trade when the product is concerned becomes symmetrical between 
buyers and sellers. As we recall the earlier results, the overall price levels were not 
equal between the North American and European sellers and the WPO- and SPO-
sellers. Price dispersion is obviously inherent in these results. In contrast, price levels 
between the groups of branded and fringe sellers were equal. However, price ranges, 
standard deviations (denoted by “S”) and coefficients of variation (denoted by ”VC”) 
of the groups in Table 4 suggest that there is heterogeneity in price levels within the 
groups and in the market. Therefore, we examine firm-specific data to make more 
precise inferences about market conditions than it was possible with aggregated data. 
72 
 
 To do that, we will employ statistical methods to discover how prices are dispersed in 
the market and within the groups. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Prices. 
 
Pure Price Ranges 
Group Mean Min. Max. S VC
Branded 13.14 7.99 16.03 2.56 0.195
Fringe 14.18 9.36 18.54 2.53 0.178 
EU 16.43 13.54 18.30 1.54 0.094 
NAFTA 13.79 7.99 18.54 2.56 0.186 
SPO 13.47 7.99 18.54 2.95 0.219 
WPO 14.44 12.59 17.08 1.50 0.104 
  
Total Price Ranges 
Group Mean Min. Max. S VC
Branded 16.87 11.66 19.85 2.56 0.152
Fringe 17.46 12.68 20.47 2.53 0.145 
EU 28.13 22.35 38.42 1.54 0.055 
NAFTA 17.24 11.66 20.47 2.56 0.148 
SPO 16.85 11.66 20.47 2.95 0.175 
WPO 18.02 16.53 20.22 1.50 0.083 
  
The differences within the groups are examined by carrying out the one factor 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the data. First, we test whether or not the 
observations in the groups are from the normal distribution. This is accomplished by 
examining skewness of data, and comparing calculated values from the data to a 
corresponding critical value of the normal distribution46. The results are presented in 
Table A2 in Appendix 1, where “zpure” and “ztotal” denote calculated absolute values 
from pure and total price levels. These values are compared to the critical value 1.96 
in the normal distribution, which corresponds to a 5% margin of error. The tests prove 
that most sellers do not meet the normality assumption required by the parametric 
ANOVA. 
 
Since the normality assumption is not valid, we apply a non-parametric ANOVA on 
the data. This is also known as the Kruskal-Wallis test47. The test hypothesis is that all 
medians from pure and total price levels are equal. These are denoted by “P1, 2, …” in 
Table 5. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one mean is statistically different 
from the others. The calculated test statistics are compared to significant values of a 
                                                     
46 The calculations involved in determining the normality test statistic “z” can be found in Appendix 2. 
47 The calculations involved in performing the Kruskal-Wallis test can be found in Appendix 2, the numbers of 
observations in Table A2 in Appendix 1. 
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 χ2-statistic with a 5% margin of error. The results from the groups are presented in 
Table 5. The test hypothesis of equal median pure and total price levels among sellers 
in the market is rejected. Furthermore, the breakdown of the market in the sub-
categories of fringe and branded sellers leads to a rejection of the test hypothesis 
within these groups as well. 
 
Table 5. The Kruskal-Wallis test: seller groups. 
Group  Hypothesis χ2calc χ20.95 Conclusion 
Marketpure P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P24 260.29 35.17 rejected 
Fringepure P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P15 159.17 23.68 rejected 
Brandedpure P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P9 82.72 15.51 rejected 
Markettotal P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P24 261.48 35.17 rejected 
Fringetotal P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P15 160.73 23.68 rejected 
Brandedtotal P1 = P2 = P3 = … = P9 80.25 15.51 rejected 
  
 
By calculating figures from price dispersion we can study conditions in the market. 
These are presented in Table 6. Regardless of a price level used in measurement, the 
share of sellers charging prices above the market mean or median is high because 
nearly a half of the seller population sets prices above the market average. This is 
consistent with Varian’s (1980) model. It predicts that prices above the market 
average are more frequent because they are a safer bet. The breakdown between 
fringe and branded sellers shows that higher prices are more frequent among fringe 
sellers. The difference between the mean and median shares is negligible. 
Consequently, average price dispersion is higher. However, the percentage of firms 
above the market mean is considerably larger than above the market median among 
branded sellers. There is also less average price dispersion among them in pure price 
levels, but total price levels seem equal. These figures suggest that branded sellers are 
more sensitive to each other’s pricing decisions than fringe sellers. 
 
Multiple comparisons are a method, which is used to enhance the results from the 
variance analysis 48 . In this case, we use it to examine, which seller pairs are 
statistically significantly different from each other. The results from the multiple 
comparisons on pure price levels are presented in Table A3 in Appendix 1. The share 
of statistically significant pairs is 30%. The same test is carried out on total price 
levels in Table A4 in Appendix 1. This does not alter the overall situation because the 
                                                     
48 The calculations used to carry out multiple comparisons can be found in Appendix 2. 
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 share reduces only slightly to 28%. These results indicate that most sellers take into 
account their competitors’ pricing decisions.  
 
Table 6. Price dispersion figures. 
 
Pure Price Levels 
Group Share of sellers above the 
market mean / median 
Average price 
dispersion 
Market 58 % / 42 % 14 %  
Branded 21 % /  8  % 12 %  
Fringe 37 % / 34 % 15 %  
  
Total Price Levels 
Group Share of sellers above the 
market mean / median 
Average price 
dispersion 
Market 58 % / 46 % 13 %  
Branded  21% / 13 % 13 %  
Fringe 37 % / 33 % 12 %  
  
 
A closer examination of how the pairs are distributed among sellers reveals the 
pricing behavior of an individual firm vis-à-vis other firms. The results on pure and 
total price levels are presented in Table 7. The implication behind these figures is that 
the less significant pairs a seller has, the more other sellers are willing to match prices 
with it. Since fringe sellers are too small to act as price leaders, dominant firms in the 
market are the branded sellers with few significant pairs. The nucleus in this group 
consists of the firms with less than a 10% share. In contrast, prices are more dispersed 
among fringe sellers, where firms above the 10% threshold form a vast majority. 
Examining total price levels do not reverse the result as changes in shares upward and 
downward roughly cancel each other out. However, among branded sellers only 
Amazon.com remains below the 10% share. An implication of this is that other firms 
use its prices as a benchmark for their pricing decisions. This conduct fits in the 
framework of price leadership.   
 
To examine more closely price dispersion within the groups of fringe and branded 
sellers, we conduct multiple comparisons on both groups. The results from the 
multiple comparisons on pure and total price levels among fringe sellers are presented 
in Table 8. In this group, pure price levels were statistically different in 33% of the 
comparison pairs. Measured with total price levels, the share of statistically significant 
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 pairs decreases to 31% of the total. The firm-specific distributions of significant pairs 
are presented in Table 9. They indicate that including extra costs in prices seems to 
reduce price dispersion within the group because the shares of significant pairs 
decrease with total prices.  
 
Table 7. Distribution of significant pairs: the market. 
 
 Pure Price Levels 
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR 
% 8.3 37.5 16.7 45.8 8.3 12.5 8.3 58.3 20.8 
Seller 800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS 
% 20.8 25.0 16.7 20.8 20.8 33.3 4.2 54.2 41.7 
Seller MM PC QM SR SG Spn    
% 41.7 8.3 12.5 41.7 33.3 33.3    
  
 Total Price Levels 
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR 
% 8.3 33.3 20.8 33.3 12.5 12.5 12.5 45.8 20.8 
Seller 800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS 
% 12.5 37.5 20.8 20.8 16.7 20.8 4.2 41.6 33.3 
Seller MM PC QM SR SG Spn    
% 54.2 54.2 25.0 33.3 37.5 41.7    
  
The row “%” indicates the percentage a seller’s price level differs from its rivals. 
 For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 8. Price dispersion: fringe sellers. 
 
Pure Price Levels 
 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn
800 - - - - - - - - + + - + - - 
AC  - - - + - - - + + - + - - 
Buy   - - - - + + - - - - + - 
CDW    - - - - - + + - + - - 
DW     - - - - + + - + - - 
Elg      - + + - - - - + - 
Exp      + - - + - - - - 
Fie      - + + + + - - 
MS      + + + + - - 
MM      - - - + + 
PC      - - + + 
QM      - - - 
SR       + + 
SG        - 
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 Total Price Levels 
 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn 
800 - - - - - - - - + + - - - - 
AC  - - - + - - - + + + + - - 
Buy   - - - - + + - - - - - + 
CDW    - - - - - + + - + - - 
DW     - - - - + + - - - - 
Elg      - + - - - - - - + 
Exp      - - + + - - - - 
Fie      - - + + + - - 
MS      + + + + - - 
MM      - - - + + 
PC      - - + + 
QM      - - + 
SR       - + 
SG        - 
 
The sign ‘+’ indicates that the pair is statistically significant. 
The sign ‘-‘ indicates that the pair is not statistically significant.  
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1. 
 
The results from the multiple comparisons show that there is price dispersion among 
fringe sellers. This is a strong argument against the conditions of free competition or 
oligopolistic competition. The best model to describe competition between fringe 
sellers is the general model of monopolistic competition. They could be applying 
pricing strategies, which exploit asymmetrically informed buyers, reach informed 
customers through price competition or target special segments of the market. 
 
Table 9. Distribution of significant pairs: fringe sellers. 
 
 Pure Price Levels 
 
 Total Price Levels 
 
The row “%” indicates the percentage a seller’s price level differs from its rivals. 
 For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1. 
Seller 800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp Fie 
% 13.3 33.3 20.0 20.0 13.3 20.0 13.3 33.3 
Seller MS MM PC QM SR SG Spn   
% 33.3 53.3 60.0 26.7 33.3 13.3 40.0  
  
Seller  800 AC Buy CDW DW Elg Exp  Fie 
%  20.0 26.7  20.0 20.0 20.0 26.7 46.7  13.3 
MS Seller  MM  PC QM SR SG Spn      
%  40.0 53.3  60.0 13.3 53.3 33.3 20.0  
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 In a similar vein, the test is conducted on the group of branded sellers. The results are 
presented in Table 10. The share of statistically significant pairs is 31% with pure 
price levels. However, when the test is carried out on pure price levels, the share 
increases to 39%. The firm-specific distributions of significant pairs are presented in 
Table 11. They show that extra costs, which are added in prices at an online store, 
increase price dispersion. Despite this, the evidence reveals that most firms want to 
match their total prices, not pure prices, with the market leader.  
 
Table 10. Price dispersion: branded sellers. 
 
Pure Price Levels 
 B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
Amaz + - + - - - + -
B&N  + + - - + + -
Blue   - - - - - -
BMG    + + - - +
Bord    - - - -
CDN    - - -
CDU    - -
Dja    +
  
 
Total Price Levels 
 B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja TR
Amaz + - - - - - - -
B&N  - + - - + + -
Blue   + - - + + -
BMG    + + - - +
Bord    - - + -
CDN    - + -
CDU    - +
Dja        +
  
The sign ‘+’ indicates that the pair is statistically significant.  
The sign ‘-‘ indicates that the pair is not statistically significant.  
For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1. 
 
These results reveal the existence of price dispersion among branded sellers. In 
comparison to fringe sellers, price dispersion is higher among branded sellers. As a 
consequence, the conditions of free competition are not met. However, we can make 
some deductions about the pricing strategies applied by the group. The statistically 
78 
 
 significant pairs are mainly hybrid sellers and the outlier, whereas other branded 
sellers do not have significant differences between their price levels. The matching 
prices set by other branded sellers could be interpreted as evidence of oligopolistic 
price competition. However, since their price levels are not the lowest in the market, it 
could constitute evidence of collusive pricing. Since prices become more dispersed 
with total price levels, it is possible that some firms have cost advantages in delivery 
cost. These could result from better contracts with logistics service providers.  
 
Table 11. Distribution of significant pairs: branded sellers. 
 
 Pure Price Levels 
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja Tow 
% 33.3 55.6 11.1 55.6 11.1 11.1 11.1 33.3 22.2 
 
Total Price Levels 
Seller Amaz B&N Blue BMG Bord CDN CDU Dja Tow 
% 11.1 44.4 33.3 55.6 22.2 22.2 33.3 55.6 33.3 
  
The row “%” indicates the percentage a seller’s price level differs from its rivals. 
 For the abbreviations, see seller descriptions in Appendix 1. 
 
The existence of a physical store chain can explain the pricing strategies employed by 
hybrid sellers. The reason for this is that it creates a higher cost structure for them, 
which in turn leads to higher prices. Another cause could be that hybrid sellers are 
obliged to match prices between their physical outlets and online stores to avoid 
cannibalizing their own business (Deleersnyder et al. 2002). Tang & Xing (2001) 
suggest that the explanation could lie in two consumer types. The first type compares 
prices and buys from the cheapest seller, which are typically pure-play online 
retailers. The second type is less inclined to buy from pure-play sellers because he or 
she lacks trust for them or is not aware of their existence. As a result, hybrid sellers 
can leverage trust earned in conventional markets to premium pricing in e-markets. 
 
The results from the internal differences among the groups of branded and fringe 
sellers are consistent with results from other studies. Compared to conventional 
markets, price dispersion seems to be equal (Bailey 1998) or higher (Brynjolfsson and 
Smith 2000) online. Ancarani and Shankar (2002) discovered that price dispersion is 
higher when measured with range among pure-play sellers but in terms of variability, 
hybrid sellers have higher price dispersion. In addition to this, hybrid sellers had 
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 higher price levels than either pure-play online or conventional sellers. Tang and Xing 
(2001) examined price dispersion between hybrid and pure-play retailers of DVDs. 
They found that price dispersion is sharply lower among the pure-plays than the 
hybrids. Smith (2001) investigated price dispersion among pure-play Internet 
bookstores. His findings included that dominant sellers are able to collude, whereas 
fringe sellers cannot do this. Moreover, some fringe sellers follow price setting of the 
dominant sellers, whereas others create their own pricing strategies. This finding is 
also supported by Clay et al. (2001). 
 
In conclusion, the existence of price dispersion can be interpreted as a sign of 
imperfect competition or low search costs. Salop and Stiglitz (1977) support the first 
approach. According to them, a sufficiently large number of informed buyers create 
an externality leading to a perfectly competitive price. For this reason, it seems that 
the buyers who search the lowest price are in the minority, whereas most buyers 
cannot reap maximum benefits from e-markets. Since sellers cannot differentiate their 
products and buyers face low search costs, some factors favor imperfect competition. 
These could be high search costs for some buyers, unawareness of the range of sellers 
in the market, or issues, such as branding. Alone or combined, they make the market 
less competitive, and we find evidence supporting oligopoly, collusion and 
monopolistic competition in the online music market. Rothschild (1974) offers the 
alternative view. He shows that increased price dispersion is a product of lower search 
costs. From this aspect, lower search costs allow a buyer to search across a wider 
distribution of prices. Therefore, we could expect the prices in online markets to be 
more dispersed. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper approaches competition in electronic B2C markets by examining price 
competition in the online music market. While most researchers have concentrated on 
comparing conventional and online markets, our approach is to study purely the 
market on the Internet. In order to do that, we have to understand the special 
characteristics of online business environment and what are their impacts on 
competition. 
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 The key difference to conventional business environment can be found in the 
economics of information. It is a result from lower costs in information processing 
and distribution. They lead to lowered search costs. As a result, buyers can become 
aware of all sellers, products and prices in the market. Electronic commerce can also 
broaden markets and lower entry costs. These factors could intensify price 
competition and benefit consumers. To succeed in e-business, sellers have to 
understand computer networks and harness their power. Online trading systems can 
create significant economies of scale and scope. However, B2C markets on the 
Internet are a recent phenomenon and for this reason, methods such as branding can 
be an important tool in a corporate strategy. 
 
We examine competition in the online music market by using price data from CDs. 
The study includes 32 pure-play online and hybrid retailers from the North American 
and European markets. We test the impacts of geographical location, branding and a 
variety of product offerings on price levels. Testing with pure price levels shows that 
a brand does not allow for a price premium. In contrast, a wide product offering seems 
to lead to a price premium. The geographical location matters on the Internet because 
European sellers have significantly higher price levels than their North American 
rivals. Testing with total price levels reveals that there is no statistical difference 
between branded and fringe sellers. The premium found in pure price levels in favor 
of the sellers of a wide product offering exists also with total price levels. Likewise, 
the difference between the European and North American sellers remains the same. 
 
The existence of price dispersion can be evidence of imperfect competition. Price 
dispersion exists in the North American market. Majority of sellers set prices above 
the market mean. However, a share of branded sellers above the market median is 
significantly lower than above the mean. This suggests that sellers in the group are 
willing to match prices. By examining the results from multiple comparisons on 
sellers in the market, we make deductions about competition and pricing strategies. 
They indicate that there is a small group of firms or a single firm acting as a price 
leader among branded sellers, with whom other sellers match their prices. Moreover, 
prices are more dispersed among fringe sellers. A closer study of the internal 
differences among the groups of fringe and branded sellers reveals that the pure-play 
branded sellers form an oligopoly or collude in pricing. We also find that hybrid 
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 sellers do not follow this practice generally. Fringe sellers, on the other hand, behave 
as the general model of monopolistic competition predicts.  
 
In conclusion, the online music market proves that expectations of more competitive 
e-markets are not realized. From the customer’s point of view, these findings imply 
that evidence of imperfect competition can be found in the market, which should be 
highly competitive due to product characteristics of CDs. This is clearly leading to 
deterioration in consumer welfare. From the firm’s aspect, we find that investments in 
branding do not necessarily pay off. However, investments in broader selection of 
goods offered in the online storefront may prove profitable. In the future, advances in 
enabling technologies of e-commerce will have further impacts on the business 
environment in online markets. Without a doubt, these will influence competition and 
market structures in e-markets. For this reason, more research will be needed to assess 
the overall impacts of e-markets on competition, the economy and social welfare.    
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ABSTRACT49 
 
The industrial organization literature suggests that firms invest in reputation to earn 
price premiums. Data from online auctions has revealed that sellers are able to earn 
returns on their reputations. This paper examines online retail markets from the same 
perspective. Data from the markets of homogeneous consumer products listed in 
Pricegrabber.com in May 2008 is analyzed with a hierarchical regression model using 
OLS and quantile regression. Contrary to online auctions, the results indicate that in 
general, sellers do not earn returns on reputation in retail e-commerce. However, the 
evidence suggests that very large sellers and small sellers may benefit from their 
reputations in competition. Moreover, we discover that while an increase in the 
number of sellers lowers prices overall, the control groups are not affected by this but 
an increase in the number of small sellers lowers prices universally.  
 
Keywords: retailing, e-commerce, competition, reputation effects, asymmetric 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
49 A version of this paper has been published in Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 196-219, 
2009. 
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 1. Introduction 
The Internet gives consumers unprecedented power in purchase decisions. Since the 
cost of search is minimal on the Internet, buyers can easily compare prices across 
several vendors before purchase. While price information is more accessible on the 
Internet, consumers face information-related risks in e-commerce. In e-commerce 
transactions, buyers disclose sensitive information, such as credit card details, to a 
seller. Furthermore, it is not possible to verify the quality of merchandise or the 
identity of a seller, because the merchandise is delivered after the seller has received a 
payment. Facing these problems of asymmetric information, buyers may need 
assurance that sellers do not cheat them. As a result, a good reputation or a widely 
recognized brand could be a valuable asset in e-commerce.  
 
New online information services have reduced asymmetric information in retail e-
commerce. To make price comparisons more convenient, several companies offer 
comparison shopping services. These websites enable comparison shopping on the 
Internet by providing up-to-date price quotes for various products. Very often these 
websites have reputation systems which collect and distribute information about the 
past activities of sellers. As a consequence, comparison shopping websites are highly 
competitive marketplaces where buyers are able to compare prices and risks 
associated with any particular seller. Comparison shopping websites are popular 
because many of them are among the 1000 most visited websites on the Internet50. 
Since large consumer flows can translate into higher revenues, firms have a solid 
financial incentive to participate in comparison shopping markets. In addition, they 
offer firms market information about the customer base and a low cost method of 
monitoring rivals.  
 
Comparison shopping markets present a great opportunity to gain insights on the 
market structures of e-markets. The determinants of market structure are market 
concentration, product differentiation, the conditions of entry and exit and information 
(Jacobson and O’Callaghan-Andréosso 1996). In comparison shopping markets, 
products are identical and the barriers to entry and exit are low. Therefore, market 
                                                     
50 Examples of comparison shopping service websites include portals and search engines such as AOL (21), CNET 
(127), Google (2), MSN (5) and Yahoo! (1) and specialized comparison shopping websites such as Become.com (2786), 
Dealtime.com (465), Pricegrabber.com (870) and NexTag.com (546). A global web traffic rank in parentheses 
(retrieved July 1st 2008) as reported by Alexa (www.alexa.com), a company that tracks web traffic.   
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 concentration and information will determine market structure. Since market structure 
determines pricing and profits, studying data from comparison shopping markets 
helps to understand how market concentration and information shape competition in 
e-markets.     
 
Asymmetric information between buyers and sellers has inspired numerous 
researchers to inspect the relationship between a seller’s reputation and prices in 
online auctions. Overall, these studies conclude that a good reputation allows some 
pricing power to sellers51. However, there is considerably less research on burgeoning 
retail e-markets. Baylis and Perloff (2002) study the e-markets of two homogeneous 
goods. They find that the firms that provide good service set lower prices. They also 
use consumers’ quality rankings from an outside source but deem it “largely random 
information” that is worthless. 
 
This study differs from the previous research because we examine the effect of 
reputation on seller’s pricing in retail e-markets. We use cross-sectional data from 
over 6000 homogeneous goods markets obtained from Pricegrabber.com which is an 
online comparison shopping service52. The product categories in the sample include 
appliances, auto parts, children’s products, cameras, computers, electronics, furniture, 
health and beauty products, indoor living products, musical instruments, outdoor 
living products, software, sporting goods, toys, TVs and video games. In addition to 
price data from these product categories, the study includes data from 
Pricegrabber.com’s reputation system. The reputation data is generated by the buyers 
who elicit feedback on sellers. The reputation system reports this feedback as an 
aggregated rating score, a ratings history and verbal comments. We use quantitative 
measures to model a seller’s reputation as a combination of the rating score and 
ratings history. We also consider the influence of auxiliary variables such as seller 
types and market concentration on a seller’s pricing. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background and a brief literature review. In Section 3, we present data descriptions 
                                                     
51 See Sun (2008) for a concise review of results. 
52 See www.Pricegrabber.com. 
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 and research methodology. Section 4 presents the results from OLS and quantile 
regression. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Foundations of Reputation and Trust in e-Commerce 
Many markets suffer from detrimental effects of asymmetric information between 
trading agents (Akerlof 1970). Even with free information, gathering and processing 
information is costly and prone to errors (Williamson 1973). Another source of 
asymmetry is the contracts that determine the terms of trade. Agents cannot be certain 
that the counterparty fully obliges to the contract. To level these asymmetries, an 
agent’s reputation is a signal of her trustworthiness. Cabral (2005) defines reputation 
as a situation, when a particular agent is expected to be something, whereas trust is 
defined as a situation, when a particular agent is expected to do something. 
 
Game theorists formulated the theory of reputation building rationalize an incumbent 
firm’s willingness to deter entry even if it is costly in the short-run (e.g. Milgrom and 
Roberts 1982). A reputation arises from repeated action which other players in the 
game interpret as a commitment to continue to take the same action in the future 
(Dellarocas 2003). In this setting, the incumbent firm develops a reputation of 
toughness by constantly deterring entry in order to discourage future entrants. Thus, 
the reputation based on the firm’s past actions affects its future payoffs, and other 
players’ probabilities about the firm’s future actions are derived from its current 
reputation (Wilson 1985). 
 
Building a reputation may provide tangible benefits for a firm. First, reputation can be 
viewed as an asset. In Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) a firm invests in 
reputation and earns a price premium on the established reputation53. Examples of the 
investments in a corporate reputation include introductory pricing and branding. 
However, the asset quality of reputation implies that the established reputations can be 
bought. For this reason, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) argue that a reputation may 
not be a good signal of quality because incompetent firms can buy good reputations. 
                                                     
53 See Tirole (2003) for a simplified version of Klein-Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) models. 
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 Second, Klein and Leffler (1981) suggest that consumers view reputation as 
protection for contractual obligation. Returns on reputation induce a firm to maintain 
good quality because the profit stream from good quality products exceeds the gains 
from cheating. Hörner (2002) argues that this does not provide sufficient incentives to 
maintain good quality. Instead, competition provides such incentives by creating an 
outside option to buyers who can patronize the firm’s rival if they detect cheating. 
 
The amount of trust a buyer places on a seller depends on a seller’s reputation 
(Resnick et al. 2000). In other words, the buyer’s beliefs on the risks involved in a 
transaction with the seller are based on the assessment of the seller’s reputation. This 
can be based on a personal transaction history with the seller. Another source could be 
learning from other agents (Dua et al. 2009). The incentive structure of the game is 
influenced by a threat of retaliation or reciprocity. For example, if a seller cheats a 
buyer (or vice versa), the seller may lose all future transactions with the buyer, or 
there will be legal consequences from a faulty action. In addition, the existence of 
reputations may discourage the market entry of less reliable sellers (or buyers) 
(Resnick et al. 2006).  
 
Although the lower information costs of e-markets could make market incumbents 
better informed about the market in many respects, the nature of e-commerce raises 
concerns about the trustworthiness of a trading partner. In e-commerce, buyers and 
sellers conduct business through a website (or other electronic channel). As a result, 
lack of direct contact between a buyer and seller in online transactions leads to 
uncertainty about the identity of the trading partner and product quality (Ba and 
Pavlou, 2002). More precisely, two main concerns are the loss of money and privacy 
(Resnick et al. 2000). Apart from information goods, a buyer cannot inspect the 
merchandise before purchase. Showing pictures of the merchandise and suitable 
descriptions reduce some informational problems, but it does not resolve all quality 
concerns (Bland et al. 2007). Moreover, a seller’s online store may not give any 
information about the seller’s quality, so it is harder to verify quality in e-markets than 
in conventional markets.  
 
Different product types increase the risks of asymmetric information in online 
transactions. Kotler and Keller (2006) identify four product types with unique 
110 
 
 characteristics. First, convenience goods, such as personal hygiene products, are 
relatively inexpensive. They are bought regularly, so the quality is usually known in 
advance. Hence, it is plausible that these are bought in bulk quantities online 
(Thirumalai and Sinha 2009). Second, shopping goods, such as refrigerators, are more 
expensive than convenience goods and thus, they require price and quality 
comparisons before purchase. Third, specialty goods, which are branded goods or 
they have a very specific usage, warrant a price premium over regular shopping 
goods. For example, Apple’s Mac computers are specialty goods. Due to increasing 
price and specificity, the risks associated with the product type increase as we move 
from convenience goods to specialty goods (Thirumalai and Sinha 2009). The fourth 
product category, unsought goods, requires active selling efforts because a buyer does 
not recognize the need for an unsought good. As a result, e-commerce may not be the 
optimal sales channel unsought goods.   
 
More concerns surface in payment of a purchase. In general, buyers prefer that the 
information that a seller obtains from them will be kept private and its use in 
marketing purposes limited (Brown and Muchira 2004). Most retail e-commerce 
transactions are paid by credit card. Disclosing sensitive information, such as a credit 
card number, involves the risks of misconduct. The ease of switching one’s identity 
on the Internet accentuates these problems. The shipping of goods is also problematic 
because a buyer can only trust that a seller obeys the contract they have entered into. 
This does not mean, however, that only the seller’s trustworthiness is a concern. Third 
parties, such as criminals or marketing companies, may gain access to sensitive 
information by illicit means. The delivery agency may also lose the ordered purchase 
which strains the buyer-seller relationship.  
 
As trust in transactions is built on an agent’s reputation, the locality of transactions is 
an important contributor to reputation building in conventional markets (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002). When transactions take place in the same physical environment, 
contacts with the seller are frequent. Thus, the seller’s identity is known and buyers 
are able to inspect the merchandise before purchasing it. They are also able to learn 
from each other’s experiences with the seller, so the word-of-mouth contributes to the 
seller’s reputation. Moreover, the risks of privacy and shipping are negligible because 
buyers monitor the payment and organize the transportation of purchased items by 
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 themselves. Sellers signal reputation by acquiring retail space in upscale locations. In 
addition to location, sellers in conventional markets can borrow reputations 
(certifications), buy reputations (an acquisition of an existing brand) or leverage 
existing reputations to new markets. 
 
Compared with conventional markets, location advantages are less important in 
reputation building e-markets because firms lack the physical retail space. 
Nevertheless, some parallels in e-markets exist because several websites attract large 
consumer flows daily. First, comparison shopping websites, such as Bizrate.com or 
Pricegrabber.com, provide marketplace platforms for e-retailers. Second, on-line 
auction sites, most notably eBay, are global centers of consumer-to-consumer e-
commerce as well as a sales channel for small-scale e-retailers. Third, web portals, 
such as MSN, Yahoo! or CNET, offer a wide range of services to their customers and 
are therefore potential locations for e-commerce. Furthermore, some websites for 
specific interest groups also support platforms for e-commerce. For example, 
Discogs.com, an electronic database for discographies, offers a marketplace function 
for its registered members. Finally, well-known e-commerce vendors, such as 
Amazon.com or Play.com, have set up marketplaces where affiliate sellers can benefit 
from the brand and customer base of the marketplace provider.  
 
Due to the risks involved in an e-commerce transaction, consumers need to be assured 
that they can trust the seller. Fast shipping, the traceability of purchased good, 
generous guarantees and return policies can foster trust. Alternative ways to pay for 
the product could also signal trust because credit cards and some e-payment solutions, 
such as PayPal, provide consumer protection in purchases54. Approval ratings from an 
impartial third party are another way to signal trust. As in financial markets, where the 
ratings from companies such as Standard & Poor’s serve this purpose, e-commerce 
merchants use certifications from the providers of Internet security, such as McAfee 
or VeriSign, to communicate that measures have been taken to protect consumers in 
online transactions (Odom et al. 2002). However, these will only be understood by the 
consumers who are familiar with the Internet security certifications (Kim and 
Benbasat 2003). Other ways to signal trust are not as easily verifiable. Easy 
                                                     
54The seller is also protected because the creditor bears the risks of consumer insolvency. 
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 navigation and a “professional look” of a merchant’s website could be crucial factors 
in purchase decisions55. Customer service, the ease of contacting the seller, effective 
communication, and consumer empowerment are also important in the reputation 
building process. Furthermore, introductory prices can be used to acquire frequent 
transactions that are instrumental in reputation building among consumers (Borenstein 
and Saloner 2001). 
 
Since building a reputation is dynamic, costly and time-consuming effort, there are 
alternative shortcuts to establish this goal. In general, large well-known companies 
have better reputations than small firms (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).  Therefore, 
established businesses in conventional markets often leverage their offline reputations 
in on-line markets by expanding the offline business model to e-markets. Another 
strategy is to buy a reputation by an acquisition of an established online business or its 
brand or by a franchising agreement. Small enterprises may find it profitable to sell 
their merchandise under the umbrellas of strong, established on-line brands that offer 
some protection to buyers in the marketplace purchases.  
 
A market maker can level the information asymmetry by collecting and distributing 
performance histories. Performance histories, which are user accounts on interactions 
between buyers and sellers, are an integral part of feedback mechanisms. A consistent 
performance history could provide the same proof as repeat purchases for quality-
conscious buyers on a seller’s commitment to maintain high quality service (Rao and 
Bergen, 1992). They provide quantitative (e.g. a length of history) and qualitative 
(e.g. a description about performance) information about transactions. Performance 
histories can be used to evaluate potential risks involved in a transaction (Resnick et 
al. 2000). They can also be viewed as a signal of a seller’s capacity (Lin et al. 2006). 
 
2.2 Reputation Systems 
To address the problems of asymmetric information, e-commerce marketplaces have 
devised reputation systems that provide information about market incumbents past 
actions 56 . One can think of this as the digital word-of-mouth (Dellarocas 2003). 
                                                     
55 This may not help because websites that have a “professional look” are easy to forge (Kumaraguru et al. 2006). 
56 Williamson (1973) suggests that “a simple performance record can be maintained and a priori probabilities 
successively  revised” to reduce asymmetric information about “the true characteristics of economic agents.” 
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 Resnick et al. (2000) define a reputation system as a system that “collects, distributes 
and aggregates feedback about participants past behavior”. To be effective, a 
reputation system should be long-lived and efficient in distributing information about 
reputations. Such a system alleviates asymmetric information problems between 
trading partners and encourages behavior that fosters trust. Usually, a reputation 
system reports a seller’s or buyer’s numerical rating score which may be accompanied 
by text comments and a ratings history. These assessments are provided by the sellers 
or buyers that have transacted with the seller or buyer. 
 
Participation in a reputation system could signal that an agent is a trustworthy trading 
partner. Zhou et al. (2008) present a model for online markets where they show that a 
reputation system can reduce asymmetric information in an online market and 
replicate the results of Shapiro (1983). An efficient reputation system provides 
incentives to fulfill contractual obligations. Also, it must create incentives to 
participate and report truthful feedback through the reputation system. Bakos and 
Dellarocas (2003) show that an online reputation system can be more efficient in 
enforcing desired behavior than a threat of litigation. On the other hand, building a 
reputation in one marketplace creates switching costs for established sellers because 
reputations are not transferable between competing marketplaces (Melnik and Alm 
2002). For this reason, a marketplace operator has an incentive to encourage 
participation in the marketplace’s reputation system because it creates a lock-in for 
sellers (and buyers, if they also act as sellers and vice versa).  
 
Despite their benefits, reputation systems are not a foolproof solution to the problems 
of asymmetric information. While feedback mechanisms rely mostly on quantitative 
measurements, awarding feedback is subjective (Pavlou and Dimoka 2006). As a 
result, a sale of a homogeneous product can receive very different reviews because 
agents have heterogeneous preferences. By the law of large numbers, feedback 
converges to some value but the problem exists with small amounts of feedback. 
Moreover, herding among feedback givers could bias reputations. Herding occurs 
when the private signals of agents become correlated with the public signals that they 
observe (Banerjee 1992). If herding occurs, a buyer may let the public opinion 
published by the reputation system influence her assessment.  However, a study by 
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2006) does not support this argument. Another problem 
114 
 
 emerges from voluntary participation, because eliciting feedback imposes an 
incremental cost to a transaction. This compares with contributing to a public good: 
avoiding the cost of giving feedback creates an incentive to free-ride on the 
information that other agents provide. Feedback may also become biased because 
only the extraordinarily bad or good performances are reported (Pavlou and Dimoka 
2006). Moreover, the fear of retaliation could deter eliciting negative feedback 
  
Even more damaging to reputation systems could be the proliferation of markets for 
feedback. Brown and Morgan (2006) describe situations where eBay’s feedback 
mechanism is manipulated by selling merchandise that is essentially worthless in 
exchange for positive feedback.  As a result, the accumulated positive feedback can be 
used to signal a good reputation in fraudulent listings of valuable items. Another way 
to go around reputation systems is shilling which is usually explicitly forbidden in 
online marketplaces. For example, a seller could act as a buyer and purchase a product 
from her own online store and return positive feedback for herself.  This could 
undermine the value of the reputation systems for buyers because the inability to 
manipulate one’s own reputation is partly responsible for the value of reputation 
(Standifird 2001). As reputation systems do not distinguish between the monetary 
values of sold items, it is possible that a seller amasses a good reputation by selling 
inexpensive items but eventually cheats at a sale of a valuable item (Livingston 2005). 
Distinguishing manipulation from regular business practices may be difficult though. 
For example, a seller offering a used CD for a nominal fee of 1 cent may be clearing 
inventory or applying the introductory pricing strategy. 
 
A major handicap for reputation building on the Internet is that changing one’s 
identity is relatively costless. For example, creating a new seller identity in online 
auctions requires only registration. In the online retail industry, comparison shopping 
services, such as Pricegrabber.com or Yahoo!, offer packages that enable a quick set-
up of an online store at low costs. While these features guarantee low entry costs, 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers may deter frequent switching of 
one’s online identity in retail markets. Switching an identity means that a seller must 
start building its reputation again from the beginning because the accumulated ratings 
under the previous identity are not transferable. For this reason, the investment costs 
of reputation building serve as an entry costs to another market. Online marketplaces 
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 also create switching costs for the market incumbents by not allowing a transfer of 
reputations between marketplaces (Brown and Morgan 2006). Therefore, marketplace 
operators have an incentive to encourage sellers into reputation building, because they 
gain more sales fees from the locked-in sellers.  
 
The issues of trust and reputation can lead to the problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in e-markets. A strong positive reputation can be viewed as an insurance 
against opportunistic behavior (Standifird 2001). The cost of adverse selection can be 
that sellers receive lower prices for their goods, or even unraveling of the markets in 
the extreme cases (Akerlof 1970; Dewan and Hsu 2004). As the full price of a product 
is a combination of a purchase price, search costs and costs of a disappointing 
purchase, a good reputation can mitigate the costs of a disappointing purchase (Kim 
and Xu 2007). Thus, a reputable seller could enjoy a price premium over its less 
trustworthy rivals. Melnik and Alm (2002) suggest that reputation can raise barriers to 
entry in an e-market because new entrants may find it impossible to compete with the 
established reputable sellers. Indeed, a study of eBay auctions by Lin et al. (2006) 
suggests that the population of sellers with high reputation scores has higher growth 
rate than the sellers with lower reputation scores. Interestingly, Professional eBay 
Sellers Alliance, a trade association of high-ranking eBay sellers, complains that 
exactly the opposite is taking place in eBay. They claim that the marketplace does not 
provide enough incentives for sellers to invest in the measures that improve seller 
reputations57. 
 
2.3 Empirical Evidence  
Popular online auctions have become a widely-used data source for researchers 
because reputation systems are commonplace in auction sites 58 . The empirical 
evidence indicates that the returns on reputation in online auctions vary considerably. 
Standifird (2001) finds only limited evidence of price premiums for a seller with a 
good reputation, but a highly negative reputation forces a seller to sell items at 
discount. Furthermore, he finds evidence that a negative reputation has more impact 
on a buyer’s purchase decision than a positive reputation. This finding is supported by 
Ba and Pavlou (2002). They find little evidence of a positive correlation between 
                                                     
57 See Professional eBay Sellers Association (2007): “Unhealthy Marketplace Dynamics – Seller Perspective”. 
58 See Dellarocas (2003) for a summary of this literature.  
116 
 
 rating scores and price premiums, but a statistically significant impact of a negative 
rating on a seller’s price exists when the auctioned items are expensive. 
 
In contrast to these findings, Melnik and Alm (2002) show that a seller’s reputation 
has a small positive impact on prices in the auctions for gold coins. They argue that 
the price premium from a reputation is likely to grow along the value of an auctioned 
object. Dewan and Hsu (2004) also report similar findings in the auctions for 
collectible stamps. They estimate that quality uncertainty lowers the prices of 
auctioned stamps by 10-15%. They interpret this as the evidence of effective dealing 
with Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons problem”. Using coin auctions, Lucking-Reiley et al. 
(2006) discover that positive ratings give a mild boost to the final price whereas 
negative comments depress final prices. Moreover, Cabral and Hortaçsu (2006) report 
a 5% price premium for a better reputation score using coin, laptop computer and 
teddy bear auctions, while Livingston (2005) finds decreasingly increasing returns on 
seller’s positive reputation in eBay auctions. Using quantile regression, Sun and Hsu 
(2007) detect a nonlinear response to a seller’s reputation as buyers place more 
emphasis on the reputation when bid values are high. Since buyers can also be sellers 
in eBay auctions, Zhang (2006) investigates the impact of a reputation accumulated 
either as a buyer or a seller on auction prices. The results show that a reputation 
accumulated as a buyer does not matter as a seller, but a reputation as a seller matters. 
Furthermore, negative feedback has a greater impact on the final price than positive 
feedback.  
 
Attempts to control for quality uncertainty have produced muted results on a seller’s 
ability to earn returns on reputation. McDonald and Slawson (2002) inspect auctions 
for new or mint-condition Harley-Davidson Barbie-dolls. They find that a seller with 
a better reputation attracts more bids and commands higher prices. Studying auctions 
for Pentium processors, Houser and Wooders (2006) detect only a small 0.17% 
increase in the final price when a seller’s reputation score increases by 10%59. In 
contrast, negative feedback lowers the final price by 0.24%. Inspecting auctions for 
gift-cards which have a pre-determined value, Pate (2006) discovers that a seller’s 
reputation accounts for only 1% of the sales price. Moreover, her evidence indicates 
                                                     
59 According to the authors, mostly unused processors were auctioned, which alleviates the perceived uncertainty 
over the product quality.  
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 that the positive returns on reputation do not increase significantly with the monetary 
value of a gift card. Resnick et al. (2006) conduct an experiment in which an 
established seller of vintage postcards, who has a strong reputation in eBay, sets up 
new seller identities and sells vintage postcards under the established identity and the 
new identities. They find that the established seller commands a price premium of 
8.1% over the new sellers. Using data from the auctions for new Apple iPod mp3-
players, Sun (2008) reports 0.1% increase in the final price in response to 10% 
increase in the reputation score.  
 
The empirical research on retail e-markets has been interested in price dispersion on 
the Internet because online markets were expected to be highly competitive. The 
existence of online price dispersion is well-documented in the literature60. The most 
common explanation for price dispersion is the cost of obtaining information (e.g. 
Stigler 1961; Varian 1980). Since online search costs are low, other explanations have 
emerged. Smith & Brynjolfsson (2001) suggest that seller brands may explain price 
dispersion by allowing branded sellers to charge higher prices than other sellers. On 
the other hand, Ancarani and Shankar (2004) argue that seller characteristics 
determine price dispersion. That is, traditional, multi-channel and Internet retailers, 
charge different prices for the same goods. Should differentiation be a successful 
strategy, buyers must place some value on the services these seller types provide. As 
e-markets mature, differential pricing across seller types may not be possible. For 
example, Gan et al. (2007) find that price levels between pure-play Internet and multi-
channel retailers do not differ in the Singaporean online groceries market. Pan et al. 
(2002) use hedonic regression to measure the impact of a seller’s service quality on 
prices of various goods. In general, shopping convenience, reliability and shipping 
and handling are positively related to prices, whereas the amount of offered product 
information has a negative impact on prices. They conclude that sellers are not always 
able to charge higher prices by offering quality service. However, they point to the 
possibility that online trust or branding could explain price premiums in e-commerce.  
 
Unlike online auctions, the extant research on the influence of a seller’s reputation in 
retail e-markets is very thin. In a pioneering study, Baylis and Perloff (2002) observe 
                                                     
60 See Pan et al. 2003 for a review of earlier studies. 
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 price developments in two homogeneous consumer electronics products. Their 
findings are startling. They observe that “good firms” charge lower prices, while “bad 
firms” charge higher prices. Moreover, the relative price positions among firms do not 
change over time, which implies that periodic sales do not take place. Using a survey 
data from the customers of an online bookstore, Kim and Xu (2007) find that a 
seller’s reputation can reduce a buyer’s price sensitivity. Another survey by Fuller et 
al. (2007) suggests that seller ratings, which are provided by a reputation system, do 
not have a lasting impact on a buyer’s decision making. In fact, buyers place more 
emphasis on direct personal experience either from the previous transactions with the 
seller or the information a buyer receives from the seller’s website. These findings 
imply that the empirical results from online auctions may not be directly applicable to 
retail e-markets.   
 
As the cost of obtaining information about a seller (or at least the information that is 
available on the Internet) is very low on the Internet, increasing the number of market 
incumbents should lower prices. Two factors contribute to this. First, a greater number 
of sellers in the market increases supply which lowers the price provided that the 
demand does not change. Second, a greater number of sellers in the market increases 
the likelihood of better fit for buyers.  As a consequence, buyers are able to select a 
combination of attributes, such as a price-quality combination, that has the best fit to a 
buyer’s preferences. The empirical evidence from eBay auctions supports this 
(McDonald and Slawson 2002). In retail markets, Baye et al. (2004) and Leiter and 
Warin (2007) find that price dispersion measured by the price gap between the two 
lowest prices decreases when the number of sellers in the market increases.   
 
2.4 Research Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review, we propose the following research hypotheses61. First, 
the theory and evidence from online auctions predict that sellers earn returns on 
reputation. Hence, we examine whether or not sellers in online retail markets are also 
able to earn price premiums with their reputations. In addition, switching identities is 
easy on the Internet. For this reason, the length of a seller’s ratings history may signal 
the seller’s commitment to stay in the market. Thus, 
                                                     
61 The proposed hypotheses are made with the standard ceteris paribus assumption. 
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 Hypothesis 1A (H1A). Better reputations measured by rating scores enable price 
premiums. 
Hypothesis 1B (H1B). Longer market histories measured by ratings histories enable 
price premiums.  
 
Second, the literature suggests that branded sellers or well-known sellers may earn 
price premiums in online markets. Moreover, since brands may signal a seller’s 
trustworthiness to buyers, relatively unknown sellers (storefronts) may compete with 
low prices to gain sales62.  For this reason,  
Hypothesis 2A (H2A). Well-known sellers charge higher prices than other sellers. 
Hypothesis 2B (H2B). Storefronts charge lower prices than other sellers. 
 
Third, the economic theory predicts that price competition intensifies as the number of 
market incumbents increases. As a continuation to H2B, we hypothesize that an 
increase in the relative number of storefronts in a market depresses prices. As a 
consequence, 
Hypothesis 3A (H3A). Prices decrease as the number of market incumbents increases. 
Hypothesis 3B (H3B). Prices decrease as the ratio of storefronts to the total number of 
market incumbents increases.  
 
Finally, the importance of a seller’s reputation in a consumer’s purchase decision may 
vary across product types. We consider three broad product categories, convenience 
goods, shopping goods and specialty goods. Convenience goods are less risky in 
terms of price and quality than shopping and specialty goods. For this reason,  
Hypothesis 4. Returns on reputation, if they exist, are greater to the sellers of 
shopping and specialty goods than to the sellers of convenience goods. 
 
We test the validity of these research hypotheses by analyzing data from retail e-
markets. Data is obtained from Pricegrabber.com which is a popular comparison 
shopping website. In the next section, we describe the research methodology and data 
in more detail. 
 
                                                     
62 Seller types will be defined later. 
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 3. Data Description and Analysis 
 
3.1 Methodology and Variables 
In this study, the proposed hypotheses are being tested on a data set that was collected 
from Pricegrabber.com. The data set is a cross-sectional random sample of posted 
prices and reputation scores from various product categories. The product categories 
include appliances, auto parts, children’s products, cameras, computers, electronics, 
furniture, health and beauty products, indoor living products, musical instruments, 
outdoor living products, software, sporting goods, toys, TVs and video games. All 
products are new to avoid product heterogeneity. The data set is a random sample of 
the products that were available in Pricegrabber.com in May 2008. By using a 
computer program designed for the purpose, the data set was collected from 
Pricegrabber.com. Data for each product category was extracted within the same day, 
but the entire process took several days to accomplish.  
 
Altogether, the sample consists of 6885 different markets for homogeneous goods. 
Data contains information on prices, the number of sellers in a market, seller types, 
seller rating scores and ratings histories for each market. From this data, we construct 
variables for regression analysis. The price (PRICE) is the dependent variable in 
regression analysis. A seller’s rating score (RATE) and a seller’s ratings history 
(HIST) are reputation variables while market thickness (THICK) and the storefront 
ratio (SFR) are market variables. Descriptive statistics together with variable 
descriptions are shown in Table 1. The price data consists of 18044 posted price 
quotes in U.S. dollars. All products are new and homogeneous which eliminates the 
possibility of product differentiation as a source of price differences.  
 
The rating score is a measure for a seller’s reputation. RATE is a decimal value which 
is provided by consumers who review the seller’s overall performance in a transaction 
in 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest) scale after the transaction has concluded. As a 
result, the rating score is an aggregate value of the overall consumer opinion on the 
particular seller. Although rating scores provide an easily quantifiable measure for 
seller reputations, they are not without limitations. First, a buyer’s review on a seller’s 
performance is subjective. Due to buyer heterogeneity, the same level of service 
performance may lead to different ratings. Second, rating scores are often 
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 accompanied by verbal comments. These may contain very important information 
about a seller’s conduct which is not captured by the numerical score. For example, a 
verbal comment on charging the credit card without shipping the order or a significant 
delay in delivery could lead to a similar rating, but send a starkly different signal to 
other buyers. Pavlou and Dimota (2006) show that accompanying verbal comments 
have a limited effect on prices in eBay auctions, but quantitative measures of a seller’s 
reputation are more important. Third, leaving feedback is optional, which may lead to 
biased feedback. This could be a result if only exceptionally good or really bad 
performances are reported. Finally, sellers may manipulate their rating scores as 
suggested by Brown and Morgan (2006). However, this is likely to be a problem that 
is specific to online auctions, because e-retailing is characterized by large volumes of 
new merchandise, whereas auctioned items are often used and sales volumes are low. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
RATE 
(RATE1) 
A seller’s average 
all-time rating. 
4.01 
(3.99) 
4.35 
(4.37) 
0.87 
(0.95) 
1.00 
(1.00) 
5.00 
(5.00) 
HIST* 
(HIST1*) 
The number of ratings a 
seller has received. 
2171.76 
(949.40) 
373 
(133) 
5004.39 
(2784.84) 
10 
(10) 
36226 
(36226) 
PRICE 
(PRICE1) 
The list price of an item 
in USD. 
408.67 
(342.68) 
112.05 
(64.95) 
1023.13 
(1140.30) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
41049.84 
(40209.95) 
SFR 
(SFR1) 
The ratio of storefronts to 
all market incumbents. 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0) 
0.20 
(0.20) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
THICK 
(THICK1) 
The number of market 
incumbents in a market. 
10.24 
(8.27) 
7.00 
(4) 
9.45 
(9.20) 
2 
(1) 
49 
(49) 
*Histories below 10 are not reported. The figures in parentheses refer to the markets where only one seller 
was active at the time the observations were made.  
 
Another way to estimate a seller’s trustworthiness is to consider ratings histories. 
HIST provides an indicator of how long a seller has been active under the same 
identity. The longer the ratings history, the more reliable the seller is. Descriptive 
statistics indicate that ratings histories are heavily skewed to the left. The figures 
suggest that most sellers are relatively new to the market, or their sales volumes in 
Pricegrabber.com are low. Cabral and Hortaçsu (2006) argue that a frequency of 
feedback is a good approximation for a frequency of sales in eBay auctions. Hence, a 
ratings history may also be interpreted as a measure of sales in online retail markets. 
 
Only one active seller could be found in a large number of markets at the time the 
observations were made. Since these markets cannot be used in the analysis, they 
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 were dropped from the sample. T-tests and Mann-Whitney-tests are conducted to 
determine whether data becomes biased in the process. The omitted portion of the 
data is denoted by HIST1, RATE1 and PRICE1 variables. The test results are reported 
in Table 2. The first test between the rating scores (RATE, RATE1) is inconclusive. 
However, the summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that the data for both groups 
resembles each other. The second test between the ratings histories (HIST, HIST1) 
leads to the rejection of the equality assumption. The summary statistics show that the 
average ratings histories are longer in more competitive markets. The third test 
between the prices (PRICE, PRICE1) suggests that the equality assumption should be 
rejected. In this case, the markets with more active sellers display higher prices on 
average than the markets of one active seller. As a conclusion of this analysis, the 
omission biases data. However, we do not believe this to be a major cause for concern 
because the rating score, which is the most important variable in our analysis, appears 
to be roughly unaffected. Moreover, since average prices are higher in the remaining 
sample, this may help detect price premiums because a buyer’s risk aversion 
presumably increases with the price.  
 
Table 2. Results for T-tests and Mann-Whitney Tests 
Hypothesis T-Test Mann-Whitney Conclusion 
RATE = RATE1 2.215** 1.166 Rejected/Accepted 
HIST = HIST1 10.044*** 20.298*** Rejected/Rejected 
PRICE = PRICE1 3.456*** 
 
14.789*** Rejected / Rejected 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1. 
  
Market thickness measures the number of sellers in a market. Market thickness 
increases when the number of sellers in the market increases. In the remaining data, 
market thickness varies from 2 to 49 with the mean at 8.27, the median at 7 and the 
standard deviation of 9.45. These figures are considerably less than the average of 
17.5 sellers in a market reported by Leiter and Warin (2007) who also obtain their 
data from Pricegrabber.com. A likely reason for the discrepancy is the sampling 
method, because their sample consists of the most popular products listed in 
Pricegrabber.com. Furthermore, dividing the number of storefronts (their definition is 
explained later) in a market by the market thickness of the respective market, we 
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 obtain a variable for the storefront ratio (SFR). On average, 7% (median) to 15% 
(mean) of market incumbents are storefronts. 
 
To facilitate a direct comparability between markets for different products, we use 
standardized variables. The downside to this procedure is that it is impossible to give 
straightforward interpretations for estimated coefficients although the direction and 
magnitude of influence can be given. In general, a standardized variable  is 
obtained by  
jiz ,
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in which  is an observation of the variable xi in the market j, jix , jx  is the mean of x in 
the market j and  is the standard deviation of x in the market j. 
Standardization concentrates the observations around zero. We denote the 
standardized variables with the letter z in front of a variable. The standardized 
variables include the price (zPRICE), rating score (zRATE), ratings history (zHIST), 
market thickness (zTHICK) and storefront ratio (zSFR). Table 3 lays out descriptive 
statistics for the standardized variables. 
)( , jixSTD
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Standardized Variables 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
zRATE 
 
0.000 0.285 0.883 -4.193 1.911 
zHIST 
 
0.000 -0.395 0.903 -1.562 4.513 
zPRICE 
 
0.000 -0.165 0.909 -2.888 5.327 
zSFR 
 
0.000 -0.410 1.000 -0.769 4.260 
zTHICK 
 
0.000 -0.343 1.000 -0.872 4.102 
 
 
3.2 Seller Types 
Firms of all sizes compete in comparison shopping markets. Pricegrabber.com has 
two fundamentally different seller types which are based on a seller’s a choice over a 
sales channel. Pricegrabber.com defines “merchants” the firms that run their own 
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 websites63. Merchants register to Pricegrabber.com to lure in customers but process 
commercial transactions through their own e-commerce systems. Pricegrabber.com 
defines “storefronts” the firms that do not run their own websites. Instead, the 
comparison shopping website processes commercial transactions between consumers 
and storefronts. Pricegrabber.com sets its fees in a way that merchants pay a fee for 
each click-through whether or not this leads to a purchase, but storefronts pay fees 
only for purchases. The click-through fee for merchants is significantly lower than the 
purchase fee for storefronts64. As a result, large volume sellers benefit from being 
merchants, whereas low volume sellers are induced to select the storefront package.  
 
We devise dummy variables to distinguish between the different seller types. The 
dummy variable SF takes the value 1 if a seller is a storefront and the value 0 if a 
seller is a merchant. Further distinctions are based on the level of sales. We use the 
annual list (2007) of The Internet Retailer to separate large, branded sellers from the 
rest of the seller population65. The dummy variable TOP500 takes value 1 if a seller is 
among the 500 hundred largest retail e-commerce sellers measured by the value of 
their annual sales in the United States. Thus, the control groups are at the opposite 
sides of the seller spectrum: storefronts are small players, whereas Top500-sellers are 
household names with wide brand recognition among consumers. 
 
3.3 Product Types 
The data set contains a diverse selection of consumer goods. To carry out robustness 
analysis, we construct a subset of data by assigning selected products in three 
categories as described in Kotler and Keller (2006)66. Convenience goods are the 
lowest risk items for consumers, whereas the risk level increases when consumers buy 
shopping and specialty goods (Thirumalai and Sinha 2009). The convenience goods 
data set (CONV) includes baby bottle feeding formula, deodorant, cleaning products, 
printer paper and storage media. The shopping goods data set (SHOP) includes desk-
collections, flat-panel LCD-monitors, mp3-players, plasma/LCD-televisions and 
                                                     
63 Notice that these definitions are how Pricegrabber.com classifies different seller types. This is not generally 
accepted terminology. 
64 See http://www.Pricegrabber.com.com/sell_here.php . 
65 See http://www.internetretailer.com/Top500/list.asp  . 
66 We omit the fourth consumer goods category, unsought goods, because the data set does not include them.  
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 refrigerators. The specialty goods data set (SPCL) includes binoculars, electric guitars, 
microphones, network surveillance equipment and SLR-lenses.  
 
Descriptive statistics for these product types are shown in Table 4. Price statistics 
verify that the average price for convenience goods is significantly lower than the 
average prices for the other two product categories. Ratings statistics display less 
severe absolute differences in averages but the distribution of the rating scores is more 
concentrated for specialty goods than for the other two product categories. History 
statistics indicate that the sellers of shopping and specialty goods have been active in 
their respective markets for a longer period of time than the sellers of convenience 
goods. The market variables verify that the average number of sellers is lower in the 
specialty goods markets than either the convenience or shopping goods markets 
reflecting the specific nature of specialty goods. In addition, the low median of the 
storefront ratio suggests that specialty goods are not a niche strategy that storefronts 
favor.   
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for Product Categories 
Variable PRICE RATE HIST 
Category CONV SHOP SPCL CONV SHOP SPCL CONV SHOP SPCL 
Mean 80.11 632.57 637.39 4.12 4.06 4.28 1375.83 3390.45 1903.00 
Med. 39.86 301.25 399.00 4.46 4.37 4.43 140.00 455.50 377.00 
Max. 1791.89 6169.00 5999.95 5.00 5.00 5.00 35762.00 36093.00 35472.00 
Min. 1.22 1.54 7.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 10 11.00 10 
Std. Dev. 169.65 773.70 769.79 0.80 0.85 0.55 3271.14 6651.92 4685.68 
 
Variable THICK SFR 
Category CONV SHOP SPCL CONV SHOP SPCL 
Mean 13.77 12.88 9.37 0.14 0.17 0.14 
Med. 10.00 10.00 6.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 
Max. 42.00 33.00 29.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Min. 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 10.66 8.70 7.97 0.16 0.20 0.20 
 
 
3.4 Regression Model 
To test the effects that the reputation and market variables have on sellers’ prices, we 
set up a hierarchical regression model. The dummy variables SF and TOP500 separate 
the effects on the specific seller types from the general effects. Moreover, only the 
markets with two or more active sellers are considered.  
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 The moderated hierarchical regression model is presented in Equations (2.1) to (2.4). 
Due to standardization, the expected value of the dependent variable is equal to zero 
and therefore, the intercept is dropped from the regression equation. However, the 
unstandardized dummy intercepts are included to preserve their meaning. Equation 
(2.1) contains the basic additive model. We hypothesize that the ratings history 
moderates the rating score, which is captured by the interaction term . 
Deploying interactions into a regression equation require that nonlinear effects should 
be controlled for. As suggested by Cortina (1993), Equation (2.2) implements the 
quadratic effects as independent variables into the hierarchical model. The next step in 
Equation (2.3) includes two-way interactions in all variables presented in Equations 
(2.1) and (2.2). As a final step, the proposed moderator effects are added as two-way 
and three-way interactions in Equation (2.4).  
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The effect of a change in zRATE on the expected zPRICE is given by  
 
1 1 1
[ | 0, 0] 2E zPRICE SF TOP zRATE zHIST
zRATE
β ϕ γ∂ = = = + +
∂
  (3) 
1 2 1 2 1 2
[ | 1, 0] 2( ) ( )E zPRICE SF TOP zRATE zHIST
zRATE
β β ϕ ϕ γ γ∂ = = = + + + + +
∂
 (4) 
1 3 1 3 1 3
[ | 0, 1] 2( ) ( )E zPRICE SF TOP zRATE zHIST
zRATE
β β ϕ ϕ γ γ∂ = = = + + + + +
∂
. (5) 
 
If a nonlinear effect, which is assumed quadratic, exists, its magnitude depends on the 
level of the variable itself.  The interpretation of interactions is very similar to this. 
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 Two-way interactions are usually a product of a dummy variable and a continuous 
variable giving a straightforward “on/off” interpretation. Interactions between two or 
more continuous variables mean that the effect of a change in the value of one 
covariate in an interaction term depends on the level of the other covariates that 
compose the interaction term.  
 
As Equations (3) to (5) display, the effect decomposes to the sum of iβ  coefficients 
(the linear main effect), the sum of iϕ coefficients multiplied by zRATE (the nonlinear 
main effect), and the sum of iγ  coefficients multiplied by zHIST (the interaction 
effect) where  in all cases. If the nonlinear effect or the interaction effect is 
statistically significant, the effect of a change in zRATE on zPRICE is dependent on 
the level of zRATE and zHIST, respectively. In addition, the main effect should not be 
interpreted in isolation of the interaction effect
3,2,1=i
67 . Standardization of the variables 
makes the interpretation easier. The effect at the average length of the ratings history 
is equal to the main effect because the mean of a standardized covariate is zero.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Heteroskedasticity, Multicollinearity and Moderation 
We estimate the hierarchical regression model using ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS). The results of OLS for Models 1 to 4 are reported in Table 5. The discussed 
numerical values refer to Model 4 unless indicated otherwise. Since each regression 
has problems with heteroscedasticity, we augment the estimates with the White’s 
heteroscedasticity consistent estimates. Furthermore, we run auxiliary regressions on 
each variable to detect multicollinearity (these regressions are omitted from this 
paper), which is often problematic in the regression models that utilize standardized 
variables. Variance inflation factors (VIF) for each model are obtained from auxiliary 
regressions. We report the range of VIFs in Table 5. They suggest that 
multicollinearity is not problematic with Models 1 and 2, but may cause some 
problems with Models 3 and 4. In Model 4, the VIFs range from 1.149 to 8.929. Since 
the magnitudes and statistical significance of estimated coefficients do not display 
                                                     
67 Since it is difficult to interpret the interaction effects, no interpretations for 
zHIST
zPRICEE
∂
∂ ][  are given.  
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 wild variation as more variables are added, there is a good reason to believe that 
problematic multicollinearity remains muted.   
    
Table 5. OLS Estimates for Hierarchical Regression Model 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
SF 0.543*** 
(0.031) 
0.565*** 
(0.032) 
0.507*** 
(0.052) 
0.502*** 
(0.052) 
TOP500 0.084*** 
(0.020) 
0.127*** 
(0.022) 
0.026 
(0.027) 
0.029 
(0.027) 
zRATE -0.147*** 
(0.012) 
-0.171*** 
(0.013) 
-0.080*** 
(0.016) 
-0.111*** 
(0.016) 
zHIST -0.080*** 
(0.010) 
-0.058*** 
(0.016) 
-0.089*** 
(0.019) 
-0.061*** 
(0.021) 
zTHICK -0.027*** 
(0.009) 
-0.018* 
(0.009) 
-0.079*** 
(0.012) 
-0.076*** 
(0.012) 
zSFR -0.127*** 
(0.011) 
-0.126*** 
(0.011) 
-0.051*** 
(0.016) 
-0.046*** 
(0.016) 
(zRATE)2  -0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.068*** 
(0.015) 
-0.051*** 
(0.015) 
(zHIST)2  -0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
SF*zRATE   -0.446*** 
(0.040) 
-0.335*** 
(0.046) 
SF*zHIST   -0.016 
(0.047) 
-0.064 
(0.048) 
SF*zTHICK   0.188*** 
(0.030) 
0.183*** 
(0.030) 
SF*zSFR   -0.094*** 
(0.028) 
-0.092*** 
(0.028) 
SF*(zRATE)2   -0.019 
(0.036) 
-0.051 
(0.037) 
SF*(zHIST)2   0.002 
(0.036) 
-0.043 
(0.036) 
TOP500*zRATE   0.024 
(0.036) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
TOP500* zHIST   -0.022 
(0.043) 
-0.049 
(0.043) 
TOP500*zTHICK   0.036* 
(0.021) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
TOP500*zSFR   -0.077** 
(0.030) 
-0.082*** 
(0.030) 
TOP500*(zRATE)2   0.106*** 
(0.022) 
0.099*** 
(0.024) 
TOP500*(zHIST)2   0.046** 
(0.019) 
0.047** 
(0.021) 
zRATE*zHIST    -0.117*** 
(0.025) 
SF*zRATE*zHIST    0.341*** 
(0.065) 
TOP500*zRATE*zHIST    0.065 
(0.048) 
Observations 8916 8916 8916 8916 
R2 0.092 0.094 0.127 0.130 
F 181.524*** 132.621*** 68.041*** 60.646*** 
ΔR2  0.002 0.033 0.003 
ΔF  7.788*** 21.037*** 9.211*** 
VIF Range 0.957 – 1.233 1.104 – 2.421 1.145 – 7.407 1.149 – 8.929 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
In general, the addition of new variables increases the overall fit of the model because 
additional regressors naturally explain more of the variance of the dependent variable. 
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 Nevertheless, even Model 4 has a relatively low coefficient of determination (0.13), 
which means that the overall fit of the model is not very good. This is hardly 
surprising because many other factors affect a firm’s pricing decision. However, this 
does not preclude that estimates obtained from OLS are not good for analytical 
purposes, because the ceteris paribus relationship between the dependent variable and 
covariates does not depend directly on the magnitude of R2 (Wooldridge 2002).  
 
The hierarchical regression procedure, which is described mathematically in 
Equations (2.1) to (2.4), proceeds as follows. First, Model 1 is a basic linear 
regression model. After this, Model 2 adds quadratic terms for the covariates that are 
hypothesized to interact with each other (Cortina 1993). Then Model 3 introduces 
interactions by placing controls on the seller subgroups. Finally, Model 4 is the full 
model that includes all interactions. As the hierarchical model progresses by adding 
more covariates to the regression equation, the change in the coefficient of 
determination (ΔR2) is small, but statistically significant (ΔF). This validates the 
inclusion of the additional regressors, and the hypothesis that a moderator effect is 
present.  
 
From the moderation perspective, it is important to examine the type of moderation to 
determine whether the moderation effect addresses the strength or form of 
moderation. To find out the type of moderation, Sharma et al. (1981) propose a 
procedure for the identification of moderator variables. The procedure requires 
examining the statistical significance of the coefficients for zHIST which is the 
hypothesized moderator of zRATE. Since 0080.01 ≠−=η  (the estimated coefficient for 
zHIST) in Model 1and 0117.01 ≠−=γ  (the estimated coefficient for the interaction 
zRATE*zHIST) in Model 4, zHIST is a quasi-moderator. As a result, Sharma et al. 
(1981) suggest that the form of moderation is examined with different values of the 
moderator variable. If zHIST influences the form of moderation, the use of the 
moderated regression analysis is warranted (Venkatraman 1989). 
 
Examining the results obtained from Model 4 gives insights of how a seller’s 
reputation and the market environment influence prices. Estimated coefficients 
indicate how much a change of one standard deviation in a covariate alters the 
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 dependent variable. Since interactions are present in the regression equation, estimates 
for the standalone term zRATE must be assessed when the moderator, zHIST, equals 
zero. Conveniently, this coincides with the mean as explained earlier. Standardization 
provides an interpretation for the deployed dummy variables. Only the dummy for 
storefronts (0.502) is statistically significant, whereas the dummy for Top500-sellers 
is not. Therefore, when all variables are set to their mean values, the storefront prices 
are a half standard deviation higher than the prices of other sellers, but Top500-sellers 
do not differ from other sellers. In consequence, the dummy variables fail to support 
both H2A and H2B. 
 
4.2 Reputation Variables 
The signs of the estimated coefficients of zRATE are statistically significant and 
negative for all sellers (-0.111) and storefronts (-0.335). This implies an inverse 
relation between prices and rating scores when zRATE and zHIST are set equal to 
zero. The quadratic effect of zRATE2 is negative (-0.051) for all sellers, but positive 
forTop500-sellers (0.099). As a result, the main effect of the rating score is 
curvilinear. For the general seller population and storefronts, these results indicate a 
strong inverse relation between prices and rating scores. However, the estimated 
coefficient of TOP500*zRATE2 for is positive and greater by magnitude than zRATE2. 
As a consequence, high rating scores dominate the general first-order and second-
order effects providing returns on reputation for Top500-sellers.  
 
The estimated coefficient of zHIST is statistically significant and negative (-0.061), 
but the coefficients for the control groups are statistically insignificant. There is no 
quadratic effect on the general seller population which suggests that the overall 
influence of the ratings history is linear. Thus, longer ratings histories are associated 
with lower relative prices. The quadratic effect is statistically insignificant also for 
storefronts, but the estimated coefficient of TOP500*zHIST2 is positive (0.047) and 
statistically significant. Hence, the effect of the ratings history on Top500-sellers is 
nonlinear implying that higher prices have a positive correlation with the longer 
ratings histories. 
 
The interaction terms are statistically significant for all sellers and storefronts. The 
overall effect (-0.117) is negative, whereas the estimate for storefronts (0.341) is 
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 positive. As a consequence, the combined effect of the interaction is positive on 
storefronts indicating returns on reputation for longer ratings histories. In contrast, 
longer ratings histories are associated with lower prices among other sellers. 
 
These results are further explored by testing Model 4 with different values of the 
ratings history and rating score. These values are entered into Equations (3) to (5) and 
assuming that the market variables are equal to zero. Tables 6 to 8 lay out the total 
effects on the price while Figures 1 to 3 illustrate these results. The values used for 
zHIST and zRATE are the minimum (min.), mean, median (med.) and maximum 
(max.) which are obtained from Table 3.  
 
Table 6 together with Figure 1 demonstrates the total effect on all sellers. The 
graphical representation shows that there is an overall trend that better reputations 
correlate with lower prices. In addition, longer ratings histories correlate with lower 
prices. The difference between the two extremes is more than 100% (a full standard 
deviation), as the minimum rating score and ratings history is 0.286, while the 
maximum values produce -0.736. In consequence, there seems to be no returns on 
reputation when all sellers are considered, because all positive total effects can be 
found in the minimum zRATE column and with the ratings histories at the mean or 
below. Thus, the evidence does not support either H1A or H1B when all sellers are 
considered. 
 
Both controlled seller groups display results that differ from the general seller 
population. Table 7 and Figure 2 present the effects on storefronts. There is again a 
visible negative trend between the rating score and prices. In contrast, the longer 
ratings histories are related to the higher prices. The only positive coefficients can be 
found in the row of the maximum length of zHIST. Thus, an increase in zRATE by one 
standard deviation increases the price by 0.788 to 0.466 standard deviations when 
zHIST is at the maximum. As with the whole sample, the difference between the 
minimum values (-0.581) and the maximum values (0.466) is again more than 100%. 
While rating scores are related to lower prices, these figures show that the longer 
ratings histories may give some pricing power to storefronts. In conclusion, we find 
support for H1B but no support for H2B when storefronts are considered. 
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 Table 6. Total Effect on All Sellers with Different Values of zRATE and zHIST 
 
 
Figure 1. Total Effect on All Sellers with Different Values of zRATE and zHIST 
    
Table 7. Total Effect on Storefronts with Different Values of zRATE and zHIST 
 
 
Figure 2. Total Effect on Storefronts with Different Values of zRATE and zHIST 
zHIST   zPRICE   
max.   -0. 424 -0. 639   -0.653 -0.736  
.   med 0. 150 -0. 065   -0.079 -0.162  
mean  0. 104 -0. 111   -0.125 -0.208  
min.   0. 286 0. 072   0.057 -0.026  
zRATE   min.   mean  med. max. 
  
zHIST   SF*zPRICE  
max.   0 . 778 0. 564   0.549 0.466  
.   med -0. 320 -0. 534   -0.549 -0.632  
mean  -0. 232 -0. 446   -0.461 -0.544  
min.   -0. 581 -0. 796   -0.810 -0.893  
zRATE   min.  mean  med. max. 
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 The results for Top500-sellers are shown in Table 8 and Figure 3. Unlike other sellers, 
there is a visible positive relation between prices and rating scores. Although most 
values are in the negative territory, their magnitude increases towards the higher 
rating scores. Nevertheless, the longer ratings histories correlate with the lower prices. 
The difference between the minimum values (-0.129) and the maximum values (-
0.547) is considerably lower at about 40%. Positive values can be found in the 
minimum row of zHIST at and above the mean zRATE, and at the median zHIST and 
the maximum zRATE cell. The magnitudes of these effects, however, are not sizable 
corresponding to 0.027 to 0.164 standard deviations. Nonetheless, these figures 
provide some support for H1A and H2A when Top500-sellers are considered.  
 
Table 8. Total Effect on Top500-Sellers with Different Values of zRATE and zHIST 
 
 
Figure 3. Total Effect on Top500-Sellers with Different Values of zRATE and zHIST. 
 
4.3 Market Variables   
The coefficients for market variables, zTHICK and zSFR, provide straightforward 
interpretations. The coefficient for zTHICK (-0.076) is negative and statistically 
significant while the estimate for Top500-sellers is not. However, the estimated 
coefficient for storefronts (0.183) is positive and greater in magnitude. Thus, sellers in 
general decrease prices when the number of market incumbents increases. Storefronts, 
zHIST   TOP500*zPRI CE 
max.   -0. 840 -0. 639   -0.625 -0.547  
.   med -0. 266 -0. 065   -0.051 0.027  
mean  -0. 312 -0. 111   -0.097 -0.019  
min.   -0. 129 0. 072   0.086 0.164  
zRATE   min.  mean  med. max. 
  
134 
 
 on the other hand, realize price gains as the increased competition drives prices 
towards a competitive price. Based on this evidence, H3A cannot be rejected entirely. 
The storefront ratio has a stronger impact on prices. Estimates are negative for all 
sellers (-0.046), storefronts (-0.092) and Top500-sellers (-0.082). This indicates that 
an increase in the proportional number of storefronts in a market has an adverse effect 
on prices. In addition, this effect is more pronounced among the control groups. As a 
result, H3B is accepted. 
 
4.4 Quantile Regression 
Quantile Regression (QR) is a semiparametric estimation method. The strength of QR 
is that it is robust to outliers in data (Koenker and Hallock 2001). A special case of 
QR is median regression which is a semiparametric alternative to OLS. As the name 
suggests, median regression reveals only a fraction of the information that QR can 
give. With QR, it is possible to get estimates for coefficients across the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable. We use QR to check how robust the results of 
OLS in Model 4 are across the conditional distribution. The quantile regression 
estimates are reported in Table 9. They are provided for the first quartile (0.25 
quantile), the second quartile i.e. the median (0.50 quantile) and the third quartile 
(0.75 quantile). The first quartile corresponds to the lower tail of the dependent 
variable’s distribution and the third quartile corresponds to the upper tail. 
 
The dummy variables behave as expected showing negative values in the lower tail 
and positive values in the upper tail. The estimates verify that when all values are zero 
at the mean, storefronts set higher prices than other sellers. For example, compared 
with Top500-sellers (0.541), storefront prices (1.391) are considerably higher in the 
upper tail. The estimates for coefficients of the market variables as described in 
Equations (3) to (5) are combined to Equations (6) to (8), so the results are easier to 
interpret. The values in parentheses are estimates for each quantile, the first quartile 
on the top, the median in the middle, and the third quartile at the bottom.  
 
Setting the levels of zRATE and zHIST equal to zero indicates that the negative effect 
of reputation dominates almost everywhere. Nevertheless, varying zRATE sufficiently 
as zHIST is held constant, brings positive effects for Top500-sellers at and above the 
median.  However, zRATE must be very large to offset the negative estimates of β at 
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 the median. Contrary to OLS estimates, all sellers may enjoy returns on reputation in 
the upper tail for all values of zRATE that exceed the mean. In contrast, the negative 
relationship between the zRATE and zPRICE persists with storefronts. Also, we find 
negative effects on all sellers at and below the median and in the lower tail for 
Top500-sellers. As a result, QR estimates show that the predictions of OLS hold 
everywhere only for storefronts but not for Top500-sellers and the general seller 
population. 
 
Table 9. Quantile Regression Estimates for Model 4 
Variable 0.25 0.5 0.75 
SF -0.437*** 
(0.070) 
0.472*** 
(0.085) 
1.391*** 
(0.068) 
TOP500 -0.555*** 
(0.034) 
0.077** 
(0.039) 
0.054*** 
(0.034) 
zRATE -0.335*** 
(0.027) 
-0.175*** 
(0.025) 
0.115 
(0.029) 
zHIST 0.222*** 
(0.035) 
-0.054 
(0.041) 
-0.280*** 
(0.034) 
zTHICK -0.135*** 
(0.011) 
-0.132*** 
(0.013) 
-0.134*** 
(0.014) 
zSFR 0.034* 
(0.020) 
-0.077*** 
(0.025) 
-0.125*** 
(0.025) 
(zRATE)2 -0.450*** 
(0.038) 
-0.130*** 
(0.021) 
0.278*** 
(0.035) 
(zHIST)2 -0.237*** 
(0.032) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.013*** 
(0.017)
SF*zRATE -0.107* 
(0.064) 
-0.418*** 
(0.069) 
-0.453*** 
(0.066) 
SF*zHIST -0.392*** 
(0.062) 
-0.075 
(0.072) 
0.305*** 
(0.059)
SF*zTHICK 0.262*** 
(0.044) 
0.195*** 
(0.050) 
0.199*** 
(0.034) 
SF*zSFR -0.069** 
(0.034) 
-0.076* 
(0.040) 
-0.094** 
(0.038) 
SF*(zRATE)2 0.377*** 
(0.062) 
0.062 
(0.052) 
-0.037*** 
(0.051) 
SF*(zHIST)2 0.187** 
(0.075) 
-0.006 
(0.062) 
-0.268*** 
(0.070) 
TOP500*zRATE 0.292*** 
(0.046) 
0.071 
(0.056) 
-0.052 
(0.050) 
TOP500* zHIST -0.248*** 
(0.053) 
-0.022 
(0.075) 
0.135** 
(0.059)
TOP500*zTHICK 0.167*** 
(0.020) 
0.0486* 
(0.028) 
-0.000 
(0.028) 
TOP500*zSFR -0.114*** 
(0.030) 
-0.163** 
(0.043) 
-0.021 
(0.048) 
TOP500*(zRATE)2 0.486*** 
(0.046) 
0.141*** 
(0.033) 
-0.197*** 
(0.042) 
TOP500*(zHIST)2 0.245*** 
(0.036) 
-0.000 
(0.032) 
-0.067** 
(0.027) 
zRATE*zHIST -0.060 
(0.055) 
-0.133*** 
(0.045) 
-0.155*** 
(0.050) 
SF*zRATE*zHIST 0.342*** 
(0.088) 
0.276*** 
(0.099) 
0.394*** 
(0.086) 
TOP500*zRATE*zHIST -0.037 
(0.068) 
0.112 
(0.076) 
0.136* 
(0.076)
Observations 8916 8916 8916 
Pseudo R2  0.070  
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Holding zRATE constant and varying zHIST shows that the predictions of OLS are not 
equal all over the distribution. While the estimates for the median and upper tail are 
negative for the general seller population and Top500-sellers, estimates for the lower 
tail are statistically insignificant. This implies that the negative effect of an increase in 
zHIST does not affect the sellers who charge the lowest prices. In addition, OLS 
predicted that storefronts, on average, respond positively to an increase in the length 
of ratings history. QR estimates show that the effect is negative at the median but 
positive in both tails. Therefore, we can conclude that an increase in zHIST benefits 
the sellers whose prices are in the lower tail and upper tail of the price distribution.   
 
Estimates for the market variables, zTHICK and zSFR, display mixed results. The 
estimated coefficients for zTHICK are negative for all sellers at all quartiles (-0.135; -
0.132; -0.138). This effect is strong enough to offset the positive coefficients for 
Top500-sellers at the median (0.048) but not in the lower tail (0.167) while the upper 
tail is not significant. Storefronts, however, show a positive response everywhere 
(0.262; 0.195; 0.199) which offsets the negative influence of the overall estimates. 
Hence, increasing market thickness leads to lower prices but the sellers in the lower 
tail realize relative gains as the prices fall more in the upper tail of the price 
distribution. On the other hand, the influence of the storefront ratio is negative for 
storefronts everywhere (-0.069; -0.076; -0.094) which offset and accentuate the 
overall influence of zSFR (0.034; -0.077; -0.125). In a similar manner, the prices of 
Top500-sellers respond negatively to an increase in the storefront ratio at and below 
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 the median (-0.114; -0.163). Overall, these results imply that intensified competition 
depresses prices more in the upper tail of the price distribution. 
 
4.5 Product Type 
The results of regressions for different product types are presented in Table 1068. The 
lack of statistical significance in estimated coefficients is striking. An explanation for 
this could be multicollinearity which inflates variances. The auxiliary regressions 
indicate that multicollinearity may be problematic especially with convenience goods 
and shopping goods because some VIFs exceed the generally accepted tolerance level 
of 10.  
 
In the convenience goods category, only the coefficient for zRATE*zHIST is 
statistically significant (-0.342). This indicates that there are no returns on reputation 
in general. For storefronts, the main effect (-0.407) and the interaction (0.777) are 
statistically significant, and the combined coefficients for the interaction terms sum to 
0.435. So only ratings histories that are significantly above the mean provide returns 
on reputation because they have to offset the negative main effect. The combined 
coefficients of the interaction terms sum to 0.362 for Top500-sellers, so any ratings 
histories above the mean could enable price premiums. As regards the market 
variables, only the storefront ratio is statistically significant and negative (-0.121). 
This implies that an increase in the number of storefronts intensifies competition in 
the markets for convenience goods. 
 
In the shopping goods category, only the interaction term is statistically significant (-
0.427) for all sellers. Thus, there are no returns on reputation for the general seller 
population. The combined coefficients for storefronts sum to 0.279. Thus histories 
significantly above the mean could enable premium pricing. For Top500-sellers, 
however, the sum is slightly below zero (-0.073), which suggests that no returns on 
reputation exist. The market variables display diverse effects. An increase in market 
thickness (-0.101) tends to lower prices, but this does not affect storefronts, for which 
the combined effect is positive (0.118). So their relative price position improves as 
market thickness increases. The storefront ratio is negative and statistically significant 
                                                     
68 Only estimates for Model 4 are reported. Estimates for Models 1 to 3 are available from the author upon request. 
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 for storefronts (-0.274) and Top500-sellers (-0.349). This suggests that storefronts 
intensify competition in the shopping goods markets.  
 
In the specialty goods category, all statistically significant estimates for reputation 
variables are negative. Hence, there are no returns on reputation in this product 
category. The results are inconclusive for the market variables. Overall, an increase in 
market thickness lowers prices, but the combined effect is positive for storefronts 
(0.479). However, these results are most likely caused by the low frequency of 
storefronts in the specialty goods markets. The storefront ratio is statistically 
significant for Top500-sellers (-0.204), which could mean that small firms force well-
known sellers into price competition. 
 
In conclusion, the influence of the product type is rather unexpected. Returns on 
reputation, when available, are the greatest in the markets for convenience goods. In 
contrast, they do not exist in the markets for specialty goods while the markets for 
shopping goods show some possibilities for price premiums. For this reason, H4 is 
rejected.      
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Key Findings 
The objective of this study was to determine whether the returns on reputation as price 
premiums exist in online retail markets. The extant research on online auctions has 
verified that sellers with better reputations as measured by their reputation scores earn 
returns on reputation. In this study, we analyze data that is obtained from the 
reputation system of the online price comparison website Pricegrabber.com. 
 
We use a hierarchical regression model to answer the research hypotheses laid out in 
Section 2.4. When all sellers are considered, the results do not support the hypothesis 
that sellers earn returns on reputation. On the contrary, the evidence points to the 
opposite effect. Higher rating scores and longer ratings histories correlate with lower 
prices. 
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 We hypothesized also that branded firms (Top500-sellers) may earn returns to their 
brands, which are in part manifestations of reputation, whereas small enterprises 
(storefronts) compete with price. The results indicate that without reputation effects, 
this is not the case. The prices set by Top500-sellers do not differ from the general 
seller population, whereas storefronts set higher prices than other sellers. However, 
the estimated total effects indicate that Top500-sellers earn some returns on their 
reputation, but storefronts do not. In addition, storefronts may receive a small 
competitive advantage from sufficiently long ratings histories. Quantile regression 
indicates that the general seller population may earn returns on reputation in the upper 
tail of the price distribution. In contrast, there is a positive correlation between higher 
prices and longer ratings histories in the storefront group, but Top500-sellers display 
the opposite effect. In conclusion, Top500-sellers and storefronts provide some 
support for the hypothesis on returns on reputation as measured by reputation scores 
and the length of ratings history, respectively. 
 
As a robustness check, we test whether the product type has any influence on price 
premiums. Three broad product categories (convenience goods, shopping goods and 
specialty goods) are being analyzed. The theory suggests that consumers perceive 
specific and valuable goods to be riskier purchases than convenience goods. This 
could give an opportunity to benefit from a good reputation. However, our findings 
indicate that this is not the case in retail e-commerce. Storefronts and Top500-sellers 
may earn returns on reputation in convenience goods markets which are the lowest 
risk markets for consumers. In contrast, returns on reputation are vague in shopping 
goods markets and they do not exist in specialty goods markets.  
 
The theory of industrial organization suggests that an increase in the number of 
market incumbents intensifies price competition. We hypothesize that increases in 
market thickness and in the relative number of storefronts in a market (the storefront 
ratio) leads to lower prices. Again, the findings are inconclusive. Our study finds that 
an overall increase in market thickness lowers prices. Quantile regression verifies that 
the effect is the strongest in the upper tail of the price distribution. However, Top500-
sellers show no response to an increase in market thickness while storefront prices 
increase relative to other prices with market thickness. A more influential variable in 
intensifying price competition seems to be the storefront ratio.  
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 Table 10. OLS Estimates for Different Product Categories 
Variable CONV SHOP SPCL 
SF 0.567 
(0.157***) 
0.921 
(0.219***) 
0.787 
(0.244***) 
TOP500 -0.081 
(0.102) 
0.062 
(0.070) 
0.0.3 
(0.094) 
zRATE -0.061 
(0.065) 
-0.040 
(0.059) 
-0.125 
(0.060**) 
zHIST -0.040 
(0.077) 
-0.080 
(0.079) 
-0.008 
(0.077) 
zTHICK -0.036 
(0.039) 
-0.101 
(0.035***) 
-0.128 
(0.040***) 
zSFR -0.121 
(0.064*) 
0.053 
(0.053) 
-0.066 
(0.060) 
(zRATE)2 0.013 
(0.067) 
-0.003 
(0.030) 
-0.069 
(0.053) 
(zHIST)2 0.010 
(0.027) 
0.030 
(0.300) 
-0.009 
(0.032) 
SF*zRATE -0.407 
(0.174**) 
-0.647 
(0.168***) 
-0.239 
(0.232) 
SF*zHIST 0.369 
(0.160**) 
0.261 
(0.189) 
0.109 
(0.158) 
SF*zTHICK -0.034 
(0.079) 
0.219 
(0.093**) 
0.607 
(0.178***) 
SF*zSFR -0.009 
(0.095) 
-0.247 
(0.088***) 
-0.043 
(0.131) 
SF*(zRATE)2 -0.139 
(0.117) 
-0.125 
(0.120) 
0.019 
(0.181) 
SF*(zHIST)2 -0.092 
(0.178) 
-0.393 
(0.261) 
-0.328 
(0.136**) 
TOP500*zRATE -0.073 
(0.155) 
-0.049 
(0.102) 
-0.173 
(0.119) 
TOP500* zHIST -0.199 
(0.193) 
0.086 
(0.134) 
-0.159 
(0.125) 
TOP500*zTHICK 0.114 
(0.070) 
-0.017 
(0.066) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
TOP500*zSFR 0.000 
(0.124) 
-0.349 
(0.089***) 
-0.204 
(0.108*) 
TOP500*(zRATE)2 -0.029 
(0.096) 
-0.009 
(0.061) 
0.034 
(0.079) 
TOP500*(zHIST)2 -0.033 
(0.079) 
-0.003 
(0.057) 
0.073 
(0.076) 
zRATE*zHIST -0.342 
(0.108***) 
-0.427 
(0.107***) 
-0.084 
(0.090) 
SF*zRATE*zHIST 0.777 
(0.274***) 
0.706 
(0.252***) 
0.286 
(0.249) 
TOP500*zRATE*zHIST 0.704 
(0.200***) 
0.354 
(0.156**) 
0.080 
(0.156) 
Observations 838 1055 581 
R2 0.170 0.238 0.269 
F 7.590*** 14.679*** 9.314*** 
VIF Range 1.754-17.857 1.783-15.625 1.742-6.803 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
 
5.2 Suggested Explanations for Findings 
Compared with the online auctions literature, we fail to detect an overall positive 
relationship between seller reputations and price premiums. An explanation for this 
could be that rating scores are a crude measure of a seller’s reputation. Thus, unlike in 
auction markets, buyers can find additional information about sellers elsewhere and 
base their purchase decisions on this information. The relationship between lower 
prices and longer ratings histories suggests that ratings histories may proxy the level 
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 of sales also in retail markets as suggested by Cabral and Hortaçsu (2006). As a 
consequence, comparison shopping services fulfill their purpose as a means to 
conduct price comparisons. Low prices attract more buyers who are satisfied with the 
low prices and return positive feedback. As control groups diverge from the general 
population, the seller type could explain results. First, Top500-sellers are well-known 
sellers. As a result, the sellers with better reputations within the group receive some 
returns on reputation. However, the negative correlation between the length of ratings 
history and prices imply that low prices attract more buyers. Second, storefronts may 
attempt to gain occasional sales at high prices which would explain the dummy 
variable that indicates a price level that is higher than the average price level of other 
sellers. The positive effect of the ratings history could mean that it signals a 
commitment to stay in the market. This could be important to buyers because returns 
and warranties often require contacting the seller. 
 
Another explanation for the differences could be that the value of merchandise 
determines the importance of a seller’s reputation in a purchase decision. Consumers 
may view a reputation as an insurance against fraudulent behavior when purchasing 
valuable items such as televisions. As the value of a purchased item increases, 
consumers become more risk averse and are willing to pay a price premium for a 
homogenous item to a more reputable seller. 
 
The price data provides some support for this proposition. The descriptive statistics of 
prices are presented in Table 11. They show that the mean (279.90) and range 
(8449.01) of storefronts prices is considerably less than the mean and range for the 
other seller types. The difference in the median prices is less severe. The statistical 
tests in Table 12 support the argument that on average, storefronts focus on items that 
are of lower value, because the mean and median prices are lower than those of the 
other two seller types. While the means of Top500-sellers and other sellers are equal, 
their medians are not. This implies that Top500-sellers sell more valuable items than 
other sellers, but this difference is not very large. 
 
This explanation is not entirely convincing because a sub-sample of product types 
reveals an inverse trend. Returns on reputation are the most apparent among 
convenience goods which are the least expensive on average (see Table 4). In 
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 contrast, price premiums wane in the shopping goods markets and disappear in the 
specialty goods markets. Furthermore, measured by market thickness, the markets for 
convenience goods are more competitive either the markets for shopping goods or 
specialty goods. An explanation for these findings could be consumer search which is 
more intense for shopping goods and specialty goods (Thirumalai and Sinha 2009). 
Buyers use comparison shopping websites to locate the best deals for the desired 
goods. In consequence, this reduces a seller’s ability to benefit from a good 
reputation.  
  
The disparate impact of market thickness is more difficult to explain. As market 
thickness increases, the likelihood that a consumer encounters a seller that has the best 
fit for her preferences increases because the number of firms in the market increases. 
For example, earlier successful transactions with a familiar seller, or a seller’s brand 
could weigh in consumer decision making which could explain the effects on Top500-
sellers and storefronts. According to Grover et al. (2006), information overload – too 
much information to process – might cause consumers to buy only at known firms.  
 
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics of Prices of Seller Groups 
Statistic Other Sellers Storefronts Top500-Sellers 
Mean 423.89 279.90 426.07 
Median 111.12 85.00 149.99 
Maximum 16797.59 8450.00 16265.20 
Minimum 0.01 0.99 0.93 
Std. Dev. 962.81 535.48 881.98 
Observations 9681 2173 2353 
  
Table 12. T-Tests and Mann-Whitney Tests for Seller Groups 
Hypothesis T-test Mann-Whitney Conclusion 
Storefronts =Top500-sellers -6.673*** 9.512*** Rejected / Rejected 
Storefronts =Other Sellers -6.741*** 5.054*** Rejected / Rejected 
Top500-sellers =Other Sellers -0.100 6.145*** Accepted / Rejected 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the effect of a seller’s reputation on pricing in retail e-
commerce. In our model, a seller’s reputation is measured by its rating score and 
ratings history. This study used data from Pricegrabber.com which is a popular 
comparison shopping service. We control for two seller types, storefronts and 
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 Top500-sellers, based on their level of sales and choice over a sales channel in 
Pricegrabber.com. We also distinguish between convenience, shopping and specialty 
goods. Moreover, the variables that characterize competition in markets (market 
thickness and the storefront ratio) were included in the regression model. OLS and 
quantile regression with standardized variables is used to estimate a hierarchical 
regression model. 
 
Our findings indicate that when all sellers are considered, there are no universal 
returns on reputation in retail e-commerce. However, the specified seller groups 
display some returns on the measures of reputation. Top500-sellers show returns on 
reputation as measured by the rating score while the longer ratings histories allow 
premium pricing for storefronts. Quantile regression indicates that returns on 
reputation concentrate to the upper quartile of the price distribution, and even the 
general seller population may obtain price premiums. The impact of competition on 
prices proves mixed. Overall, an increase in market thickness lowers prices as 
expected. In contrast, the results indicate that Top500-sellers are not affected by this 
increase, and storefront prices increase with market thickness. However, an increase 
in the storefront ratio lowers prices in all seller groups.    
 
5.4 Contribution 
The main contribution of this paper is to expand the empirical research of reputation 
effects in e-commerce from online auctions to online retail markets. The influence of 
reputation scores on prices has not been studied in this scale in the context of retail e-
markets. Therefore, this study fills the void that has existed in e-commerce research 
and contributes to the extant literature of reputational effects in e-commerce.  
 
Overall, these results show that a reputation score does not enable price premiums 
when all sellers are considered. Unfortunately, our results are not directly comparable 
to those obtained from auction markets because of the fundamental differences 
between retail and auction markets. The closest comparison is Bayliss and Perloff 
(2002) who find that favorable third party ratings have no effect on prices. They 
conclude that there is no premium associated with the ratings because “bad firms” 
charge higher prices than “good firms”. Our study points to the same direction. 
However, we hesitate to give this interpretation because the average rating score is 
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 over 4 in a scale of 1 to 5. Consequently, “bad firms” are not abundant in the market. 
In addition, it is impossible to tell how many sales these firms are able to conclude 
after bad reviews start to accumulate. In the end, even small differences in rating 
scores and ratings histories could matter if sellers were otherwise similar.  
 
Our evidence shows that Top500-sellers earn returns on their investments in 
reputation. One explanation could be brand recognition as suggested by Brynjolfsson 
and Smith (2001). On the other hand, by definition Top500-sellers are major players 
in e-commerce. Running an e-commerce operation with such magnitude requires 
investments in state-of-the-art technology and good services (Saloner & Borenstein 
2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that returns on reputation are found in this seller 
group. As a result, investment in a large-scale, well-run e-commerce operation may 
result in a good reputation that, in turn, is a competitive advantage in retail e-
commerce. 
  
Storefronts displayed returns on the length of ratings history. As these sellers are 
small-scale e-commerce vendors, this suggests that a consistent ratings history signals 
commitment to stay in the market to buyers. Buyers could value experience which is 
reported by McDonald and Slawson (2002) in online auction markets. They find that 
experienced sellers receive more bids and end up receiving higher final prices. These 
findings suggest that a small-scale e-commerce start-up should sell at low prices 
initially to generate and build up a consistent ratings history. Eventually, this strategy 
may allow charging a price premium over other sellers. 
  
Our evidence indicates also that the number of sellers in the market have an impact on 
pricing. More precisely, the number of storefronts seems to affect more than the 
overall number of sellers. The seller type could explain this. As storefronts sell their 
products through the comparison shopping website, they have a larger propensity to 
enter into price competition. For other sellers, a comparison shopping website is a 
way to attract more price-conscious customers because they may derive a large bulk 
of sales elsewhere. For this reason, they have no interest in entering price competition 
for the informed consumers who look for bargains. Instead, the market for them 
resembles the situations described in Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Varian (1980) 
where the informed customers pay lower prices and the uninformed pay higher prices. 
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 Occasionally, a firm charges the lowest price universally by organizing a sale or just 
by being lucky. 
 
5.5 Implications 
The findings of this study provide information about the importance of a seller’s 
reputation in highly competitive online comparison shopping markets. For small 
enterprises, a commitment to stay in the market, which is reflected by the length of a 
firm’s ratings history, may provide some pricing power. Large, e-commerce 
enterprises seem to reap some benefits from their reputations. In light of this evidence, 
a firm should not overestimate the competitive advantage of a good reputation. It is 
likely that as long as a seller does not deviate from its peers significantly, buyers 
overlook small differences in reputations and prefer lower prices. Thus, active 
reputation building may not be an effective tool in building a competitive advantage 
in comparison shopping markets, whose main purpose is to enable consumers’ price 
search across different vendors. In contrast, the low price strategy, at least initially, 
may be effective for small enterprises to gain consumer trust. As small firms become 
established sellers, they may be able to set small price premiums over market entrants.  
 
5.6 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
There are a few obvious problems with this study. First, the overall fit of the model is 
not very good. To address this problem, the scope of the study should probably be 
narrowed down to include a smaller number of products. Second, the sample of sellers 
may be biased towards sellers whose strategy is to compete with price. This is because 
buyers who use a comparison shopping service are likely to be more experienced 
users of e-commerce and more price sensitive than the average buyer. As a result, 
sellers who choose to participate in a comparison shopping market choose to compete 
with price and not with service quality, for instance. Third, reputation systems provide 
more information than numerical scores in the form of written comments. Analyzing 
these comments, and whether or not they have an impact on transactions, opens a new 
avenue to research as demonstrated by Pavlou and Dimoka (2006). Fourth, this 
research, as well as many other empirical inquiries into e-commerce, use posted 
prices. For this reason, it is impossible to tell which offers lead to concluded 
transactions. Access to the data that shows details about concluded transactions would 
greatly enhance knowledge about the influence of a seller’s characteristics in e-
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 commerce. Indeed, data from e-commerce companies could provide insight how 
much a seller’s efforts to increase buyer’s switching costs through loyalty programs 
mitigates consumer’s price sensitivity and what is the influence of the seller’s 
reputation in that case. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a model in which two profit-maximizing sellers sell a 
homogeneous good to Bayesian, risk-neutral buyers in an online comparison shopping 
service. Buyers use a reputation system to update their beliefs about sellers. Buyers 
purchase from the seller that maximizes the buyer’s expected utility from the 
purchase. We find that the seller’s profit depends on the distribution of buyer beliefs. 
A degenerate distribution of beliefs implies either Bertrand competition or a 
monopolistic market. A non-degenerate distribution implies that both sellers can be 
profitable, if their reputations differ from each other. The seller with a higher 
reputation score receives a greater profit. If sellers are similar in every respect, the 
Bertrand equilibrium obtains. We test the theory with data from Pricegrabber using 
OLS and quantile regression. Controlling for different seller types, the evidence 
indicates that higher reputation scores may support price premiums.     
 
Keywords: electronic commerce, comparison shopping, competition, reputation 
systems 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The ease of comparing prices and product offerings increases efficiency in electronic 
markets. Designed for this purpose, comparison shopping services are electronic 
marketplaces that lower buyer search costs by gathering and distributing information 
about sellers 69 . The buyer that wishes to purchase some product uses the search 
engine of a comparison shopping website to receive a list of price quotes from the 
sellers that offer the desired product. As a result, the buyer can choose the most 
preferable offer from the available sellers in terms of price, delivery, payment and the 
seller’s quality.  
 
In the economic literature, comparison shopping services relate to information 
clearinghouse models. In Varian (1980), a fraction of buyers use the information 
clearinghouse, such as a newspaper, to locate the seller who sets the lowest price, 
whereas other buyers are evenly distributed among all sellers. As a result, buyer 
heterogeneity produces price dispersion. Baye and Morgan (2001) take information 
clearinghouse models to electronic markets. They suggest that an optimizing 
monopolistic operator of a comparison shopping service sets its fees for sellers high 
enough to induce some sellers to stay out of the service. In contrast, the fees for 
buyers are low enough to encourage full participation. In consequence, the prices are 
lower in the comparison shopping service than in the outside market, which 
encourages buyers to use the service. From the buyer’s perspective, comparison 
shopping markets may provide considerable increase in consumer surplus because it 
mitigates the buyer’s information costs and spurs competition among sellers. From the 
seller’s perspective, they could lead to cut-throat price competition, because there is 
little room for product differentiation and free entry erases supernormal profits.  
 
Despite the challenging market environment, empirical evidence shows that well-
known e-commerce giants as well as less-known small firms participate in 
comparison shopping markets (Saastamoinen, 2008). Since the operators of 
comparison shopping websites often charge fees from the participating vendors, 
benefits from participation must exceed its costs for sellers. For a small firm, a 
                                                     
69These services are also known as a price comparison service or a price engine. See more details in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_comparison_service. 
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 comparison shopping market could bring visibility at low costs (Wan, 2006). 
Visibility is vital because buyers are aware of only a fraction of sellers in the market 
(Grover et al. 2006). To attract unaware buyers to their online stores, sellers have to 
advertise or organize promotional alliances with search engines (Latcovich & Howard 
2001; Filson 2004). On the other hand, a firm must pursue an aggressive pricing 
strategy which restrains profitability. While incentives to participate in comparison 
shopping services are not obvious, some benefits from participation may exist. First, 
firms may organize periodical sales or inventory clear outs and occasionally win the 
bidding contest as suggested by Varian (1980). Second, as more buyers learn to use 
the search mechanisms of the Internet for commercial purposes, it is harder to 
maintain prices above the competitive level. Third, it gives an opportunity to monitor 
prices or issue a commitment to certain price level. Smith (2001) entertains a 
possibility that dominant sellers could use a comparison shopping service in collusion 
to maintain higher prices.  
 
Price alone cannot explain competition in comparison shopping markets because the 
problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard are inherent in e-markets. The 
lack of direct contact between buyers and sellers raises concerns about opportunistic 
fraudulent behavior (Friedman et al. 2000). In markets of perfect and complete 
information, every action an agent takes and the agent’s action history is observable to 
other agents rendering reputation irrelevant in such markets. Asymmetric information 
creates incentives to reputation building. Cabral (2005) defines reputation as “the 
situation when agents believe a particular agent to be something.” This belief may be 
crucial for commercial transactions to take place. For this reason, seller reputations 
may play a large role in competition. To address this problem, many e-commerce 
marketplaces have introduced reputation systems which gather and distribute 
aggregated information from buyers about the past behavior of sellers (Resnick et al. 
2000). 
 
As the online business environment cultivates concerns over the trustworthiness of a 
trading partner, this may impede market entry because buyers trust the established 
firms more than newcomers. Economic benefits of reputation building may explain 
the proliferation of reputation systems. First, reputation can be viewed as an asset. In 
Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983), a firm invests in reputation by selling 
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 high quality products at loss initially but earning a price premium on the established 
reputation later. To be qualified as an asset implies that established reputations can be 
bought. As a result, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) show that a reputation may not be 
a good signal of quality because incompetent firms buy good reputations. Second, 
Klein and Leffler (1981) suggest that consumers view reputation as a protection for 
contractual obligation. A price premium from reputation induces a firm to maintain 
good quality because the profit stream from good quality products exceeds the gains 
from cheating. Hörner (2002) argues that this does not provide sufficient incentives to 
maintain good quality. Instead, competition provides such incentives by creating an 
outside option to buyers who can patronize the seller’s rival, if they detect cheating on 
behalf of the seller. 
 
The comparison shopping services with reputation systems may provide 
simultaneously a low-cost entry point to the market as well as insulation from price 
competition. Zhou (et al. 2008) present a model for online markets, in which they 
show that a reputation system can reduce asymmetric information in an online market 
and replicate the results of Shapiro (1983). An efficient reputation system provides 
incentives to fulfill contractual obligations. There must also be incentives to 
participate and report truthful feedback through the reputation system. Bakos and 
Dellarocas (2003) show that an online reputation system can be more efficient in 
enforcing desired behavior than a threat of litigation process. 
 
In this paper, we present a model of interactions between buyers and sellers in a 
comparison shopping service with an integrated reputation system, and derive 
implications for competition. In addition, we test the model with empirical data from 
Pricegrabber, which is a popular online comparison shopping service. The paper 
proceeds as follows. In the second section, we present the theoretical model. In the 
third section, we test the model with least-squares regression (OLS) and quantile 
regression (QR). In the final section, we conclude the paper. 
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 2. Model of Competition in Online Comparison Shopping Services 
 
2.1 Buyers 
Consider an electronic marketplace for a homogeneous good. The marketplace is a 
comparison shopping service with an integrated reputation system. A comparison 
shopping service is an electronic marketplace, where buyers receive simultaneously a 
list of price quotes for the desired product from all the sellers that participate in the 
comparison shopping service70. We assume that the use of the comparison shopping 
service is costless to buyers and sellers. A reputation system gathers and distributes 
information about a seller’s past behavior. The buyers that have transacted with the 
seller report their experience through a feedback mechanism. After this, aggregated 
buyer feedback is made publicly visible. This feedback profile forms the seller’s 
reputation in the marketplace. The reputation system of the comparison shopping 
service exists as long as the market exists, and all buyers elicit feedback after 
completed transactions.  
 
The overall market for the good consists of a mass of buyers normalized to one. 
Buyers enter the market in cohorts, one cohort in each period of time. A cohort buys 
at one seller or multiple sellers in each period t, . Repeated purchases are 
possible. Buyers are utility maximizers that are concerned about the price of the good 
and the quality of service (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001). A fundamental distinction 
between types of goods was proposed by Nelson (1970) who categorizes them into 
search goods and experience goods. Price and/or quality comparisons precede 
consumption of search goods, whereas experience goods have to be consumed before 
their quality can be ascertained. As delivery often places a significant lag between 
purchase and consumption of a good, the entire transaction process could be 
considered as a good that has the characteristics of both good types. Sellers cannot 
differentiate the good they sell, so buyers perceive quality differences only in the 
services that sellers provide to them. Comparison shopping services provide easy 
access to price information. However, the uncertainty over the overall purchase 
experience raises concerns about the seller’s trustworthiness.  
Nt ,,0K=
 
                                                     
70 Few examples of such websites include www.bizrate.com, www.pricegrabber.com and shopping.yahoo.com. 
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 The quality of a transaction with the seller is discernible to the buyer after the 
transaction has been concluded. For simplicity, the buyer rates the transaction as a 
success or a failure. Therefore, the reputation system is similar to the binary system 
presented in Dellarocas (2004). In consequence, the feedback takes two values: 
“good” (G) for a successful transaction and “bad” (B) for a failure71. As the tth buyer 
elicits feedback on the seller, the reputation system updates the seller’s feedback 
profile by adding  if the feedback is good, or by adding  if 
the feedback is bad. The initial values before are . Hence, a seller’s 
reputation in period t is the likelihood that a seller is good, which is given by the ratio 
11 += −tt GG 11 += −tt BB
000 == GB
 
 t
tt
t
t BG
GGoodPR γ=
+
=)( .        (1) 
 
Consequently, the likelihood that the seller is bad 
is ttt GoodPRBadPR γ−=−= 1)(1)( . In any given period, a seller’s public feedback 
profile, which is visible to all subsequent buyers and rival sellers, shows the 
likelihood that the seller is good ( tγ ) and the number of reviews the seller has 
received (t). The public feedback profile is a crude measure for a seller’s reputation 
when t is small, but its precision increases as a more feedback is being accumulated. 
A consistent feedback profile could provide the same proof as repeat purchases to 
quality-conscious on the seller’s commitment to maintain high quality service (Rao 
and Bergen 1992). While switching one’s identity easy on the Internet, a large value 
of t signals the seller’s commitment to stay in the market under the same guise. As 
reputation building is a gradual, time-consuming process, a long market history 
implies greater costs of an identity switch to the seller. 
 
If the seller’s type is unknown to the buyer before a transaction, the buyer must assess 
the seller’s trustworthiness from the available information. Each buyer has a private 
signal ]1,0[∈θ  (prior probability) on the seller’s type. The seller’s reputation can be 
interpreted as a buyer’s belief of the seller’s true type (Cabral 2005). It is easy to 
imagine numerous factors that could contribute to θ . For example, previous 
                                                     
71 A candidate parameterized distribution for estimation would be the Beta-distribution. Equation (1) coincides with 
the expected value of Beta trials.  
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 transactions with the seller could completely override the public information (Smith 
and Brynjolfsson 2001). The buyer assigns 1=θ  (extremely favorable) or 0=θ  
(extremely unfavorable) depending on her previous experience72. New buyers may 
have lower values for θ  in general, whereas experienced buyers are more trustful on 
sellers (or vice versa). Allowing for herd behavior, the buyer could also take cue from 
her immediate predecessor’s opinion by setting a low or high value for θ  to conform 
to the predecessors’ reviews. In addition, a price may signal the seller’s type (Doyle 
1990; Tirole 1994). For now, we only assume that θ  is distributed according to some 
distribution with density )(θf . Priors for all sellers are drawn from this distribution. 
 
Infrequent purchases and a constant influx of new buyers into the market make the 
forming of seller reputations (Tirole, 1994). For this reason, an important piece of 
information is the public feedback profile provided by the previous buyers. This is an 
electronic counterpart to the word-of-mouth in the physical world (Resnick et al. 
2000). We assume that the only communication mechanism between buyers is a 
reputation system, so other buyers’ private signals are only observable through their 
feedback. Moreover, a seller cannot be a buyer which prevents manipulation of 
sellers’ reputations.  
 
Buyers use the Bayes’ rule to obtain the posterior probability ),( γθμ  for the seller’s 
trustworthiness. The posterior probability obtained by Bayesian updating can be 
interpreted as the seller’s reputation (Cabral 2005). The reputation system provides 
the public feedback profile ( ti,γ ) of Seller i, which is the evidence-based likelihood 
that the particular seller is good, for any period t. The buyer’s prior probability that 
Seller i is good in period t is ti,θ . After the transaction is concluded, the buyer elicits 
feedback through the reputation system, which updates the seller’s feedback profile. 
All subsequent buyers benefit from the feedback given by their predecessors. In 
general, a buyer updates the posterior probability ti,μ  by 
 
                                                     
72 Notice that the absolute certainty on the seller’s type does not have any larger impact on 
subsequent buyers than uncertainty because only concluded transactions are registered. For 
this reason, only 1=θ  is indirectly observable to other buyers, whereas 0=θ  leads to the 
buyer abandoning the seller. 
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Notice that if no transaction takes place, the next buyer has only the first buyer’s 
feedback at disposal. For this reason, the length of a ratings history may also provide 
important information about the seller’s quality.   
 
Suppose that buyers in the market are risk-neutral. They have identical valuations ( ) 
for the homogeneous good. Let k denote the cost of an unsuccessful transaction, and 
. Given the posterior probability the buyer’s expected value V of the good is 
w
kw >
 
 ))(1( kwV −−+⋅= μμ .       (3) 
 
Equation (3) can be simplified by dividing it with w, so the value of the good to the 
buyer is 1. To simplify the analysis, assume that . This could be interpreted as 
the third party, such as a credit card company, bearing the cost of misdemeanor, or the 
good being low in value. Let 
0=k
w
Vv =  denote the normalized expected value of the 
good. As a result, Equation (3) simplifies to 
 
 μ=v .          (4) 
 
The value of the good to the buyer depends only on the buyer’s posterior probability 
that the seller’s type is good. This is the buyer’s reservation price for the good that is 
purchased from the specific seller. Buyers maximize their (expected) utility (u ) 
 
 pu −= μ ,         (5) 
 
where  is the set of normalized prices. The utility is increasing in ),0[ ∞∈p μ  and 
decreasing in p. Clearly, transactions take place only if p≥μ . Moreover, Equation 
(5) implies that risk-neutral buyers buy from the seller that guarantees them the 
highest (expected) surplus.  
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 Since μ  implies that buyers also care about the level of service, we assume that there 
exists a price that buyers consider too low for a seller to provide sufficient service. 
We assume that this price is common knowledge. This sets a lower bound to the set of 
possible prices. Any price below the lower bound signals with certainty that the 
seller’s type is bad. Klein and Leffler (1981) show that consumers can use price to 
judge the quality of a firm’s products. Their model suggests that consumers are able to 
distinguish the situations in which the price is too low to produce quality products.  
 
2.2 Sellers  
Sellers are retailers in a vertical market structure. The good is produced by an 
upstream manufacturer. The upstream market is competitive and thus, the 
manufacturer’s price  (the wholesale price) equals to the manufacturer’s marginal 
cost. Sellers maximize their profit in the downstream market. There is no vertical 
integration between the upstream manufacturer and downstream retailers. Since the 
upstream market is competitive, the linear pricing contract in the vertical market 
structure is admissible and sellers take  as given (Tirole 1994).  
wp
wp
 
Sellers face two strategy variables. Strategy variables are choice variables that affect a 
seller’s rivals profits or the payoffs accruing to buyers, or both (Doyle 1990). First, 
the seller selects a retail price p. The choice is effectively constrained by the 
monopolist from below and the buyers’ maximum willingness to pay ( μ ) from above. 
Thus, ],[ μwpp ∈ . Second, the seller chooses a level of effort denoted by e  after the 
buyer makes a purchase. For example, effort could be understood as effective 
customer service, measures that secure confidentiality in an electronic transaction, fast 
delivery, and so forth. Effort enters as a cost per unit sold in the seller’s profit 
function. Let  be a continuous choice on . The seller’s profit function is then e ),0[ ∞
 
 ][),( eppep w −−= λπ ,       (6) 
 
where ]1,0[∈λ  is the fraction of buyers the seller receives (we define this measure 
later). There is a mass of buyers normalized to one in the market in each period. This 
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 assumption allows us to split the market between sellers if a buyer cohort receives an 
equal surplus from both of them. 
 
The level of effort has an indirect impact on a seller’s reputation. The probability of a 
successful transaction is increasing in the level of effort. For this reason, even good 
sellers occasionally disappoint buyers, but the seller’s reputation score is an 
approximation of the level of effort the seller has chosen in the past. By taking high 
effort, the seller increases the probability that the buyer has a positive experience with 
the seller and the resulting feedback is positive.  
 
2.3 Market 
For simplicity, suppose that there are two sellers in the marketplace, Seller h and 
Seller l. In any period, a competitive price cannot be equal to the wholesale price 
. If a seller sets its price equal to the wholesale price, it signals to the buyer 
that the seller chooses zero effort. The buyer concludes that the seller must be a bad 
seller and assigns 
wpp =
0=θ . Since this leads to 0== μv , the only possible price that a 
transaction could take place is . But this means that  and the seller 
loses money. Hence, the seller is always better off with  and  cannot be 
a Nash-equilibrium strategy. In consequence, the seller that chooses no effort has 
always an incentive to mimic the seller that selects a positive level of effort. Thus, a 
bad type can be signaled with certainty but a good type cannot.
0=p wpp <=0
wp p =p > wp
73 
 
Consider now a one-period game when two sellers are identical in every respect. As a 
result, this is simply a repetition of the Bertrand equilibrium, in which sellers undercut 
each other by ε  until the market price equals the marginal cost. The market 
equilibrium obtains at the competitive price 
 
epp w +≡          (7) 
 
where e  is the minimum level of effort that enables a successful fulfillment of the 
transaction. This price yields the normal profit that includes the opportunity cost 
                                                     
73 A duopoly model can be easily expanded to comprise more sellers. 
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 forgone in an alternative investment. Hence any price above p  is a dominated 
strategy. However, any price below p  is also a dominated strategy because it signals 
zero effort to buyers. Thus, the seller who sets  is always better off by setting 0=e
pp ≥ . If the seller chooses , its expected profit is 0>e 0][
2
1),( =−−= eppep wπ . 
If  is selected, this yields the profit 0=e 0][
2
1)0, =p( >− wppπ . The dominant 
strategy in the one-period game is to select )0,p(  which maximizes the seller’s profit. 
However, rational buyers expect this, and they conclude that the seller is bad and 
assign 0=θ . As a result, the market unravels due to asymmetric information in the 
one-period game74.  
 
A market can exist as long as buyers believe that there are good sellers that are 
committed to stay in the market with some positive probability. Therefore, a multi-
period game requires a device that signals the seller’s commitment to quality to 
buyers. Dellarocas (2004) shows that a binary reputation system provides sufficient 
incentives for a seller to maintain good quality. In his model, cooperating sellers and 
cheating sellers both produce good quality and bad quality with positive probabilities. 
As a result, even good sellers, though not as frequently as bad sellers, produce 
occasionally bad quality which is reported to buyers by the reputation system. 
Corresponding to their reputation profiles, sellers adjust their prices to maximize 
profit. We assume that sellers find it worthwhile to induce effort, which is reflected by 
their reputation profiles.    
 
The distribution of buyer beliefs is crucial in determining seller profits. A degenerate 
distribution means that all buyer priors satisfy i∀∈= ]1,0[iθ θ , which implies 
homogeneous buyer population. This has stark consequences on market structure. 
First, suppose that lh γγ > . Then Seller h wins the price competition in every period. 
Since any pp <
                                                     
 signals that the seller chooses zero effort, this is clearly a dominated 
strategy. Hence, Seller h can always offer a higher surplus to every buyer. Moreover, 
it can gradually increase the price such that  without losing customers because 1→p
74 This reflects Akerlof’s (1970) example of how asymmetric information may destroy markets.  
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 of increasing buyer satisfaction. This gives a strong incentive to sustain  because 
cheating, if detected, undermines the seller’s pricing power and lowers the future 
profits. Second, if the sellers are identical, which occurs when 
0>e
γγγ == lh , the 
Bertrand equilibrium obtains. This could be a stable equilibrium. Suppose that a seller 
is tempted to select , “to cheat”, because this could result in a short run profit 
provided that buyers do not detect cheating. Still, the seller cannot charge a higher 
price after a successful deviation because it shares 
0=e
γ  with its rival. However, the 
probability that buyers detect cheating increases with . If the seller is caught 
cheating and the rival does not cheat, this gives the upper hand to the competitor with 
every period forward because its reputation score is higher. As a consequence, the 
cheating seller can be driven out of the market. 
0=e
 
A non-degenerate distribution of private signals implies heterogeneity in buyer 
beliefs. Thus, some buyers are extremely pessimistic on sellers while others display 
extreme optimism. Assume that the distribution of buyer beliefs is independently 
distributed on ],[ θθ . Let )(θF  denote the proportion of buyers with prior beliefs o  f
θ  or less about the seller’s type (since ) (θF  is non-degenerate, there are at least two 
types of prior beliefs).  
 
Buyer heterogeneity influences a seller’s profitability. If the sellers are identical, that 
is γγγ == lh , the usual argument of epsilon price cutting drives the price down to p . 
Buyers with beliefs of ],[ θθθ ∈  or greater which satisfy 0=p),( −θμ γ  buy the 
good from either seller. As a result, the Bertrand equilibrium obtains in each period 
regardless of the buyer distribution. The sellers split the market and each seller earns 
zero profit. 
 
Is there an incentive to choose zero effort in this setting?  Obviously, selecting “no 
effort” yields 0)(][
2
1)0,( >−= ∫θ
θ
θπ dFppp w  at least once. If cheating is detected, 
the seller’s rating score is lower in the next period (this occurs also if positive effort 
has resulted in a bad rating). Surprisingly, this may increase profits for both sellers. 
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 Suppose that tlth ,, γγ >  in period t. Then tlth ,, μμ >  for all ],[ θθθ ∈  when 
ppp lh ==  which means that all buyers place a higher value for Seller h’s offer. 
This gives an opportunity to Seller h to increase its price above p  and make profit. 
Any ),() hp μ≤≤,( ,,,, thtthth γθγθμ  dominates p  because it yields higher profit than 
playing the Bertrand equilibrium. It is obvious that Seller h could force Seller l out of 
the market and still make profit by choosing the price  such that the consumer 
surplus when buyers buy from Seller h  
hp
 
  ∫∫ −>− θ )(]dFph θ
θ
θ
θ
θμ )(][[ ,, dFptltμh .      (8) 
 
However, this choice may not maximize the profit of Seller h. Instead, an interval 
],[ *θθ  which results in 
 
 )(][[
*
*
*
,, ≥−>− ∫∫ θ
θ
θ
θ
θμμ dFphthtl )(]* θdFpl 0 ,      (9) 
 
pwhere pp lh ≥>
**  are the prices that solve the profit maximization problems, may 
yield higher profits for both sellers. Equation (9) states that Seller h may ignore the 
most optimistic buyers with  and set prices high enough to sell the good to the 
buyers whose beliefs are drawn from 
*θθ >
],[ *θθ . In essence, Seller h extracts surplus 
from the more distrustful buyers. As buyers maximize surplus, the most optimistic 
buyers purchase from Seller l which has to sell the good at a strictly lower price than 
Seller h.     
 
Since sellers know each other’s reputation profiles and the updating mechanism of 
buyers, they can compute the lower bound for priors that yield a non-negative surplus 
to buyers. For example, with a choice of price  and the given reputation profile hp
th,γ , the lower bound for the priors that yield non-negative surplus to buyers is 
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We denote the absolute lower bound by )( pθ  which is the prior that induces a buyer 
to buy with the lowest possible price. The lower bound is increasing in p  and 
decreasing in γ .  In consequence, the minimum profit of Seller h is on the interval 
],[ lh θθ  because Seller l cannot set any lower price that could expand its market. 
Thus, by raising the price a seller loses customers among the more pessimistic buyers 
but this increases revenue from the more optimistic buyers. Lowering the price 
attracts more customers from both ends of the buyer distribution but decreases the 
overall revenue per customer. As a result, the seller selects  that maximizes its 
profit. This may preclude some pessimistic buyers from the market because the 
decrease in the revenue per customer may more than offset the additional revenue 
from the increased market size. 
*p
 
The upper bound for Seller h is obtained by solving for θ  in equation 
 
 ltllhthh pp −=− ),(),( ,, γθμγθμ       (11) 
which sets the surpluses equal between the two sellers. We assume that the seller with 
a better reputation receives buyers that are indifferent between the two sellers. Let 
),,,( ,, tlthlh pp γγθ  denote the solution to this problem75. By implicit differentiation of 
Equation (11), we notice that 
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75 The solution for this problem is available from the author upon request. 
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 because a marginal increase in hμ  is greater than in lμ  when θ  increases76. Thus, the 
upper bound for Seller h increases if Seller h lowers its price and decreases if Seller l 
lowers its price. Also, let θ  denote the absolute upper limit of the distribution of 
buyer priors. 
 
In each period, Seller h sets the price  which maximizes its profit 
 given that Seller l sets the price that maximizes its profit.  Seller l optimizes 
its profit in a similar manner. Seller h earns a price premium of , 
in which 
)|( ** llhh pppp =
),( ** ephhπ
(
)(** lhlh pp μμ −+=
)lh μμ −  is Seller h’s return on reputation. Thus, the profit of Seller h is 
 
 ∫ −−
*
*
)()( *
θ
θ
θdFepp wh ,       (13) 
 
where ),( ,
**
tkhp γθθ =  and ),,,( ,,**
*
tlthlh pp γγθθ = . As a result, the buyer with a 
private signal θ  receives surplus from the sellers according to 
 .
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The profit of Seller l is 
 
 ∫ −−θ
θ
θ
*
)()( * dFepp wl ,        (15)
      
and 
 
 ∫∫ −−≥−− θ
θ
θ
θ
θθ
*
*
*
)()()()( ** dFeppdFepp wlwh .    (16) 
 
                                                     
76 See Appendix. 
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 The optimal prices depend on the distribution of buyer beliefs and the seller’s 
reputation. These support various market structures. A degenerate buyer distribution 
leads into a monopolistic market in which Seller h takes over the entire market 
extracting all consumer surplus. A non-degenerate buyer distribution may produce 
price dispersion. Seller h maximizes its profit from the buyer population whose priors 
are drawn from the interval ],[
** θθ . Seller l receives the demand from the more 
optimistic buyers whose prior beliefs are drawn from the interval ],(
* θθ . Notice that 
if θθ =* , Seller h takes over the entire market. Seller h’s profit is at least as high as 
Seller l’s profit, because Seller h can always undercut Seller l by a small amount and 
make profit. Profit-maximizing may also dictate that a part of the market, ),[ *θθ , 
may not be serviced because the additional revenue from the lower segment of the 
market does not offset the loss of income in the upper segment. 
 
Since reputation scores are public knowledge, both can use Equation (2) to compute 
reservation price paths for the known or expected distribution of buyer beliefs. Using 
Equation (5), sellers can experiment with prices that maximize their profits. If buyers 
place value on seller reputations, both firms may be able to sell their products in the 
market with supernormal profit and without collusion. Consequently, price dispersion 
may result from this because reputation provides pricing power. Since even good 
sellers receive bad reviews occasionally, prices may fluctuate as sellers adjust their 
prices to maximize profits in their reputation profiles.  
 
The model explicitly shows that the distribution of buyers’ private signals impacts 
sellers’ profits. One could conjecture that new buyers might have lower priors which 
benefits more reputable sellers. As long as e-markets grow in size, which means that 
the share of new buyers in the market is steady or increasing, maintaining a good 
reputation is a profitable strategy. This offers rationale for well-known vendors to 
have presence in highly competitive comparison shopping services because their 
existing reputations may provide opportunities for premium pricing. However, a shift 
in distribution towards higher priors, which could happen when buyers become more 
experienced, may diminish the value of a good reputation in favor of more aggressive 
price competition. Moreover, this model offers an explanation for the observed price 
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 dispersion in online markets, which has been a finding in numerous studies (e.g. 
Brynjolfsson and Bakos (2000); Ancarani and Shankar (2004); Leiter and Warin 
(2007)). 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
We test the theory of competition with reputations in a comparison shopping service 
with the data from two-seller markets listed in Pricegrabber, which is one of the most 
popular comparison shopping websites 77 . A cross-sectional data set was obtained 
from Pricegrabber in May 200878. It consists of prices for various goods ranging from 
consumer electronics to auto parts. Pricegrabber has a reputation system which 
provides rating scores for each seller. A rating score, which ranges from 1 (the lowest) 
to 5 (the highest), is aggregated from buyer feedback. We approximate seller 
reputations with the rating scores. 
 
To test the theory, it is important to control for different seller types. One way is to 
use the two seller packages offered by Pricegrabber as a controlling device. A 
merchant runs its own e-commerce websites and pays a click-through rate to 
Pricegrabber for buyers that are redirected to the merchant’s website by Pricegrabber. 
A storefront pays a commission to Pricegrabber for each commercial transaction, but 
it does not run an own e-commerce website. Consequently, storefronts rely on the 
comparison shopping service as their only sales channel, while merchants use the 
service to lure in price-conscious buyers. Small sellers are likely to select the 
storefront package, whereas other sellers opt for the merchant package. The dummy 
variable SF denotes storefronts. In addition, we use the Internet Retailer’s list of the 
largest e-commerce retailers to control for the largest sellers 79 . These are large 
companies whose brands may provide them some insulation from price competition in 
e-markets, because buyers view brands as a proxy for reliability (Smith, 2002). The 
dummy variable TOP500 denotes large e-commerce vendors.  
 
                                                     
77 For more details about the website, see www.pricegrabber.com. 
78 The data set is described with more details in Saastamoinen (2008). 
79 See www.internetretailer.com. 
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 We consider only the markets where two sellers are active, so the data relates directly 
to the model. The difference in prices is calculated as 
 
 ,        (17) minmax kkk ppPDIF −=
 
in which  ( ) is the maximum (minimum) price observed in the market k. 
Since , it follows that .  
max
kp
max p≥
min
kp
min
kkp 0≥kPDIF
 
Due to diversity of product categories in the sample, product values vary 
considerably. For this reason, the pecuniary value of price differences may naturally 
be greater in expensive products than in relatively low priced products. To make price 
differences more comparable, we take a logarithmic transformation of . The 
logarithmic transformation must be defined as 
kPDIF
 
 )        (18) 1( += kk PDIFLogLPDIF
 
because the difference between prices can be zero. Obviously, also . 0≥kLPDIF
 
We calculate also a difference between reputation scores. This is 
  
minmax
kkk rrRDIF −= ,        (19) 
 
in which  ( ) is the reputation score of the seller that sets the maximum 
(minimum) price observed in the market k. Taking a logarithmic transformation also 
from  provides a straightforward interpretation of regression coefficients as 
elasticities.  The logarithmic transformation of requires scaling of . This is 
done by 
max
kr
k
min
kr
RDIF
kRDIF
 
 )      (20) 1||( min ++= RDIFRDIFLogLRDIF kk
  
where  is the absolute value of the minimum of  in all k markets. || minRDIF kRDIF
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 Descriptive statistics of the sample are shown in Table 1. They indicate that the mean 
(median) of price differences is greater in markets where storefronts and Top500-
sellers operate, whereas the range of price differences is greater in all markets. In 
contrast, the mean (median) of differences in rating scores is higher in all the sample 
than in either control group. Storefronts and Top500-sellers did not overlap each other 
in this sample. Altogether, the control groups account for 15 per cent of the markets. 
 
As a test hypothesis for regression analysis, we expect a positive relationship between 
 and . Higher prices should correlate with higher reputation scores. 
This correlation might emerge in the markets where storefronts are active because 
unlike other sellers, storefronts have a limited access or no access to the markets 
outside the comparison shopping service. As a consequence, storefront sales are mode 
dependent on the reputation-price tradeoff. 
kLPDIF kLRDIF
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
Statistic LPDIF SF* 
LPDIF 
TOP500* 
LPDIF 
LRDIF SF* 
LRDIF 
TOP500* 
LRDIF 
Mean 0.913 2.352 1.675 1.625 0.102 1.506 
Median 0.000 2.321 1.295 1.758 0.000 1.609 
Maximum 8.355 6.512 7.963 2.169 2.158 2.015 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 1.448 1.555 1.733 0.256 0.395 0.325 
Obs. 1429 91 128 1429 91 128 
 
 
We devise a log-linear regression model to test the theory. A log-linear functional 
form provides a convenient interpretation for estimates: a one unit increase in the 
difference between rating scores increases the difference between prices by  
per cent. The regression equation is  
100ˆ ⋅β
 
 
kkk
kkkkkk
LRDIFTOP
LRDIFSFLRDIFTOPSFCLPDIF
εβ
ββ
+⋅+
⋅++++=
500
500  
3
21 . (21) 
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 The results from OLS-regression with White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Estimates 
(HSCE) are reported in Table 2. Excluding the dummy variables for the controlled 
groups, all estimates prove statistically significant. OLS estimates for the regression 
constant and dummy constants indicate that the difference between prices is higher in 
markets where storefronts and Top500-sellers are active than in all markets. The 
impact of an increase in the difference between rating scores varies. The general 
effect is negative (-0.815). This implies that a one per cent increase in the difference 
between rating scores decreases the difference between prices by -0.8 per cent. In 
contrast, the control groups display a positive dependency. Together with , the 
estimates for storefronts (1.931) correspond to 1.1 per cent increase in the price 
difference. vershadows the positive coefficient of Top500-sellers (0.655) yielding 
a mild decrease of -0.2 per cent when the difference between rating scores increases 
by a one per cent. Hence, the evidence suggests that reputation has an impact on a 
seller’s pricing especially in the markets where storefronts are active.  
1βˆ
1βˆ  o
 
Table 2. OLS Estimates for  with HSCE. kLPDIF
Coefficient C SF TOP500 
1βˆ  2βˆ  3βˆ  
Value 2.059*** 
(0.243) 
-1.495 
(1.102) 
-0.143 
(0.557) 
-0.815*** 
(0.142) 
1.931*** 
(0.697) 
0.655* 
(0.368) 
Regression 
Statistics 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.117 F-Statistic 38.920***
 
Obs. 1429 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
The histogram of OLS residuals and the Jarque-Bera test for normality in Figure 1 
indicate the distribution of residuals is not normal. Since the value of a good may be 
important in consumer’s decision-making, we test the robustness of the results with 
quantile regression (QR). QR provides information about how changes in covariates 
impact in different points of the distribution of the response variable. Estimates are 
obtained for 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 quantiles. The results of quantile process are presented 
in Table 3. QR estimates for 0.5 quantile corresponds to the median, which is a 
semiparametric alternative to OLS. Therefore, it is interesting to see that the estimates 
for 0.5 quantile do not agree with OLS. The intercept decreases in magnitude to 
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 0.155. Also, the dummy for Top500-sellers becomes positive and statistically 
significant at 2.246. All estimates for storefronts are statistically insignificant. The 
estimates for all markets is -0.085 and for Top500-sellers -0.793. These correspond to 
-0.1 per cent and -0.9 per cent decreases in the difference between prices when the 
difference between ratings increases by a one percent. Thus, the median regression 
does not provide empirical evidence for the test hypothesis. 
 
The tails of the distribution of the dependent variable provide some empirical 
evidence for the theory. In the lower tail (0.25 quantile), the only statistically 
significant estimates are for Top500-sellers. TOP500 is 1.953 and  is -1.214 which 
indicates that the marginal effect is -1.2 per cent negative. In the upper tail (0.75 
quantile), on the other hand, all estimates are statistically significant. The intercept 
and dummies are range from -2.618 to 5.119. Overall, there is a difference between 
prices that ranges from 5.1 percent to 2.5 per cent. The marginal effect for the general 
population is negative (-2.535) which implies -2.5 per cent decrease. In contrast, the 
estimates for the control groups are positive. The estimated coefficients for storefronts 
(3.120) and Top500-sellers (2.847) correspond to 0.6 per cent and 0.3 per cent, 
respectively, increases in the difference between prices. These results imply that a 
reputation may enable price premiums especially when buyers purchase more 
valuable goods. As a conclusion, QR estimates provide mixed evidence about positive 
dependency between  and .  
3βˆ
kLPDIF kLRDIF
0
100
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400
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600
700
800
-2 0 2 4 6 8
Series: Residuals
Observations 1429
Mean      -4.07e-15
Median  -0.581804
Maximum  7.632724
Minimum -2.629295
Std. Dev.   1.358467
Skewness   1.677191
Kurtosis   5.960716
Jarque-Bera  1191.888
Probability  0.000000
 
 Figure 1. Histogram and Normality Test of OLS Residuals. 
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 These two regressions provide empirical evidence that reputation scores may explain 
price differences in electronic markets. The results from OLS give some support to 
the theory that a positive relationship between prices and reputation scores results 
from sellers’ profit-maximizing behavior. While QR does not agree with OLS 
entirely, it implies that seller reputations are more important in the upper tail of the 
distribution of the dependent variable. Intuitively, this is hardly surprising because the 
pecuniary value of price differences is greater among more valuable goods. A greater 
value of a good implies potential for a greater financial loss to the buyer. Therefore, a 
seller whose reputation score is higher than its rival may charge higher prices in a 
market of zero search costs for price information. 
 
Table 3. Quantile Regression Estimates for . kLPDIF
Coefficient 
Quantile 
C SF TOP500 
1βˆ  2βˆ  3βˆ  
0.25 0.000 
(0.087) 
-1.506 
(1.717) 
1.954*** 
(0.572) 
0.000 
(0.051) 
1.530 
(1.018) 
-1.214*** 
(0.364) 
0.50 0.155* 
(0.083) 
2.136 
(4.026) 
2.426*** 
(0.445) 
-0.085* 
(0.048) 
0.104 
(2.486) 
-0.793** 
(0.369) 
0.75 5.119*** 
(0.794) 
-2.618* 
(1.472) 
-2.538*** 
(0.822) 
-2.535*** 
(0.534) 
3.120*** 
(0.943) 
2.847*** 
(0.580) 
Regression 
Statistics 
(0.50) 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.095 Quasi-LR 
Statistic 
625.237*** 
 
Obs. 1429 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we present a model of duopoly competition for a comparison shopping 
service which has an integrated reputation system. Electronic marketplaces that 
provide comparison shopping services have become widespread in retail e-commerce. 
These services reduce buyer’s search costs by providing price quotes from several 
sellers for the buyer’s benefit. Since buyers may feel that risks of an e-commerce 
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 transaction are greater than in a conventional commercial transaction, e-marketplaces 
have introduced reputation systems to reduce the risks of asymmetric information. 
 
We assume Bayesian buyers with heterogeneous beliefs about seller types. Buyers use 
the reputation system to update their beliefs about seller types. A profit-maximizing 
seller takes into account buyer beliefs, its rating score and its rival’s reputation score 
in its pricing decision. We find that sellers may earn supernormal profits as returns to 
their reputations. The seller that has a better reputation earns higher profit than its 
rival. If sellers are identical, competition erases supernormal profits. Since even good 
sellers occasionally disappoint buyers, sellers adjust their prices to maximize profits 
in their current reputation profiles. For this reason, market prices are likely to 
fluctuate and price dispersion emerges. 
 
We test the theory with the price and rating score data from Pricegrabber, which is a 
popular comparison shopping website. We find evidence that there is a positive 
dependency between prices and reputation scores. This is especially evident among 
sellers whose only sales channel is the comparison shopping service. Moreover, well-
known e-commerce sellers may be able to leverage their existing reputations and 
charge price premiums. Quantile regression reveals that this may be especially true 
among more valuable goods where the buyer’s pecuniary risks are higher. 
 
In conclusion, this paper proposes a theory and evidence why a good reputation could 
be a valuable asset in e-commerce. For this reason, a seller may find it profitable to 
keep consumer satisfaction at a high level at least initially to gain competitive 
advantage later. As a direction for future research, it would be interesting to find out, 
how much weight consumers actually place on sellers’ reputation profiles in their 
purchase decisions. Also, a detailed view of which actions taken by the seller increase 
consumer satisfaction and lead to higher rating scores would provide valuable 
information to e-commerce vendors.  
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Appendix 
 
To show that the condition in (12) holds, it must be that 
θ
μ
θ
μ
∂
∂
≥
∂
∂ lh . First, use 
Equation (2) for both types and differentiate in respect of θ . We obtain 
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It can be shown that [ ]2)1)(1(
)12(
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 because 
manipulating the inequality yields 0)1(1 ≥− hγθ
, which is true because ]1,0[∈hγ . 
Since the right-hand side of (A1) is analogous to the left-hand side, we can rearrange 
Equation (A1) to 
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Consider now the left-hand side of Equation (A2). For equation to hold, it must be 
that 
 
 
)1)(1()1)(1( ll
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.     (A3) 
 
Equation (A3) reduces to 
 
 lh γγ > ,         (A4) 
 
which holds with strict inequality because lh γγ >  by definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
